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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the history of U.S. Army deception and doctrine, and combines the 
insights gained with the various works on deception, cognitive psychology, 
communications, and decision-making in order to distill a concise handbook for 
deception practitioners. A longitudinal review of U.S. Army doctrine reveals a wide 
variation in the treatment of deception, from emphasized to ignored. This variation can be 
primarily explained by the U.S. preference for the cumulative destruction style of war 
and the perceived balance of power between the U.S. and its adversaries. This thesis 
strives to fill the current doctrinal gap by distilling the existing body of work to create a 
theory of deception in the military context. The theory presented provides a cogent 
structure, taxonomy, and lexicon; as well as, emphasis on how deception functions within 
the frameworks of communications and decision-making. Next, a synthesis of the 
practice of deception is presented, with a focus on deception planning and the essential 
elements of deception practice. Examples of U.S. use of deception from the 
Revolutionary War to Operation DESERT STORM are presented to provide illumination 
on the utility and use of deception. Finally, the thesis provides recommendations on how 
to organize for deception operations. 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
For where the lion’s skin will not reach, you must patch it out with the 
fox’s. 
 – Lysander the Spartan1 
During the opening phases of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) hammered the network of Hezbollah bunkers along the Lebanese border. 
Hezbollah had been building the bunker network for years, under the watchful eyes of 
IDF surveillance, Lebanese spies working for Israel, and the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), patrolled the southern Lebanese border. What the IDF did 
not realize until far too late was the network of bunkers so diligently—and visibly—
emplaced by Hezbollah were decoys; Hezbollah’s true bunkers were scattered across the 
countryside and covered by layers of security and camouflage. The bunker deception was 
but one of several cunning stratagems used by Hezbollah to blunt the IDF’s technological 
and information advantages, allowing Hezbollah to maintain combat effectiveness in the 
face of the Israeli assault. Deception had once more proven its worth.2 
A. BACKGROUND 
Stratagems are essential in war, as commanders seek to hide their real intentions, 
capabilities, and actions from the enemy, while cunningly showing false intentions 
capabilities and actions to lure the enemy into defeat. From the earliest battles of 
antiquity, commanders have used guile and misdirection for tactical, operational, and 
strategic effect. Hannibal at Cannae, the Greeks’ use of the Trojan Horse, and Gideon’s 
raid on the Midianites are but a few examples of successful deception in the ancient 
world. Operations OVERLORD and BARBAROSA during WWII, British pseudo-operations  
 
 
                                                 
1 Plutarch, John Dryden and Arthur Hugh Clough, Plutarch's Lives, Modern Library paperback ed., 
Vol. 1 (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 588. 
2 David A. Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War" (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School), 43 – 45, accessed 15 January 2012, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469918.  
2 
during the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya, and Hezbollah’s use of deception against 
Israel during the 2006 war demonstrate the continuing utility of deception in the modern 
era.  
Even within the more limited scope of U.S. Army history, deception has played 
an important role. General Washington utilized numerous stratagems to great effect 
during the Revolutionary war, including deceiving the British about the status of his 
forces at Valley Forge to deter attack, and later about his intentions to attack New York, 
setting the stage for the final showdown at Yorktown. During the Civil War, Confederate 
General Magruder used decoy cannons made of nothing more than painted tree trunks to 
hold Union forces in check for months after the First Battle of Manassas. General 
Pershing deceived the Germans about his intentions in order to gain surprise for the 
assault on the St. Michel salient during World War I.3 U.S. use of deception reached a 
plateau during World War II. After a slow start, the U.S. Army became adept at using 
deception and by 1947 Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower [in a 1947 memo 
to the Lauris Norstad, Director, Plans and Operations Division] stated: 
…no major operations should be undertaken without planning and 
executing appropriate deception measures. As time goes on… there is a 
danger that these two means [psychological warfare and cover and 
deception] may in the future not be considered adequately in our planning. 
I consider it essential that the War Department should continue to take 
those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of… cover and 
deception and that there should continue in being a nucleus of personnel 
capable in handling these arts in case an emergency arises. I desire 
therefore that the Director of Plans and Operations maintain the potential 
effectiveness of these arts in order that their benefits may become 
immediately available, as and when desired, in furtherance of national 
security.4  
During Vietnam, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam—Studies and 
Observation Group [MACVSOG] made extensive use of deception in its operations against  
 
                                                 
3 Richard Baker, "The Lost and found Art of Deception" (Paper presented at the Conference of Army 
Historians, Arlington, Virginia, 25 – 28 July 2011). 
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Chief of Staff, ed. Louis 
Galambos, Vol. VIII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 1763.  
3 
North Vietnam. During Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. forces deceived Saddam’s forces 
into believing the assault into Kuwait would come from the sea, and not from the now 
famous “left hook.”  
In spite of the demonstrated utility of deception in support U.S. military 
operations, the U.S. Army currently falls short on the requirement to provide practitioners 
of deception with a solid doctrinal foundation in the theory and practice of deception. 
Instead, the U.S. Army has for the most part of two decades done little more than pay lip 
service to the importance of deception, or in the case of camouflage and concealment, 
stripped the concepts of their deception lineage. The last dedicated deception manual was 
published in 1988, and is no longer available through official channels. Furthermore, the 
1957 and 1967 editions of the deception field manual have effectively disappeared.5 
Current U.S. Army doctrine, discounting uses of the word “deception” as a buzzword, is 
limited to a 30-page section in the information operations field manual that completely 
ignores essential tenets of deception like perceptual and cognitive biases. There is a need 
for a concise distillation of theory and practice for the military practitioners of deception. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
The degree of emphasis of deception in U.S. Army doctrine is primarily related to 
the perceived balance of power between the United States and potential adversaries.  
There are essential tenets of the theory and practice of deception that can be 
drawn from the existing bodies of work. 
C. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE  
What the literature review shows is there is a definite lack of guidance on the 
theory and practice of deception within current U.S. Army doctrine, despite a continuing 
theme in the doctrine that deception is of utility to operations. On the civilian side, there 
is a diversity of ideas on the theory and practice of deception; however, these ideas are 
                                                 
5 The author’s quest to find these manuals has included contacting each service academy and war 
college, all the proponents for deception; as well as, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the 
National Archives. These requests were in addition to the tireless and patient work of the Dudley Knox 
Library Staff. The vanishing of FM 31-40 is indicative of the U.S. Army’s habit of purging “obsolete” 
doctrine; a habit that perhaps merits its own thesis on the value of institutional knowledge. 
4 
dispersed over a large body of work. What is lacking in the civilian literature is an 
equivalent to the Grand Unification Theory in Physics, one work that distills the breadth 
and depth of the deception field into a usable synthesis. While not being so presumptuous 
as to present a Grand Unification Theory of deception, this thesis will bridge the gap in 
U.S. Army doctrine by creating a petite military deception focused synthesis of the body 
of deception work. This work is not intended to be proscriptive or all-inclusive; rather, 
the goal of the work is to provide commanders and practitioners a framework of concepts 
and ideas which can be altered to fit their organizational and operational needs. Central to 
this thesis is a reunification of cover with deception, as cover and active deception are 
mutually supporting concepts. The creation of an unclassified deception handbook will 
fill a doctrinal void and hopefully increase the perceived utility of deception within the 
force.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the breadth of U.S. Army military 
deception history and doctrine, and combine the insights gained with the various works 
on deception theory and practice, cognitive psychology, communications, and decision-
making in order to distill the theory and practice of deception into a concise handbook for 
deception practitioners. Rather than attempting to cover the entirety of deceptive 
practices, the scope of this thesis is deception as employed in support of military 
objectives. 
In order to achieve this goal, the thesis first constructs a longitudinal review of 
U.S. Army doctrine focusing on the capstone operations manual series and deception 
related manuals in order to discern whether there is a pattern to U.S. Army doctrine’s 
treatment of deception. The scope of this survey is from the 1905 Field Service 
Regualtions through the 2012 ADP 3-0. Next the thesis examines the reasons commonly 
given for why deception is marginalized within military affairs. This examination is 
conducted through the lenses of doctrine and practice.  
Then the thesis shifts to a distillation of the existing body work on deception to 
create a theory of deception in the military context. Within the theory of deception 
5 
chapter the focus will be on providing a cogent structure, taxonomy, and lexicon for 
deception with an emphasis on how deception works. The structure provided by Bell and 
Whaley’s general theory of deception will be used as the initial framework. To the 
framework is added an understanding of the role of perceptional and cognitive biases in 
deception; a fleshed out lexicon of deception related terms; and a broad set of categories 
for deception techniques. This requires taking the mélange of existing works on 
deception and rendering the concepts down to a cohesive synthesis. 
After deception theory, the thesis presents a synthesis of the practice of deception. 
The practice of deception chapter first presents a planning process that builds upon the 
planning process presented in JP 3-13.4: Military Deception. Next, the chapter reviews 
the various maxims, principles, and considerations presented by deception theorists and 
practitioners to draw out the essential elements of deception practice. Additionally, the 
chapter examines the uses of deception in war illuminated with examples from history. 
The practice chapter ends with a discussion of deception failures in order to reinforce the 
necessity of proper planning and execution. 
A chapter surveying U.S. military use of deception from the Revolutionary War to 
Operation DESERT STORM follows the practice chapter in order to provide additional 
illumination in the context of historic U.S. operations. This chapter serves a secondary 
purpose of priming the mind of the reader by demonstrating the U.S. military has a long 
and storied history of using deception. Finally, a conclusions chapter provides 
recommendations on how to organize for deception operations, with ideas on manning, 
training, integration in the staff, and special resource requirements. 
6 
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II. DECEPTION IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE 
  Deception is common sense soldiering. 
– General Carl E. Vuono6 
According to FM 1, The Army, “Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army 
forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.”7 
Furthermore, doctrine creates a shared culture for the force; standardizes operations; and 
provides a common frame of reference.8 Thus any attempt to understand the role of 
deception within the U.S. Army must begin with an examination of U.S. Army doctrine. 
The U.S. Army has two capstone manuals that serve as the doctrinal foundations of the 
force; currently, these manuals are: FM 1: the Army and APD 3-0: Unified Land 
Operations.9 FM 1 serves as a broad overview of the U.S. Army’s “fundamental purpose, 
roles, responsibilities, and functions, as established by the Constitution, Congress, and the 
Department of Defense.”10 APD 3-0 serves as the “overarching doctrinal guidance and 
direction for conducting operations.”11 In addition to these capstone documents, it is 
necessary to examine other doctrine publications directly related to the various aspects of 
deception. Each of these manuals in its various incarnations over time plays a vital role in 
setting the conditions for the role, or lack of a role, of deception in U.S. Army operations. 
The adjectives best describing the U.S. Army’s historical and present guidance on 
deception are haphazard and shallow. Within the operations field manuals are statements 
to “use deception” sprinkled about almost as an afterthought. Only rarely are any 
statements approaching the strength of General Eisenhower’s about the essential 
                                                 
6 Quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL Bulletin 3-88: Deception (Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: Combined Arms Training Activity, 1988),  3. 
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1: The Army, 2005 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-20. 
8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1: The Army, 2005, 1-20 to 1-21. 
9 Each of these manuals has undergone name and nomenclature changes over their history. 
10 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1: The Army (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 1994), v. 
11 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), ii. 
8 
importance of deceptions in every operation. Discussion of how deception works is either 
missing or disregarded. For example, in FM 3-13, the section on exploiting target biases 
states that the target’s biases can be “the most powerful weapon in the MD [military 
deception] planner’s arsenal;” however the very next sentence obliterates the importance 
of the target’s biases with “However, such information is not essential to preparing a 
viable MD plan.”12 
 
Figure 1.   Timeline of Deception-Related Doctrine and Deception Proponents from 
1905–2011 
A. PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA 
Discussion of the concept of deception in U.S. military doctrine prior to the 
World War II era was minimal, and when present often negative. The 1905 edition of the 
War Department’s Field Service Regulations admonishes there will be no quarter 
                                                 
12 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13: Information Operations: Doctrine, 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Department of the Army, 2003), 4-9. 
9 
expected for troops utilizing the enemy’s uniform for “treacherous advantage,” and 
advised commanders forced to use pieces of the enemy’s uniform in extremis to maintain 
sufficient difference from the enemy’s ensemble so as to avoid the charge of willful 
deception.13 Where concealment is discussed, it is almost purely in association with force 
protection, with only one mention of concealing trench works in the defense to set the 
stage for an “ambuscade.”14 The 1910 edition eliminates much of the discussion on 
perfidy and wrongful deception, and increases the mentions of surprise and concealment. 
However, discussion of deceiving the enemy is limited to cryptic comments like: “If it is 
desirable to annoy or deceive the enemy, the supreme commander gives the necessary 
orders.”15 In the 1914 edition of Field Service Regulations the main discussion of 
surprise is in the context of an imperative to not be surprised.16 While the term deception 
is not used in the manual, deceiving the enemy is given as a primary purpose for holding 
attacks.17 Amusingly, the other major reference on the topic of deception occurs in the 
guidance on war correspondents.18  
The 1923 edition breaks from the preceding editions, representing the hard 
learned lessons of World War I. The manual introduces the concept of 
counterinformation, that is, the measures designed to prevent the adversary from gaining 
information on friendly capabilities, dispositions, and plans. Counterinformation 
effectively constitutes the deception principle of hiding the real. Of particular note is the 
value placed on camouflage throughout the manual. In addition to efforts to deny 
information, counterinformation is supported by means designed to mislead or deceive 
                                                 
13 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1905, with Amendments to 1908 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 200; This is possibly a reaction to the backlash 
against Colonel Funston’s use of enemy uniforms during the Philippine Insurrection. 
14 War Department, Field Service Regulations.1905, 102. 
15 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1910 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1910), 76. 
16 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1914 (New York, NY: 
Government Printing Office, 1914), 80. 
17 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1914, 84 – 85. 
18 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1914, 168. 
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the enemy.19 In a complete reversal from the 1914 manual, surprise is now presented as 
vital to all combat actions, with feints and demonstrations presented as ways of gaining 
surprise.20 Furthermore, surprise and deception are considered essential to the successful 
execution certain operations, e.g., river crossings.21 While still insignificant in the context 
of the entirety of the manual, the inclusion of deception concepts indicates some lessons 
learned during World War I, such as General Pershing’s use of deception during the 
offensive against the Saint Mihiel salient, were taken to heart.22 
B. WORLD WAR II ERA 
The intriguing anomaly in U.S. military doctrine prior to and during the World 
War II era is the presence of the concept of deception. Though cursory, the inclusion of 
both the covering and deceiving aspects of deception within U.S. doctrine runs counter to 
the prevailing conventional wisdom that the U.S. military was a deception neophyte until 
the capability was nurtured under the tutelage of its British counterparts. Building on the 
1923 Field Service Regulations, the 1939 operations manual, now FM 100-5: Tentative 
Field Service Regulations: Operations, establishes deception’s role in support of surprise, 
stating: “The effect of surprise is dependent on… the effectiveness of the means 
employed to deceive the enemy of our own dispositions and intentions.”23 The cover 
aspect of deception remains incorporated in the section on counterinformation, or 
“…measures taken to prevent the enemy from gaining information relative to our 
dispositions, movements, and plans.”24 Additionally, active deception becomes more 
strongly tied to counterinformation, with the manual stating: “Counterinformation is 
supplemented by positive measures designed to deceive or mislead the enemy as to our 
dispositions and intentions;” however, while counterinformation is provided a page and a 
                                                 
19 War Department, Field Service Regulations, United States Army. 1923 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1924). 
20 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1923, 77. 
21 War Department, Field Service Regulations. 1923, 118. 
22 See Chapter VI for further discussion of the Saint Mihiel deception operation. 
23 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations of Operations, 1939 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 28 – 29. 
24 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations, 41. 
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half, the “postive measures” are not described in any detail.25 Interestingly, within the 
types of operations, deception—again without detail—is only mentioned in the section on 
guerrilla warfare, as if this is the only appropriate time. Here, the manual states: 
The attack [emphasis in original] on the enemy is made by surprise 
obtained by deception and ambush…. By feint and demonstration… by 
spreading false information, the attacker attempts to mislead the 
enemy….26 
In the 1941 edition, now FM 100-5: Field Service Regulations, the term 
counterinformation is replaced by counterintelligence. The set of tasks bundled under the 
aegis of counterintelligence includes: counterespionage, cover, measures designed to 
deceive the enemy, counterpropaganda, and censorship.27 Thus active deception 
completes the integration into counterintelligence started in preceding editions. The 
counterintelligence section includes three paragraphs on active deception, and includes a 
prompt designed to spur the egos of commanders: “A commander who is ingenious and 
resourceful in the use of tactical stratagems [sic] and ruses often will find methods of 
deceiving or misleading the enemy and of concealing his own intentions.”28 Of note is 
the inclusion of several examples of deception techniques: e.g., feints, demonstrations, 
fake concentrations, and dummies. However, the section also includes a combined 
warning and constraint that since deception creates the danger of misleading one’s own 
forces: “Such measures may be adopted only by the theater commander or by his 
authority.”29 Throughout the manual, deception is integrated into discussions on the 
various types of operations; such as, the use of simulated activities by screening forces to 
facilitate a retrograde maneuver, and the use of feints during mountain operations.30 
Despite the incorporation of deception across the manual, there are two notable 
                                                 
25 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations, 42. 
26 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Tentative Field Service Regulations, 1939, 228 – 229. 
27 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations of Operations, 1941 (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 57. 
28 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations, 1941, 58. 
29 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations, 1941, 58. 
30 For deception in support of the retrograde, see War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service 
Regulations, 1941, 169. For deception in support of mountain operations, see page 220. 
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inconsistencies. First in a curious change from the 1939 manual, the section on partisan 
warfare, which replaces the 1939 section on guerrilla warfare, is devoid of deception. 
Second, in opposition to the overall tenor of deception as a useful tool, the manual seems 
to undercut the utility of deception in the offense stating:  
The degree of surprise attained is dependent in a large measure on the 
coordination and timing of the measures taken to deceive the enemy. 
Ruses, demonstrations, feints, and other measures for deception executed 
at the wrong time and place will be obvious to an alert enemy and will 
warn him of the impending attack. Superior mobility and speed of 
execution may be determining factors in achieving surprise.31 
In addition to the operations manual, during this period there were several other 
manuals directed related to deception. FM 30-25: Basic Field Manual of Military 
Intelligence Counterintelligence expands the guidance of FM 100-5 with sections on each 
of the aspects of counterintelligence. Though the section on tactical measures—feints, 
demonstrations, and ruses—is unfortunately a verbatim repeat of the section in FM 100-
5, the counterintelligence manual is a de facto deception manual as it provides in depth 
detail on the cover aspects of concealment and denial through the manual’s emphasis on 
depriving the enemy access to friendly information. In keeping with the constraint 
imposed by FM 100-5, while the manual encourages commanders to embrace most 
aspects of deception, false information—e.g., the deliberate loss of notional orders—is 
restricted to the discretion of the theater commander out of the risk that friendly plans 
will act on the assumption the enemy has been deceived. 
FM 21-45: Basic Field Manual of Protective Measures, Individuals and Small 
Units, published in 1942, provides further guidance on concealment at the Soldier and 
unit levels; as well as, reinforcement of the vital necessity to protect military information. 
Notably, FM 21-45 sets more stringent guidance for protecting information than current 
doctrine; for example, the manual states: 
Prior to going into combat, all distinguishing marks and insignia on 
vehicles, equipment, or persons will be removed or obliterated under an 
officer’s supervision. You must be careful to remove divisional, 
regimental, or company insignia from your clothes and equipment. Search 
                                                 
31 War Department, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations, 1941, 109.  
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your pockets for letters, memoranda, orders, souvenirs, or keepsakes 
which might disclose your organization.32  
Additionally, while cover at this time is coupled with deception, the War 
Department and later the U.S. Army have published a separate manual for camouflage 
since at least 1940. Despite being treated separately from cover and deception, 
camouflage was intrinsically linked to both concepts until the late 1960s. The 1940 
edition of FM 5-20: Engineer Field Manual, Camouflage lists three methods of 
camouflage: hiding, blending and deceiving.33 The 1944 edition expands upon the theme 
of camouflage and deception, devoting an entire chapter to the subject of deceiving 
camouflage.34 Furthermore, the 1944 edition states:  
Camouflage uses concealment and deception to promote our offensive 
action, to surprise, to mislead the enemy, and to prevent him from 
inflicting damage upon us. Concealment includes hiding from view, 
making hard to see clearly, arranging obstructions to vision, deceiving and 
disguising, and deception involving sound.35  
C. POST WORLD WAR II THROUGH VIETNAM 
While the 1944 edition of FM 100-5 is essentially the same as the 1941 edition, 
the 1949 edition of FM 100-5 differs in two critical ways with regards to deception. First, 
this edition of the operations manual introduces a distinct set of principles of war, with 
surprise being one.36 Second, though counterintelligence continues to include means to 
deceive the enemy, the separate paragraphs on deception present in the two previous 
editions are absent.37 The separation of deception from counterintelligence possibly 
reflects the shift of deception proponency from the Joint Security Control to the Army 
                                                 
32 War Department, Field Manual 21-45: Basic Field Manual of Protective Measures, Individuals and 
Small Units (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 137. 
33 War Department, Field Manual 5-20: Engineer Field Manual of Camouflage, 1940 (Washington, 
DC: War Department, 1940), 3. 
34 War Department, Field Manual 5-20: Camouflage Basic Principles, 1944 (Washington, DC: War 
Department, 1944). 
35 War Department, Field Manual 5-20, 1944, 4. 
36 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations—
Operations, 1949 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1949), 21 – 23. 
37 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, 1949, 43 – 46. 
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G3, Plans and Operations Division. The lack of detail on the execution of deception is 
perhaps best explained by a training memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Army 
Field Forces to the commanders of the Armor, Infantry, and Artillery Centers. This 
declassified memorandum reveals the intent of the Army to keep the lessons learned from 
World War II well under wraps: “The security classification of this whole subject 
[strategic cover and deception] is and probably will remain TOP SECRET….”38 
In 1950, Brigadier General McClure campaigned for the establishment of a 
psychological warfare division within the Department of Army Special Staff. This 
division was to have purview over psychological operations, cover and deception, and 
unconventional warfare; however, when the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare 
was established in 1951, cover and deception were not included in the scope of the 
office’s operations.39 In 1954, proponency for deception was assigned to the Ground 
General School, specifically to the Aggressor Center at Fort Riley, Kansas.40 This 
decision was the General Staff’s halfhearted response to a request from the Commander, 
Army Field Forces for a purpose built unit trained in deception along the lines of the 23rd 
Headquarters Special Troops in World War II.41 The decision to place deception under 
the Aggressor Center given the Aggressor Center’s role as a professional opposing force 
seems to demonstrate how quickly the Army drifted from General Eisenhower’s 
admonishment. 
The 1954 edition of FM 100-5 represents another fundamental revision of the 
manual; as well as, both the apex of discussion of deception activities within the capstone 
document and the beginnings of deception’s dismemberment. This iteration of FM 100-5 
                                                 
38 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Strategic and Tactical Cover and Deception Training 
(Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, 1948). 
39 Alfred Paddock Jr, US Army Special Warfare. Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional 
Warfare, 1941 – 1952 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1982), accessed 12 February 2012, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA118758, 89. 
40 Concepts and Force Design Group, Tactical Cover and Deception: Final Report (Alexandria, VA: 
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 1972), accessed 8 August 2011, 
https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADB966185&collection=ac-
tr&contentType=PDF&citationFormat=1f , 1-3. 
41 U.S. Department of the Army. General Staff, G-3, “Combat Deception,” (1954), Photocopy from 
U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. 
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separates active deception from counterintelligence into a distinct three page section on 
“combat deception” that includes subsections on the importance of military deception; 
the fundamentals of military deception; security considerations; planning; and means. 
The manual advises: “It is imperative that commanders constantly realize the importance 
of combat deception and that they train their troops and staff in the techniques and 
planning for combat deception.”42 Though the split of deception from counterintelligence 
elevates the status of deception within the manual, the split has the negative effect of 
separating deception from the security aspects of cover. Furthermore, while deception is 
still considered a tool of surprise, a new principle of war, economy of force, admonishes 
that deception—along with limited attacks, retrogrades, and the defense—is only to be 
used in non-critical areas in support of the concentration of forces at the decisive point.43 
This admonishment runs counter to deception’s economy of force role, and could only 
serve to dissuade the use of deception. 
In 1955, the Ground General School was discontinued and deception proponency 
was transferred along with the aggressor cadre to the Command and General Staff 
College.44 In 1957, the U.S. Army published a field manual dedicated to deception, FM 
31-40: Tactical Cover and Deception; however, this manual was classified ‘confidential,’ 
effectively placing it, and therefore detailed deception guidance, out of reach of much of 
the force. As a consequence of the manual’s publication, the 1962 iteration of FM 100-5 
truncates the section on military deception to two paragraphs on the utility of deception 
that close with a reference to FM 31-40. At the same time, the cover aspects of 
counterintelligence and camouflage remain intact. Despite the removal of deception 
guidance to FM 31-40, this FM 100-5 continues the trend of deception being an 
important part of operations: “Tactical cover and deception plans are an integral part of 
                                                 
42 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations—
Operations, 1954 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1954), 37 – 39. 
43 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1954, 47. 
44 Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders no. 20 (Alexandria, VA: Department of the 
Army, 1955), www.armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/go5520.pdf.. The aggressor cadre was a permanent 
opposing force designed to provide realism to Army training exercises. The aggressor cadre was equipped 
with numerous deception aids, including sonic platoons—elements outfitted with loudspeaker equipped 
vehicles and weapon simulation devices for conducting audio deceptions. See FM 30-101 (1959) for more 
information on the aggressor cadre. 
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all operations planning.”45 Furthermore, this edition of the operations manual includes 
tactical deception units as a type of combat support element—possibly a reference to the 
sonic deception units assigned to the aggressor cadre.46 The 1968 version of FM 100-5, 
Operations of Army Forces in the Field repeats the short section on deception and a 
reference to FM 31-40. However, missing from this edition of FM 100-5 is any reference 
to dedicated deception units as combat support elements; instead, tactical cover and 
deception is listed as a task of engineering units.47 At some point in the early 1960s 
proponency for deception was transferred from Command and General Staff College to 
the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command.48 
FM 31-40 was updated with changes in 1960 and 1963, and a still classified 
update to FM 31-40 was published in 1967. 49 In 1969, the U.S. Army published Training 
Circular 30-1: Tactical Cover and Deception (TC 30-1), an unclassified document 
providing guidance on the training of cover and deception from the company to division 
level, with the stated intent of encouraging commanders to include cover and deception in 
their planning process.50 In 1973 an update was drafted but not published. Currently none 
of the editions of FM 31-40 are available for examination, though an idea of their 
contents can be drawn from TC 30-1. The circular provides a basic overview of the 
history of deception; definitions of key terms and concepts; general guidelines, 
responsibilities, and considerations for planning of deception operations; and example 
                                                 
45 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations—
Operations, 1962 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1962), 50. 
46 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 30-101: Aggressor, the Maneuver Enemy, 
1959 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1959), 55 – 57. 
47 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: 1962, 39. 
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applications of deception. Of particular note is the planning consideration of target 
reaction, which demands a thorough understanding of the target: 
Success of cover and deception is dependent on the ability of the deceiver 
to predict the probable enemy reaction. The staff charged with the 
deception planning must be able to think as the enemy does and not react 
as a friendly commander transplanted into the enemy situation. This is 
possible only as a result of a thorough understanding of the enemy, his 
culture, and military system. The enemy intelligence system must be 
evaluated because this system is the vehicle that carries the deception 
story to the enemy commander. Determination must be made regarding 
the enemy’s characteristics, his habits that make him vulnerable to 
deception, and those aspects that present the least likely deception target. 
The probable enemy reaction depends on the commander. An uncertain 
commander may react to deception while a steadfast veteran commander 
may ignore all but exceptionally convincing efforts. Some commanders 
may be overanxious, others overcautious; if possible, we should know the 
characteristics of the enemy commander, to include the degree of freedom 
allowed subordinates, his reaction time to new situations, and how this 
fear of the unknown influences his actions. A single known characteristic 
of a commander is more important than the entire statistical record of his 
military career.51 
The one major drawback of TC 30-1 is that since FM 31-40 was classified, the 
information in TC 30-1 with regards to means, techniques and examples of application is 
unfortunately shallow. 
Looking at the camouflage aspect of deception, the 1959 edition of FM 5-20 
represented the pinnacle of the linkage between camouflage and cover and deception. In 
the manual’s discussion of the nuclear battlefield, the manual explicitly states the role of 
camouflage in both denying information and deceiving:  
The best means of reducing the chance of a unit becoming the target of 
nuclear attack is to deny the enemy information as to the unit location and 
strength, or to fool the enemy by deception. Habitual use of proper 
camouflage will greatly assist in denying this information to the enemy.52  
                                                 
51 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 15. 
52 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20: Camouflage Basic Principles and Field 
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Additionally, FM 5-20 emphatically bound camouflage to deception via the very 
definition of camouflage: “Camouflage is a French word meaning disguise and is used to 
describe actions taken to mislead the enemy by misrepresenting the true identity of an 
installation, an activity, or an item of equipment.”53 Finally, the manual reinforced 
camouflage’s linkage to cover and deception to the point of subordinating camouflage to 
deception: “Camouflage, as an element of military deception, permits us to approach 
unseen and to remain hidden within striking distance of the enemy.”54 
Between the 1959 edition of FM 5-20 and its successor in 1968, the relationship 
between camouflage and deception was severed. In the 1968 edition of FM 5-20, the third 
method of camouflage was changed from “deceiving” to “disguising.”55 Though 
deception was still discussed in the manual, to include a chapter on decoys, the concept 
of camouflage as an element of deception was thoroughly expunged. The divorce of 
camouflage from deception was reciprocated on the deception side of doctrine. The 1969 
TC 30-1 listed FM 5-20 as a reference; however, the 1978 FM 90-2: Tactical Deception 
did not. 
D. POST VIETNAM ERA THROUGH DESERT STORM 
The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 is an anomaly within the operations series as the 
manual is fixated squarely on the operations of a numerically smaller force against 
numerically superior Soviet forces in Western Europe. Though the distinct section on 
deception present in previous editions is absent, deception remains thoroughly integrated 
in the manual. For example, the following guidance is given for the offense: “If a smaller 
force is to concentrate superior combat power at the point of decision… commanders 
must employ surprise and deception as well as the full mobility of the force.”56 
Furthermore, one of the basic tasks of the covering force in the defense is to deceive the 
                                                 
53 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20: 1959, 3. 
54 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20: 1959, 4. 
55 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20: Camouflage, 1968 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 1968), 20. 
56 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations, 1976 (Washington, DC: 
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enemy, and deny information on friendly force dispositions.57 In the section on desert 
warfare, the manual states, “using deception is a primary means of obtaining success.”58 
However, despite the relatively complete integration of deception into operations, details 
on how to execute deception activities are again absent. Oddly, no mention is made of a 
deception manual within the body of the manual, though FM 90-2 is listed in the 
references.59 
The 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5 introduce the concept of Airland Battle, 
a fundamental revision of how the U.S. Army conducts operations. The Airland Battle 
approach places the principle of maneuver in primacy and embraces Liddell Hart’s 
indirect approach.60 As a result, deception is integrated into the 1982 and 1986 editions 
of FM 100-5 to an unprecedented—and unrepeated—degree. Deception is included in the 
list of major functional areas alongside maneuver, intelligence, and fires.61 In addition, 
deception is listed as a reason for offensive action, and discussed in depth in the sections 
on defense and retrograde operations.62 Furthermore, echoing General Eisenhower’s 
admonishment, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 states: “An integral part of any plan of 
campaign or major operation is the deception plan…. Deception is a vital part of tactical 
operations as well.”63 The dedicated section on deception, though smaller than the one in 
the 1954 edition, is still robust and includes examples of deception integration; as well as, 
some planning guidance.64 The section on electronic warfare includes mention of 
manipulative electronic deception [MED] and imitative communications deception [ICD] 
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as electronic warfare activities that support the overall deception plan.65 In a striking 
departure from previous operations manuals, the 1982 edition removes deception from 
the discussion of surprise as a principle of war, instead moving deception to the principle 
of security.66  
In 1978, the U.S. Army retrieved the dedicated military deception manual from 
classified purgatory and published the unclassified FM 90-2: Tactical Deception. As the 
title implies, the focus of FM 90-2 is with only the tactical fight: “…tactical deception 
here refers to short-term actions of corps or lower units within the battle area.”67 Though 
this “How to Fight” manual is rather simplistic, its release marked the beginning of a 
military deception renaissance within the U.S. Army. Of note however, the 1978 field 
manual severs the connection between deception and the term cover, though it maintains 
camouflage and concealment as aspects of visual deception. Despite these limitations, 
FM 90-2 provides a workable foundation of deception practice, principles, and planning 
considerations. 
In 1986 proponency for deception was transferred to the U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center and School at Fort Huachuca. Shortly afterwards, FM 90-2 was updated as FM 
90-2: Battlefield Deception. The 1988 iteration of FM 90-2 is an intellectually weighty 
tome, delving into the cognitive underpinnings of deception as well as providing detailed 
guidance on the planning and execution of deception at both the tactical and operational 
levels of war. This manual was designed to address what the U.S. Army considered to be 
a shortfall in deception integration:  
Today, commanders use little deception in planning, directing, and 
conducting combat operations. As a result, many deception-related skills 
that have served our Army well in the past have been forgotten, and where 
remembered, have not been made part of our war-fighting capabilities 
Armywide.68  
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Without having access to the editions of FM 31-40 for comparison, the 1988 
edition of FM 90-2 represents the strongest presentation of deception theory and practice 
within U.S. Army doctrine. Shortly after the publication of this edition, deception 
proponency was shifted once more, to the U.S. Combined Arms Center, where it remains. 
E. POST COLD WAR ERA 
Despite the successful use of deception in Operation DESERT STORM, the 1993 
edition of FM 100-5 almost appears to be a repudiation of the prior editions with regards 
to deception, and marks the beginning of deception’s descent into a doctrinal abyss. 
Among the principles of war, deception is absent from security, and relegated to a mere 
factor of surprise; furthermore, economy of force demands force allocations for tasks 
such as deception be measures so as to not detract from the ability to mass at the decisive 
point.69 Deception is not listed as a combat function; rather, deception is relegated to a 
single mention as one of the tasks contributing to mobility and survivability.70 Finally, 
the robust section on deception in the 1986 edition is replaced by a two paragraph 
recitation of the definition of deception and guidance to see FM 90-2 for further 
information. Though the term deception continues to appear throughout the manual, the 
overall marginalization of the concept of deception from the previous manuals is striking. 
A possible explanation for the marginalization of deception lies in the shift of the 
strategic equation with the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union left 
the United States without a peer competitor, and thus without the need for indirect 
approaches to compensate for numerical inferiority and vulnerable lines of 
communication.71 
The marginalization of deception continued outside the operations manual. In 
1997, the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center rescinded FM 90-2 without replacement. 
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The stated reason was that the manual “no longer represents valid Army doctrine.”72 In 
1998, an unofficial military deception planner’s guide was published with a SECRET 
classification, again putting the tenets of deception outside the reach of a majority of the 
force. Additionally, since this was an unofficial document, it is given no reference in 
subsequent editions of FM 100-5. With the rescinding of FM 90-2, deception was 
subsumed by the emerging concept of information operations and incorporated into the 
1996 FM 100-6: Information Operations as little more than a buzzword. Absent from FM 
100-6 is any guidance on the planning and execution of deception operations; as well as, 
any mention of the cognitive and theoretical foundations discussed in FM 90-2. FM 3-13: 
Information Operations replaced FM 100-6 in 2003. Though FM 3-13 provides more 
discussion on the integration, planning, and execution of deception than FM 100-6, the 
level is still far below FM 90-2. Furthermore, FM 3-13 has fallen out of favor itself and is 
no longer in synch with ADP 3-0, limiting the manual’s appeal. 
In the 2001 iteration of the operations manual, now FM 3-0, Operations, 
deception continues its path into doctrinal oblivion. In keeping with the model of FM 
100-6, deception is relegated to being an element of information operations, and an 
aspect of information superiority. While deception returns to the discussion of the 
principle of security, deception is absent from the principle of surprise.73 The separate 
section on deception is limited to a single paragraph which restates the definition of 
military deception; gone is the guidance to refer to a deception field manual because the 
1988 version of FM 90-2 was phased out without replacement. As with the 1993 FM 100-
5, the term deception is present, but the concept is not. 
The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 sees deception, now categorized as an information 
task, again limited to a single paragraph with a reference to FM 3-13: Information 
Operations and the joint forces publication on military deception, JP 3-13.4: Military 
                                                 
72 Memorandum signed by Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, Director, Corps and Division Doctrine, 
dated 30 September 1996 as cited in Bradley K. Nelson, “Battlefield Deception: Abandoned Imperative of 
the 21st Century” (Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 28, accessed 2 
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73 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 2001 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2001), 4-14. 
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Deception. For the first time since 1914, the concepts of feints and demonstrations—in 
fact, the very words—do not appear within the operations manual. The early 2011 change 
to FM 3-0 gives deception three paragraphs as an element of inform and influence 
activities, though there is a note stating: “military deception will migrate to another 
functional area in future editions of FM 3-0.”74 Interestingly, this edition does not 
reference the still current FM 3-13 for deception guidance, rather it points to JP 3-13.4, 
the joint force publication. ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations superseded FM 3-0 as part 
of the Army’s “Doctrine 2015” program. APD 3-0, weighing in at a concise 32 pages, 
does not mention deception at all, and relegates all inform and influence operations to 
three uses of the term without elaboration or mention of external references. 
The 1990 edition of FM 5-20, renamed FM 20-3: Camouflage, further reduces the 
relationship of camouflage to deception by removing the chapter on decoys and stating 
that camouflage and deception are part of a set of interrelated tactical measures 
supporting survivability.75 In 1998, FM 20-3: Camouflage, Concealment and Decoys 
introduces the term Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys [CCD]. It is important to note 
the level of the disjunction between deception and cover at this point. While at the Army 
level the acronym CCD means the aforementioned Camouflage, Cover, and Decoys; at 
the joint level CCD means Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception [the Army refers to 
the joint version of CCD as JCCD]. Further, whereas the 1990 edition includes deception 
in the interrelated tasks supporting survivability, the 1998 edition removes deception. 
While essentially ignoring the connection between deception and camouflage, FM 20-3 
does ironically state in a standalone paragraph in its introduction:  
Deception helps mask the real intent of primary combat operations and 
aids in achieving surprise. Deception countermeasures can delay effective 
enemy reaction by disguising information about friendly intentions, 
capabilities, objectives, and locations of vulnerable units and facilities.76  
                                                 
74 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, Change 1 (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 6-19. 
75 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 20-3: Camouflage, 1993 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-1. 
76 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 20-3: Camouflage, Concealment, and 
Decoys, 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 6. 
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The 2010 iteration of the Army’s camouflage doctrine, ATTP 3-34.39: 
Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys represents a complete reversal of earliest editions 
of camouflage field manuals, calling deception a component of CCD. However, the 
publication offers no discussion or guidance on deception.77 
F. CONCLUSIONS OF DOCTRINE REVIEW 
A review of the U.S. Army capstone document for operations from 1905 to 
present shows the emergence and growth of deception as an operational concept. 
However, the level of emphasis is cyclic, with peaks occurring during and immediately 
after World War II, and during the late 1970s through 1980s. Conversely deception 
integration is at its weakest prior to World War I, and since the end of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the only time all the aspects of deception were unified under one concept 
was during the World War II era when the aspects were bundled under the aegis of 
counterintelligence. Since that time, deception was slowly and methodically 
dismembered and marginalized to the point that camouflage is no longer considered a 
form of deception and the term “cover” has completely lost its connection to deception 
within U.S. Army doctrine.78  
                                                 
77 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-34.39: 
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III. EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIATION OF DECEPTION 
EMPHASIS 
As can be seen from the longitudinal survey of deception within U.S. Army 
doctrine, deception is consistently mentioned; however, the degree of emphasis and level 
of guidance varies significantly over time. The variance in deception emphasis has driven 
deception authors to propose numerous explanations as to why the U.S. Army does not 
treat deception with a greater level of emphasis given deception’s demonstrated utility. 
The reason given the most weight is the idea that America’s desired style of warfare, 
firmly grounded in cumulative destruction and influenced heavily by Clausewitz, leaves 
little consideration for indirect methods like deception.79 The second reason, espoused by 
Herbert Goldhamer, is the rise of a professional officer class separated officers from the 
political practice of deception.80 A third reason cited is the over-classification of 
deception post-WWII has had the unintended consequence of removing deception from 
consideration by the force. Fourth, various authors have pointed to the perception within 
Western culture that deception is immoral as reducing the desire to embrace deception’s 
worth. While none of these explanations completely explain the diminished role of 
deception in U.S. Army doctrine, the American style of war best explains the 
fluctuations.  
A. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 
The most frequent explanation of why the U.S. Army has not consistently placed 
the degree of emphasis on deception commensurate of deception’s utility is that the style 
of war preferred by the United States does not emphasize indirect approaches, including 
deception. In order to assess this explanation it is necessary to first analyze the styles of  
war to see if there is a variation of deception emphasis between the styles, then examine 
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whether the United States has a preference for one style of war, and finally, what reasons 
might drive any United States preference for a particular style.81 
1. Styles of War 
Essential to understanding the role, or lack of a role, of deception in the U.S. 
Army is an understanding the two warfighting styles employed by the U.S. Army. On one 
end of the spectrum is cumulative destruction, which includes what Hans Delbrück and 
Russell Weigley refer to as the strategy of annihilation, and what Basil Liddell Hart and 
Edward Luttwak call attrition. On the other end of the spectrum is systemic disruption, 
which includes Delbrück and Weigley’s strategy of attrition; as well as, the indirect 
approach by Liddell Hart, and relational maneuver by Luttwak.82 Cumulative destruction 
seeks to destroy the enemy’s capacity for war by decisive defeat of the enemy’s military 
forces, and exemplified by the battles of Cannae, Austerlitz, and the trenches of World 
War I, especially the German strategy at the Battle of Verdun. Because successful 
application of the cumulative destruction approach is rooted in the ability of a force to 
effectively inflict greater net damage on the enemy force, the approach is dependent on 
an overall force superiority. Even if an inferior force can achieve a series of tactical 
victories, the additive effect of the losses results in strategic defeat.83 For example, 
General Lee’s tactical victories over General Grant in the 1864 campaign came with 
unsustainable manpower losses for the Confederate force, resulting in the final strategic 
defeat and surrender at Appomattox.  
Systemic disruption seeks to achieve victory through attacks against the enemy’s 
weaknesses, (e.g., popular will, production capacity, communications, and command and 
                                                 
81 Author’s note: the discussion of styles of war within this thesis is solely in the context of emphasis 
on deception; any evaluation of the superiority of one style of war over the other is beyond the scope of this 
work. 
82 The terms cumulative destruction and systemic disruption are used because the various authors have 
used the term attrition with diametrically opposed meanings. Delbrück and Weigley equate attrition with 
the strategy of exhaustion; see Delbrück’s The History of the Art of War. On the other hand, Luttwak, 
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battles]; see Luttwak’s “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare.” In a similar vein, there is a risk of unintentional 
conflation of relational-maneuver with the maneuver principle of war. 
83 Edward Luttwak and Steven Canby, MINDSET: National Styles in Warfare and the Operational 
Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis (Pontiac, MA: C&L Associates, 1980). 
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control) which leave the enemy paralyzed and unable to react effectively. The exemplars 
for systemic disruption are the German blitzkrieg, most forms of guerrilla warfare, and 
the AirLand Battle concept. Because the systemic disruption approach places strength 
against weakness, the potential effect is not dependent on overall force superiority. An 
inferior force has the potential for strategic victory over a superior force; therefore 
inferior forces must lean towards a systemic disruption approach in order to have a 
chance at prevailing.84 Guerrilla campaigns and insurgencies by necessity spend most of 
their time tilted heavily toward systemic disruption, as a toe-to-toe fight with government 
forces from a position of inferiority invites defeat. For example, during the Tet Offensive, 
the Viet Cong attempted to shift to a cumulative destruction posture resulting in the 
destruction of the Viet Cong as an effective fighting force.  
 Cumulative Destruction Systemic Disruption 
Target Strength against Strength Strength against Weakness 
Endstate Incapacitation through attrition of 
resources (e.g., manpower, equipment, 
supplies); Materialschlacht (battle of 
material) 
Incapacitation through strategic 
paralysis 
Focus of Efforts Tactical level, with objectives in terms 
of terrain 
Operational level, with 
objectives in terms of shattering 
the enemy 
Outcome Predictable, based on “overall 
superiority of net attrition capacity”85 
Unpredictable, based on ability 
to perceive and affect enemy 
weaknesses 
Orientation Interior focus on processes to achieve 
maximum efficiency of tasks 
External focus to identify enemy 
weaknesses and limitations 
Force Design Systems and formations designed for 
all-around capabilities – infrequent, 
revolutionary changes to capabilities  
Systems and formations 
designed for specific enemy 
forces – frequent, evolutionary 
changes to capabilities 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Cumulative Destruction and Systemic Disruption 
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85 Luttwak and Canby, MINDSET: National Styles in Warfare, 3. 
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Cumulative destruction and systemic disruption as described above actually 
represent a false dichotomy for the sake of analysis. In practical application, pure 
expressions of either approach do not exist. Rather, all warfighting can be envisioned as 
existing on a spectrum between cumulative destruction and systemic disruption, 
exhibiting aspects of each style.87 The degree to which a commander’s style tips towards 
cumulative destruction or systemic disruption influences the degree to which deception is 
practiced. Luttwak suggests that forces leaning towards the cumulative destruction style 
tend to be more focused on internal processes and organization than on the enemy since 
victory is achieved by the most effective and efficient application of superior firepower. 
Because of this inward perspective, there is less effort given to understanding the enemy 
to the degree needed for effective deception. Conversely, systemic disruption oriented 
forces are more focused on the external since victory is achieved through the 
identification and exploitation of enemy weaknesses.88 Deception is considered to be one 
of the three interrelated principles of systemic disruption, along with avoidance of the 
enemy’s main strength and dominance of momentum.89 As a result of the centrality of 
deception to systemic disruption, the deception plan is elevated “…to full equality with 
the battle plan; certainly deception planning cannot remain a mere afterthought.”90 Thus, 
as a force leans towards cumulative destruction, the emphasis of deception decreases, and 
conversely, as the force leans towards systemic disruption, the emphasis of deception 
increases. 
Clausewitz’s On War and Jomini’s The Art of War are considered the pillars of 
the cumulative destruction mode of warfighting. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Basil 
Liddell Hart’s Strategy are representative of the systemic disruption model. Colonel John 
Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflict” provides a thorough comparison between the two styles, 
though Boyd’s preference for systemic disruption colors the discussion. Additionally, 
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Michael Handel’s Masters of War offers side-by-side comparison and analysis of 
Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu; as well as, Machiavelli and Mao Tse-tung. 
2. American Preference for Cumulative Destruction 
As Lysander suggested, when the skin of the lion—force—will not suffice, then 
the skin of the fox—guile—must be used to cover the gap. The inherent implication to 
this advice is when the skin of the lion is sufficient, the fox is not needed. Several authors 
mention the evolution of Napoleon’s warfighting as the exemplar for this relationship. As 
Napoleon’s armies grew in power and capability, Napoleon transitioned from a reliance 
on cunning and misdirection to a reliance on force.91 Weigley, in his classic, The 
American Way of War, states as his premise that America fought a war of systemic 
disruption during the Revolutionary War because the nascent nation was too weak to 
fight a war of cumulative destruction; however, after the Revolution as the nation grew 
and strengthened, the strategy of cumulative destruction became the preferred America 
strategy.92 Even during the Revolutionary War there was resistance to the systemic 
disruption approach employed by General Washington, as exemplified by John Adams in 
a letter to Abigal Adams: “I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters. The officers drink, 
A [sic] long and moderate war. My toast is, A [sic] short and violent war.”93 John 
Adams’ desires are frequently reflected in U.S. Army doctrine. For example, FM 100-5 
(1939) states:  
The ultimate objective [emphasis in original] of all military operations is 
the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in battle…. Concentration of 
superior forces [emphasis in original], both on the ground and in the air, at 
the decisive place and time, creates the conditions most essential to 
decisive victory and constitutes the best evidence of superior leadership.94  
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Additionally, FM 100-5 (1993) states the American people’s desire for short, decisive 
war:  
The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary 
casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right 
to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met.95  
These attitudes are the essence of cumulative destruction, and help demonstrate the U.S. 
Army’s preference for that style of war. 
Since the United States tends towards the cumulative destruction side of the 
spectrum, U.S. Army doctrine tends to embrace Clausewitz’s positions on the execution 
of war. As a result, Clausewitz’s disdain may have an impact on deception’s place in 
doctrine. Clausewitz writing about craft and cunning stated: “The fact remains that those 
qualities do not figure prominently in the history of war. Rarely do they stand out amid 
the welter of events and circumstances.”96 As for the act of deception, Clausewitz argues: 
To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an 
enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the 
costs increase with scale of the deception. Normally, they call for more 
than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have 
the desired effect.97  
Goldhamer suggests this blatant disregard for the historic record as the “bias of a 
professional soldier for whom the conflict of force with force and the destruction of the 
enemy on the battlefield were the principle instruments in the art of war.”98 Handel 
suggests that Clausewitz and Jomini’s diminishing of deception and trickery in war was a 
result of the period in which they fought.99 Handel further points out that Clausewitz’s 
method of war relied on a concentration of forces at the decisive point, and that deceptive 
feints and demonstrations reduced a commander’s ability to mass his forces.100 
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Regardless of the reasoning at the time behind Clausewitz’s diminishment of the utility of 
deception, his work continues to influence the development of U.S. military doctrine. 
3. Balance of Power 
If one accepts that the U.S. Army tends to favor a cumulative destruction style, 
why has U.S. Army doctrine on occasion increased its emphasis on deception? The 
answer may lay in the comments of Weigley and others: perceived and actual balances of 
power influence the proportions of cumulative destruction and systemic disruption within 
a force’s particular warfighting style. If there is a significant imbalance between 
opponents, the stronger force can rely on its strength to overcome the opposition. J. 
Bowyer Bell states: 
Power and capacity, as in real life, can make deception unnecessary. 
Napoleon, as the power of his armies increased, relied more on force and 
less on cunning and misdirection. In an invasion of a small country, the 
larger aggressor need only dispatch overwhelming power: how could 
Grenada repulse the forces of the United States…. American military 
strategy has often been based on deploying maximum power and 
technological capability without recourse to duplicity—”more” is more 
and force needs no enhancing…”101 
Because a superior force does not need to rely as heavily on aspects of systemic 
disruption like deception, while conversely an inferior force must shift weight towards a 
systemic disruption approach, there is a trend whereby the level of emphasize on 
deception within U.S. Army doctrine waxes and wanes as the perceived and actual 
balance of power shifts (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.   Comparison of Balance of Power and Doctrinal Emphasis of Deception 
During World War I, the German military was seen initially as a superior 
competitor, thus during World War I deception—especially the covering aspects of 
camouflage and operations security—increased in importance. This increase is reflected 
by the inclusion of sections on counterinformation and surprise in the 1923 Field Service 
Regulations. Similarly, during World War II the Axis was seen as an existential threat, 
and deception reached a crescendo. Post-World War II, the United States operated from a 
position of parity during the Cold War, and over time deception receded from the 
operations manuals.102  
The 1970s represented a tectonic shift in the perceived balance of power. First, 
the failures of Vietnam, the Mayaguez incident, and the failed attempt to rescue the 
hostages in Iran caused a crisis of faith within the U.S. Army leading to the development 
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of the Airland Battle doctrine.103 Second, the 1976 National Intelligence Estimate on 
Soviet military capability included a second assessment which painted the Soviet military 
as superior to the United States military in both nuclear and conventional forces:  
Within the ten year period of the National Estimate the Soviets may well 
expect to achieve a degree of military superiority which would permit a 
dramatically more aggressive pursuit of their hegemonial [sic] objectives, 
[italics in original] including direct military challenges to Western vital 
interests, in the belief that such superior military force can pressure the 
West to acquiesce or, if not; can be used to win a military contest at any 
level.104 
Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate addendum reassessed Soviet intentions, 
painting a picture that the Soviet Union was a far greater and imminent threat than 
previously recognized. This radical re-estimation of Soviet capabilities and intentions 
shifted the perceived balance of power, placing the U.S. in an inferior position. As a 
result, U.S. Army doctrine at the time increased emphasis on systemic disruption and 
deception. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 fixates almost totally on operations in Western 
Europe against a superior force. This manual also marks the reemergence of deception 
emphasis to a degree not seen for decades. Furthermore, the era marks a renaissance of 
deception throughout the U.S. Army culminating with the central use of deception during 
Operation DESERT STORM. The 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5 see the U.S. Army 
doctrine at the apex of systemic disruption.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was left without 
a peer competitor. As a result, the balance of power shifted decisively in the favor of the 
United States, alleviating the perceived need to emphasize systemic disruption. In the 
absence of an overpowering threat, U.S. military doctrine returned to the comforts of the 
cumulative destruction style of war, and deception emphasis ebbed to the point that the 
current capstone operations manual, APD 3-0, does not mention deception at all. 
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B. PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CLASS 
Goldhamer suggests an interesting alternate hypothesis: the rise of the 
professional officer class led to the marginalization of deception in war. The professional 
officer class became specialists in the art of the direct approach as described by 
Clausewitz, and developed a professional pride in using physical force to overcome an 
adversary. The sense of worth as a professional officer was based in the ability to defeat 
the enemy in a stand up fight.105 Gerald in Secret Soldiers provides anecdotal evidence 
supporting Goldhamer’s assertion stating:  
Not all soldiers are fond of practicing deception. Some American combat 
commanders in World War II instinctively resisted using deception, 
preferring to charge straight ahead like the old-style cavalrymen they 
were…. Others… simply preferred conventional battle as a route to honor 
and glory.106 
Additionally, the political agnosticism of the professional officer class also 
impacted deception, as it separated military action from foreign political involvements—
foreign political involvements are seen by Goldhamer as more conducive to manipulation 
and deception.107 The divorce of the senior officer class from diplomacy meant a 
degradation of peacetime concerns about national strategy; as well as: 
…those manipulative and deceptive measures that might strengthen in 
peacetime the nation’s position vis-a-vis a potential enemy by misleading 
him and weakening his present and future powers of resistance. Such 
measures require close coordination of military and political leadership, a 
cooperation less likely to occur given the professional soldier’s distance 
from the foreign office and for the most part, the political leader’s and 
parliamentarian’s divorce from strategic and grand strategic concerns.”108  
Goldhamer’s argument is undermined somewhat by the championing of cover and 
deception by General Eisenhower during and after World War II; however, the idea of 
the U.S. Army as a profession of arms is a recurrent theme that may serve to reinforce 
direct approaches. 
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C. OVER-CLASSIFICATION 
A third potential explanation for the dearth of deception in U.S. Army doctrine is 
the over-classification of deception. While security is essential for the execution of 
deception operations, classification of the very concept can be immensely detrimental to 
the inculcation of the utility of deception to the force. If future leaders are not exposed to 
deception during their formative years as junior officers, how can they be expected to 
appreciate deception’s utility later? The negative impact of classification can be seen in a 
1948 memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces to the 
commanders of the Armored, Artillery, and Infantry Centers on the subject of training 
cover and deception. The cursory introduction to strategic cover and deception was 
restricted to confidential level with no questions authorized and contained the comment: 
“The security classification of this whole subject [strategic cover and deception] is and 
probably will remain TOP SECRET [emphasis in original]…” leaving one to wonder the 
utility of the training.109 Tactical cover and deception was subjected to similar 
classification. Classification of the first two editions of FM 31-40: Tactical Cover and 
Deception effectively removed deception from the playing field. The 1954 edition of FM 
100-5 contained several pages on the planning and execution of tactical cover and 
deception; however, this was cut to a couple of paragraphs in the 1962 edition.  
In addition to the classification of doctrine, the classification of the actual 
deception operations negatively impacted the institutional memory of the force. The 
mission of 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, a purpose built deception unit in World 
War II, was not declassified until 1996.110 With the information on operations 
compartmentalized behind walls of classification, the memory of deception resting in the 
minds of the practitioners could not be effectively passed on to future generations of 
leaders. Thus as the personnel with firsthand knowledge of deception operations retired 
from the force, the institutional knowledge retired with them.111 The double impact of the 
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classification of both deception doctrine and historic examples of deception placed an 
extremely high barrier against access of deception resources by junior leaders, inhibiting  
the development of new institutional memories on the use of deception. The lack of 
exposure at the junior levels translating into a feeling at higher levels of command that 
deception is unnecessary—after all, it was not needed at the lower levels. 
D. MORALITY 
A fourth potential explanation touched on by Jon Latimer, John Bell, and Barton 
Whaley is that deception is immoral. Honesty has long been considered a virtue within 
American life as expressed by maxims such as “Honesty is the best policy,” and the 
apocryphal tale of George Washington and the cherry tree. The idea of the American 
military as moral paragons is also frequently present in official and unofficial military 
guidance and writings. For example, General Dempsey [in his paper “America’s 
Military- a Profession of Arms”] recently stated: 
The Profession of Arms demands its members live by the values described 
in the “City on the Hill” metaphor. We must provide an example to the 
world that cannot be diminished by hardships and challenges. This 
example is based upon the words and intent of the US Constitution that 
each of us takes a personal oath to support and defend. Our oath demands 
each of us display moral courage and always do what is right, regardless 
of the cost. We are all volunteers in our willingness to serve and to place 
others’ needs above our own. As shared values, our calling cards are Duty, 
Honor, Courage, Integrity, and Selfless Service. Commitment to the rule 
of law is integral to our values which provide the moral and ethical fabric 
of our profession.112 
Deception in particular has been viewed as dishonorable, an idea exemplified by 
the some of the responses over Colonel Funston’s use of deception to achieve victory 
over the insurgents during the Philippine Insurrection; rather than lauded, Funston was 
vilified for winning by deceit.113 On the floor of the Senate, Senator Patterson of 
                                                 
112 Martin Dempsey, “America’s Military—a Profession of Arm” (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2012), accessed 24 February 2012, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-
02/022312120752_Americas_Military_POA.pdf, 3. 
113 J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, Cheating and Deception (New Brunswick, NJ Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), 45. 
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Colorado accused Funston of violating the rules of civilized warfare.114 Colonel Funston 
was also the subject of a sermon decrying the use of underhand methods which lower the 
standard of honor.115 However, while it may be that deception is viewed as immoral, 
little in U.S. Army doctrine conveys this view. The 1905 edition of Field Service 
Regulations stands almost alone in its level of condemnation of illegal acts of 
deception.116 Furthermore, a survey of the use of deception by the U.S. Army across the 
span of its history shows that even if deception is viewed by the organization as immoral 
the view is not a serious impediment to the execution of deception. Rather, the attitude of 
Ulisse Guadagnini seems to hold more sway: “Moral considerations have validity only in 
civilian life and should not interfere with preparations for war.”117 
E. CONCLUSION 
The primary explanation for the undervaluing of deception in U.S. Army doctrine 
is the emphasis on the cumulative destruction style of war; however, the other 
explanations play their part in further reducing the level of emphasis. Taken together, the 
composite effect of the explanations leads to the creation of an organizational bias against 
deception. Daniel and Herbig state that organizational bias presents itself in two ways. 
First, there is a “bureaucratic imperative that organizations trained for particular tasks 
will seek to perform them.” Second, due to availability bias, people will think and act in 
ways familiar to them.118 Allison and Zelikow in Essence of Decision present a model for 
organizational behavior that suggests the behavior is linked more to standard operating 
procedures and established doctrine than to deliberate choices. Formalized doctrine 
                                                 
114 "Gen. Funston's Action," The Washington Post (1877 – 1922) March 28, 1902, ProQuest 
(144350948). 
115 "Funston Subject of Sermon," New York Times (1857 – 1922) April 15, 1901, ProQuest 
(96118056). 
116 While acts of perfidy are frequently cited in doctrine as illegal, the 1905 Field Service Regulations 
described illegal acts of deception using terms like treacherous, fiendishness, and infamy. War Department, 
Field Service Regulations, 1905, 214. 
117 Quoted in Waldemar Erfurth, Surprise, trans. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, 
PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), 51. 
118 Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, "Propositions on Military Deception," in Strategic 
Military Deception, eds. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 
14. 
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serves to constrain behavior.119 Thus the degree of emphasis on deception in doctrine 
translates to the degree of deception operations in practice. 
Another area where the organizational bias has impacted deception is the lack of a 
stable proponency. Since 1923, deception has shifted proponency numerous times, and 
has never been in the position of being the primary focus of whatever command held 
purview. Additionally, some aspects of deception have been separated under difference 
proponents, such as camouflage under the U.S. Army Engineer School. The lack of a 
stable proponency with deception as its central focus further undermines the integration 
of deception into U.S. Army doctrine three important ways. First, the frequent changes of 
deception proponency impede continuity of knowledge. Second, since deception is never 
the primary focus for a proponent, deception is always at risk of marginalization in favor 
of the primary focus. Third, some efforts implemented are abandoned when the 
proponency changes. For example, while deception was under the U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center and School, the tables of organization for corps and divisions were modified to 
add deception cells. After deception proponency shifted to the U.S. Army Combined 
Arms Center, the deception cells were dropped in order to support the emerging 
requirement for unmanned aerial vehicles.120 
                                                 
119 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 1999), 143 – 145. 
120 Nelson, “Battlefield Deception,” 29 – 30. 
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IV. THEORY OF DECEPTION 
Every means is permitted which deceives the enemy and induces him to 
take wrong steps. The lion’s bravery and the fox’s cleverness must 
combine to wrest victory from the enemy. 
 – General Waldemar Erfurth121 
A. WHAT IS DECEPTION 
Despite deception’s long and storied place in the history of war, J. Bowyer Bell 
and Barton Whaley assert in, Cheating and Deception, that their theory was the first 
attempt to create a “general theory of cheating.”122 Bell and Whaley’s theory of deception 
is elegant in its simplicity. The theory categorizes all deceptions into two interdependent 
sets: showing the false and hiding the real. These categories are further subdivided into 
six categories. Hiding the real is divided into the categories of masking, repackaging, and 
dazzling, while showing the fake is divided into the categories of mimicking, inventing, 
and decoying. Each category has myriad characteristics that can be drawn from for the 
deception plan. The categories of deception and the chosen characteristics are used in 
ruses to create one of five effects: unnoticed, benign, desirable, unappealing, and 
dangerous. The purpose of the ruse is to create a perception in the target that causes the 
target to generate an illusion the target interprets as reality, causing the target to act in the 
desired manner to achieve the deception goal and thus the strategic goal.123 While Bell 
and Whaley’s theory provides a neat and tidy structure for the taxonomy of deception, 
one weakness of the theory is that it does not delve in the cognitive psychology allowing 
deception to occur.  
Michael Dewar offers a different theory of deception in The Art of Deception in 
Warfare. Dewar’s theory is a less structured discussion than Bell and Whaley’s theory; 
nevertheless, the theory provides important insights into the inner workings of deception. 
Dewar provides an overview of deception means, principles, and techniques. Of 
                                                 
121 Erfurth, Surprise, 198. 
122 Bell and Whaley, Cheating and Deception, 45. 
123 Bell and Whaley, Cheating and Deception, 45 – 74. 
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particular note are his comments on the prevalence of preconceived ideas on the 
battlefield, and the role of doctrinal and technical innovation in achieving surprise.124  
1. Deception Defined 
According to Random House Webster’s, deception is “something that deceives or 
is intended to deceive; fraud; artifice.”125 While this is a sufficient definition for casual 
uses, this definition is not sufficient for deception in the context of military operations. 
Daniel and Herbig in their work “Propositions on Military Deception” define deception 
as: “the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage.”126 
One problem with Daniel and Herbig’s conceptualization of deception is their fixation on 
deception as being based in falsehood or lies. This concept of deception ignores the ideas 
of deception by omission and deception by selective truth. Furthermore, the definition 
makes no mention of the target of the deception. In the definition’s defense, the concept 
of gaining a competitive advantage is important. Deception in military operations is not 
undertaken for deception’s sake; deception is undertaken to achieve some goal.  
The definition of deception used in U.S. Army doctrine since at least 1969 is a 
better starting point for a working definition of deception: “Activity designed to mislead 
an enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react 
in a manner prejudicial to his interest.” 127 While the current U.S. Army definition is a 
good starting point, this definition too is not quite sufficient. The first deficiency with the 
current doctrinal definition is that “induce” is an imprecise term for what deception does: 
manipulating the enemy’s decision-making process. Second, the best deceptions rely on a 
foundation of truth to reinforce and support the falsehoods, an idea the definition seems 
                                                 
124 Michael Dewar, The Art of Military Deception in Warfare, 1st ed. (Newton Abbot, UK: David & 
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125 Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed., revised and updated ed. (New York: 
Random House Reference, 2001), 516. 
126 Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, 3. 
127 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular no. 30-1: Tactical Cover and 
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to ignore with the modifiers used to describe the evidence. Finally, the term enemy is 
unnecessarily constraining, as deception can be applied against any target. A strength of 
the doctrinal definition is its acknowledgement of the role of intent in human deception. 
While biological deceptions exhibited in the plant and animal kingdoms can be 
unintentional, human deception requires intent.128  
Taking in account the shortcomings of the existing definitions of deception, a 
modified definition of deception can be crafted: 
Deception is the deliberate misleading of a target into taking actions 
prejudicial to the target’s interests by manipulating the target’s decision-
making processes through the communication of true, manipulated, 
distorted, and/or falsified information.  
This revised definition of deception requires some elaboration. Deliberate 
misleading does not obligate the practitioner to a formal planning process; while formal 
planning is preferable, rapid ad-hoc planning by a nimble practitioner can in extremis 
achieve the objective in time constrained or fluid situations, though with increased risk of 
failure. Successful deception is more than creating a perception; successful deception is 
about the target taking action. Furthermore, the goal of a deception can be the target 
taking no action at all, e.g., the failure of a regime’s security apparatus to breach a special 
reconnaissance element’s cover or the German armored divisions remaining in place at 
Pas de Calais during the opening phases of Operation OVERLORD. The interaction 
between the practitioner and the target occurs in the framework of communication. 
Finally, the perceptions used by the target in its decision-making process rely heavily on 
the indicators created by the practitioner. 
2. Deception: Truth and Lies 
Many definitions of deception conflate deception with lies; however, this 
conflation is incorrect as deceptions and lies are not synonymous. In order to discuss the 
difference between a lie and deception it is first necessary to establish an adequate 
                                                 
128 For a discussion on biological deceptions see: Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, Unweaving 
the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 78. For 
a discussion on the requirement for intent in human deception see: Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. 
Feehan, "The Intent to Deceive," The Journal of Philosophy 74, no. 3 (March, 1977), 143 – 159. 
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definition of each. One definition defines a lie as occurring when a person asserts to a 
second person a proposition that the first person knows to either be false or not true with 
the intent of causing the second person to have a justified belief in the proposition.129 
Since a deception can contain truth—an actual training exercise used as part of a 
deception is still a true event—it is immediately apparent that deception and lies are not 
equal; however, this still leaves the proposition that lies are a subset of deception.130 For 
example, Daniel and Herbig’s model of deception has lies and the act of lying subsumed 
by deception (Figure 3). The definition of deception used here requires injury to the 
target or advantage for the practitioner; this leaves lies undertaken without the intent of 
injury or advantage [white lies] to exist outside the sphere of deception. Thus, while the 
sets of lies and deception overlap, neither subsumes the other  (Figure 4). While lies are 
used in deception, not all deceptions are lies. Judicious use of the truth can be far more 
supportive of deception than outright falsehood. 
 
Figure 3.   Daniel and Herbig’s “Deception’s Subsidiary Concepts.” (From: 131) 
                                                 
129 Chisholm and Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 152; This work presents an in-depth parsing of what 
it means to lie and what it means to intend to deceive. 
130 Chisholm and Feehan provide another illuminating example attributed to Immanuel Kant: “For 
there are types of intended deception that cannot properly be said to be cases of lying. Kant's example will 
do: ‘I may, for instance, wish people to think that I am off on a journey, and so I pack my luggage; people 
draw the conclusion I want them to draw . . .’ But although I thus succeed in deceiving them, Kant insists, 
‘I have not lied to them, for I have not stated that I am expressing my opinion.’" Chisholm and Feehan, The 
Intent to Deceive, 149. 
131 Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, 4. 
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Figure 4.   Interrelationship of Truth, Deception, and Lies 
B. TAXONOMY OF DECEPTION 
1. Taxonomy of Method 
Taxonomies are systems of categorizing items in a set into subordinate sets based 
on a defined system of characteristics. The most recognizable example for taxonomies is 
the system of classifying living things into kingdoms, phyla, classes, orders, families, 
genera, and species. Within the field of deception, there are several suggested taxonomies 
for deception, four of which are: method, sophistication, effect, and commission-
omission. Taxonomy by method focuses the mode of the deception, such as a display. 
Taxonomy by sophistication categorizes deceptions by the degree to which the deception 
adapts or does not adapt to changing circumstances. Taxonomy by effect focuses on what 
the deception does, e.g., dazzling. Finally, taxonomy by commission-omission breaks 
down deceptions based on whether the deception causes the target to acquire a false 
belief or contributes to the target continuing a false belief. For this purposes of this work, 
taxonomy by method is used as it closely matches existing U.S. Army doctrinal concepts 
of deception (Figure 5). Brief descriptions of the alternate taxonomies are provided at the 
end of this section. 
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Figure 5.   Taxonomy of Deception 
2. Deception 
Deception is the set of actions designed to deliberate mislead a target into actions 
or inactions prejudicial to the target’s interests by manipulating the target’s decision-
making processes through the communication of true, manipulated, distorted, or falsified 
information. Deception is subdivided into two broad categories: active deception and 
cover. Active deception consists of those actions designed to convey deceptive indicators 
to the target. Cover, as used here, is the set of actions designed to prevent the target 
access to the indicators necessary for constructing a correct perception of the situation 
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and environment, and thus necessary for proper decision-making.132 Though some of the 
actions included in the category of cover are not usually considered to be part of 
deception in U.S. Army doctrine, the obfuscation of indicators is an intrinsic part of 
deceiving a target.133  
3. Active Deception 
Active deception is comprised of actions which convey deceptive information to 
the target, also referred to as simulation or showing the false. The set of active deception 
includes those modified versions of the actions traditionally associated with military 
deception. Active deception is divided into four broad categories: displays, feints, 
demonstrations, and disinformation. 
a. Displays 
Displays are static depictions of activities, forces, or equipment for the 
purpose of deceiving the target’s collection apparatus.134 Though the formal Army 
definition of a display limits the type of target collection to visual, displays can also occur 
in all physical senses; as well, as in the electromagnetic spectrum. Displays are divided 
into two categories: simulation and portrayal. Simulations use decoys and other devices 
                                                 
132 This usage of cover is consistent with historic Army and DOD usage, and in numerous civilian 
works. See: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, 1-48 to 1-49; Concepts and Force 
Design Group, Tactical Cover and Deception: Final Report, 1-4; Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on 
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133 Bell and Whaley, Cheating and Deception, 49; Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, "Strategic Denial 
and Deception," in Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, eds. Roy Godson 
and James J. Wirtz (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1 – 2. 
134 Adapted from official Army definition: “In military deception, a static portrayal of an activity, 
force, or equipment intended to deceive the adversary’s visual observation.” Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, Field Manual 1-02, 1-83. 
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to create a dummy force or capability. Decoys are models or dummies used to replicate 
actual equipment, buildings, and personnel.135 Magruder’s Quaker guns were decoys 
used to create the perception that the Confederate lines were more heavily fortified than 
they were in reality. MACVSOG’s ruse of an active resistance movement in North Vietnam 
contained major elements of simulation and portrayal.136 
Portrayals use actual forces to present either the image of a unit which 
either does not exist, or that the unit is of a different type than it actually is.137 An 
infantry company presenting itself as an infantry battalion or brigade is a form of 
portrayal. Pseudo-operations and “false flag” operations are specialized forms of 
portrayals where the unit being portrayed is either a third party or an element of the 
target’s forces. Colonel Funston’s ruse during the Philippines Insurrection involved his 
force portraying the insurgent force in order to gain access to the insurgent camp.138 
British forces in Kenya used pseudo-operations to masquerade as Mau-Mau elements for 
the purposes of intelligence collection.139 Soviet forces engaged in “false flag” operations 
during the suppression of resistance movements in Lithuania by posing as the Lithuanian 
resistance while attacking the population in an effort to separate the resistance from the 
population.140 Portrayals also encompass the cyberwar concepts of the honeypot and 
social engineering.141  
 
                                                 
135 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 5. 
136 See Chapter V for more information on MACVSOG deception operations. 
137 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 10. 
138 See Chapter V for additional details on Colonel Funston’s operation. 
139 Kitson, Frank, Gangs and Counter-gangs, (London: Barry and Rockliff, 1960). 
140 John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, revised and updated ed. (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 
1996), 38. 
141 A honeypot is an enticing computer or server designed to draw attacks by adversarial forces. 
Honeypots may also be classified as a form of feint here since they must survive contact with the target 
without revealing their true nature. The purpose of the honeypot is typically to gain intelligence about the 
adversarial forces’ capabilities, identities, and location. 
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b. Feints 
Feints are operations designed to deceive the target into reacting as if the 
feint is an actual decisive operation.142 Feints differ from demonstrations in that some 
manner of contact with the target is sought. The degree of contact varies significantly. 
Feints are used for several purposes; for example, to distract the target from the actual 
decisive action, facilitating relative superiority at the point of decision; luring the target 
into exposing artillery positions; or to trick the target into prematurely committing the 
reserve. Field Service Regulations (1914) describes a stronger variant of the feint: 
holding attack. In addition to distracting the enemy from the main effort, the holding 
attack seeks to fix the enemy in time and space.143 Also, the covering force concept in 
FM 100-5 (1976) has an element of feint, though its primary mission is not deception.144 
In addition to traditional offensive and defensive operations, feints also encompass lures 
designed to draw the target into an unequal fight, e.g., the bait and ambush tactics of 
guerrilla and insurgent forces. 
c. Demonstrations 
Demonstrations are deceptive shows of force where actual engagement 
with the target is not sought.145 Because contact is not sought with the target, the forces 
used for a demonstration can be considerably smaller than those used for a feint. While 
the traditional U.S. Army doctrinal definition of demonstrations implies demonstrations 
occur in the vicinity of the enemy lines, almost as a less aggressive form of a feint, this is 
                                                 
142 Adapted from the DOD and Army definitions of feint: “In military deception, an offensive action 
involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location 
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145 Adapted from the DOD, NATO, and Army definitions of demonstration: “An attack or show of 
force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. 2. (DOD only) 
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attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of 
force. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy.” Headquarters, Department 
of the Army, Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics, p1-57 to 1-58. 
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not the case. Demonstrations include training events and exercises well away from the 
target. For example, a demonstration of increased airborne training in the United States 
can be used to create the perception of a pending airborne assault.  
d. Disinformation146 
Disinformation is the exposure to target collection assets of false, 
modified, or selectively true information with the intent to deceive.147 Disinformation has 
no set form or design; any communication from a presidential proclamation to a scrap of 
paper left in a waste basket can be used to convey disinformation. The British DOUBLE 
CROSS system during World War II is considered the exemplar for disinformation, with 
British intelligence using its control of the German HUMINT networks in Britain and 
North Africa to great advantage.148 Disinformation also includes the flooding of the 
information environment with notional information for the purposes of overloading the 
target’s systems.149 Deceptions of this type are similar to the jamming denial type, but 
different in that disinformation flooding contains deceptive indicators intended to mislead 
the target; whereas, the jamming of a radio net with static does not. Using multiple radio 
networks to obscure the actual location of a unit is an example of this form of 
disinformation, as is swamping a regime’s police hotline with false reports in order to 
overwhelm the response system. 
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Cover is the set of actions taken to protect the actual mission by preventing the 
deception target from receiving the indicators of real actions, capabilities, or intentions.150 
Whereas active deception seeks to provide misleading information to the deception 
target, cover seeks to obfuscate by masking indicators and closing channels. There are 
two categories of cover: camouflage and denial. 
a. Camouflage 
Camouflage seeks to prevent indicators from being detected by the target’s 
collection assets. Within camouflage, there are four broad methods: hiding, blending, 
disguising, and securing. In hiding the item is concealed by a physical barrier; such as, a 
bunker, cave, forest canopy, or netting. The physical barrier itself may be visible, blended 
into the background, or disguised. In blending, the item is concealed by means that merge 
the item with the background. This can be accomplished in the field through the 
application of camouflage paint or natural materials. In disguising, the item is concealed 
by making it look like something innocuous, such as a bunker disguised as a 
farmhouse.151 In securing, indicators are reduced via the use of operations security, 
information security, and emissions control. While not traditionally considered aspects of 
camouflage, securing functions serve the same purpose—suppression of friendly 
indicators. The concepts of camouflage are applicable across the spectrum of operations. 
A special operations team operating out of a safe house is hidden within the safe house, 
which in turn is blended into the surrounding neighborhood. A HUMINT team attached to 
a maneuver element is blended in with the element. An intelligence officer conducting 
special reconnaissance while posing as a tourist is disguised. Through proper document 
disposal procedures, information is secured. 
                                                 
150 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 5; see Note 130 for more 
information on this definition of cover versus the competing definition. 
151 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20, 1968, 17 – 20. 
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b. Denial 
Whereas camouflage focuses on masking indicators, denial attacks the 
channels indictors travel on to the target. Denial seeks to degrade target collection 
channels so that the adversary is either not able to receive indicators, or is herded onto a 
smaller set of channels. Forcing the target to depend on a smaller set of channels reduces 
the ability of the target to validate intelligence using multiple sources, reducing the effort 
necessary in telling the deception story. Additionally, if the target can be herded onto 
channels controlled by friendly forces, deception indicators can be fed directly into the 
target’s intelligence cycle, as was the case with the British DOUBLE CROSS operation in 
WWII. Denial methods include counterreconnaissance, jamming, counterintelligence, 
and physical destruction of collection tools. While these methods are not normally 
considered aspects of deception by U.S. Army doctrine, they are forms of cover to be 
considered during any deception planning and execution. 
5. Alternate Deception Taxonomies 
In addition to the method-based taxonomy of deception, there are other 
taxonomies for deception. Three alternate taxonomies are: commission and omission; 
level of sophistication; and effect-based. These taxonomies are useful for expanding the 
ways to think of deception. 
a. Commission and Omission 
Chisholm and Feehan in “Intent to Deceive” delineate eight types of 
deception divided into two categories. Deceptions by commission are typified by the 
deceiver contributing causally to the belief of the target. Deceptions by omission are 
typified by the deceiver facilitating the target’s maintenance of an existing belief. 
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Deception by Commission 
1- Deceiver contributes causally to target acquiring belief in the proposition 
2- Deceiver contributes causally to target continuing to believe in the proposition 
3- Deceiver contributes causally to target stopping belief in the negation of the proposition 
4- Deceiver contributes causally to target not acquiring belief in the negation of the proposition 
 
Deception by Omission 
5- Deceiver allows target to acquire belief in the proposition 
6- Deceiver allows target to continue belief in the proposition 
7- Deceiver allows target to cease belief in the negation of the proposition 
8- Deceiver allows target to continue without the belief in the negation of the proposition 
Table 2.   Chisholm and Feehan’s Eight Ways to Deceive.152 
b. Level of Sophistication 
Gerwehr and Glenn in Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in 
Future Urban Operations present a way to categorize deceptions based on the level of 
sophistication used in the deception. Sophistication is determined by the degree to which 
the deception takes in count the variables of a situation, e.g., environmental factors, target 
capabilities, target preconceptions, and the context of the situation. There are four levels 
of sophistication, ranging from least to most sophisticated: static, dynamic, adaptive, and 
preemptive. Static deceptions are the least sophisticated of deceptions and “…are in place 
regardless of state, activity, or the histories of either the deceiver or target.”153 The Army 
Combat Uniform is an example of static camouflage. “Dynamic deceptions are those that 
activate under specific circumstances. The ruse itself and the trigger do not change over 
time, nor do they vary much by circumstance or adversary.”154 A howitzer battery having 
established procedures to erect camouflage netting upon occupying a firing position is an 
example of a dynamic deception. “Adaptive deceptions are triggered like dynamic 
deceptions, but either the trigger or the ruse itself can be modified with experience. This 
category covers deception improved through trial and error.”155 Wearing cloths of local 
design in order to blend into crowd during a special reconnaissance mission is an 
                                                 
152 Chisholm and Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 143 – 159. 
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155 Gerwehr and Glenn, Unweaving the Web, 34. 
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example of adaptive camouflage. Premeditative deceptions display the greatest level of 
sophistication. “Premeditative deceptions are designed and implemented based on 
experience, knowledge of friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities, and, moreover, 
observations about the target’s sensors and search strategies.”156 Complex deceptions, 
such as Operation FORTITUDE, are at the premeditative level of sophistication. 
c. Effect-Based 
Bell and Whaley in Cheating and Deception present an effect-based 
taxonomy of deception that categorizes deception by what the deception does. This 
taxonomy has two broad subdivisions: hiding and showing. Hiding deceptions seek to 
obscure indicators, and consist of masking, repackaging, and dazzling. Masking 
deceptions hide by blending the object into the background, as in camouflage. 
Repackaging deceptions hide the real by making the object appear as something 
innocuous, e.g., a bunker made to look like a food stand. Finally, dazzling seeks to 
confound the target about certain aspects of an object, such as using multiple radio 
transmitters to confuse the target of a unit’s true location. Showing deceptions seek to 
present misleading indicators to the target and consist of mimicking, inventing, and 
decoying. Mimicking deceptions recreate the characteristics of an object for advantage, 
such as using a company of soldiers to replicate a division. Inventing deceptions mislead 
via creation of new objects, as in notional documents. Decoying misleads by presenting 
alternate options as the actual option, such as the First U.S. Army Group being used to 
mislead German leadership as to the actual target of Operation OVERLOAD.157 
C. DECEPTION AND UNCERTAINTY 
1. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of military operations. Despite the desires of 
every commander, a perfect understanding of the situation is impossible.158 Among the 
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phenomena creating uncertainty are inadequacy of collection channels, infiltration of  
noise corruption, and the fundamental inability to read the opponent’s mind. The 
compounded result of these phenomena is an obscuration of the situation, as if a 
metaphorical fog had settled over the field. As Whaley states: 
It [“the fog of war”] refers to the chaos of information inherent in the fast-
breaking crisis of battle--the confusing muddle of delayed and mislaid 
messages, garbled and misunderstood orders, fragmentary and 
misinformed intelligence, pridefully exaggerated claims of successes and 
cringingly suppressed reports of blunders. In other words, “the fog of war” 
is the state of uncertainty resulting from the inability of a military 
information system to either accurately or speedily monitor the events of 
battle. The battle maps and situation reports become jangled 
representations of fiction and fact. The Commander neither knows what he 
knows nor can be certain of what he doesn’t know. Crucial decisions 
about deployment, tactics, and strategy are made with the most 
fragmentary information.159 
Deception and uncertainty enjoy a complex relationship. The fog of war created 
by uncertainty provides the necessary environment for deception. If the enemy possessed 
perfect situational awareness deception would be almost impossible. Deception in turn 
can be used to either thicken the fog of war—increasing the target’s uncertainty—or 
deception can be used to present a false parting of the fog—decreasing the target’s 
uncertainty—by revealing vista of the deceiver’s making. Deception used to increase 
uncertainty is often referred to as ambiguity increasing, or A-Type, deception. Deception 
used to create a false reduction of uncertainty is often referred to as misleading, or M-
Type, deception.160 
2. A-Type Deception 
A-type deceptions seek to increase the ambiguity of a situation so that the target 
becomes “…unsure as to what to believe.”161 Ambiguity can be increased through the 
use of covering deception to obscure the real situation, through the use of active 
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deception to present a number of reasonable alternatives to the real, or a mixture of both 
aspects. A-type deceptions can be attempted solely through the use of covering aspects, 
such as a unit camouflaging itself in a wood line. One of the goals of A-type deceptions is 
to cause the target to delay decision-making in the hopes of further information, thereby 
allowing the deceiver to seize or retain initiative. Another goal is to cause the target to 
spread their forces in an effort to cover every potential outcome, thus affording the 
deceiver the opportunity to achieve relative superiority at the point of decision.162 
3. M-Type Deception 
M-type deceptions “…reduce ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one 
wrong alternative.”163 All M-type deceptions utilize covering deception to obscure the 
true situation, while using active deception to present the false situation. One goal of M-
type deceptions is for the target to concentrate resources against the deception, allowing 
the deceiver opportunity to successfully conduct the true plan.164 For example, the 
ambush of the Japanese fleet at Midway was facilitated by deceptive radio traffic which 
created the perception that Admiral Halsey’s fleet was still in the vicinity of the Solomon 
Islands.165  
D. THE WHY OF DECEPTION 
1. Overview 
As discussed previously, deception is not undertaken for the sake of deception; 
deception is conducted to drive the behavior of the target to achieve some benefit for the 
practitioner or some deleterious effect for the target. Four reasons are typically given for 
the use of deception: to achieve surprise, to gain freedom of action, to save lives, and to 
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mislead the enemy.166 In addition to these reasons, there are four other reasons for 
attempting deception: to secure relative superiority at the point of decision, security, 
subversion, and mental isolation.  
2. Surprise 
Surprise is the most common reason cited for the use of deception. Surprise in the 
military context is defined as: “[striking] the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for 
which he is unprepared.”167 There can be no question of the role of surprise in war; of 
122 battles surveyed in Whaley’s classic study, the casualty ratio in battles without 
surprise was one-to-one; however, the casualty ratio where surprise was achieved was 
one-to-five in favor of the initiator.168 Deception is the handmaiden of surprise as the 
secrecy necessary for surprise to succeed “…cannot be obtained by ‘saying nothing.’ 
Secrecy requires the systematic confusion and deception of the enemy.”169  
3. Freedom of Action 
Deception can enhance freedom of action by decreasing the chance of enemy 
interference. Disguising movements of personnel, materials, and equipment as something 
innocuous can facilitate staging for future operations. Deceptions designed to prevent the 
target from interdicting lines of communication support freedom of action. Deception can 
also be used to assist the movement of key leaders. For example, President Roosevelt’s 
secret meeting with Prime Minister Churchill to hammer out the Atlantic Charter in the 
fall of 1941 was facilitated by a portrayal depicting the president as being on a fishing 
trip off Cape Cod.170 
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4. Save Lives and Resources 
Deception can be used to save lives and resources in three ways. First, through the 
achievement of surprise, gaining of freedom of action, and securing of relative 
superiority, deception can reduce the amount of fighting necessary to reach a decision, 
thus reducing casualties and material costs. Second, deception can be used to elicit 
surrender, thereby avoiding conflict all together. Nathan Bedford Forrest used a ruse 
involving a notional secret weapon to successfully elicit the surrender of four Union 
blockhouses during the Civil War.171 Finally, deception can be used in the retrograde to 
decrease the risk to the withdrawing troops. During the Korean War, 7th Division used the 
fact that the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Pork Chop Hill were conditioned to seeing 
armored personnel carriers resupplying U.S. forces on the crest of the hill. When the 
decision was made to withdraw the forces, rather than risk a night withdrawal, the forces 
were withdrawn using armored personnel carriers mimicking a supply run.172 
5. Mislead the Target 
“Deception is by itself an asymmetric approach to warfighting: tricking the 
opponent into misapplying strengths and revealing weaknesses.”173 A 1948 Department 
of Army memorandum on strategic and tactical cover and deception training provided ten 
specific examples of desired outcomes for deception operations (Table 3). These 
outcomes were divided into positive reactions—the target takes an action to its detriment-
-and negative reactions—the target fails to take an action to its detriment.  
How deception can be used to mislead the target into not exploiting a weakness is 
illustrated by an example from the Vietnam War. A brigade commander was ordered to 
detach two battalions to support another operation, and the brigade commander realized 
that to do so would offer the Viet Cong an opportunity to exploit the reduction in forces 
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in his area of operations. In order to support the requirement while preventing the Viet 
Cong from seizing the advantage, the brigade commander directed support personnel to 
portray the advance parties of another division while spreading the rumor that the 
portrayed division would be assuming control of the area of operations. The combination 
of the portrayal and the ruse caused the Viet Cong to go to ground, denying them the 
opportunity to exploit the brigade’s temporary loss of maneuver forces.174 
 
Positive reactions by target to deception 
1- Movement of reserves and their premature commitment to erroneous positions 
2- Engagement by enemy in activities which exhaust his resources and/or prohibits their use elsewhere 
(i.e., extensive defensive preparations) 
3- Dispersal or over-extension of enemy forces 
4- Diversion of enemy thrusts 
5- Disclosure of enemy positions 
Negative reactions by target to deception 
1- Failure to move reserves to meet intended offensives 
2- Failure to exploit our weaknesses 
3- Failure of counterattack 
4- Failure to disengage 
5- Failure to locate and act against true positions of artillery, reserves, dumps, etc. 
Table 3.   Examples of Target Responses to Deception.175 
6. Relative Superiority 
Relative superiority is the “condition that exists when an attacking force… gains a 
decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended force.”176 Deception, along with 
surprise and maneuver is an essential tool for gaining relative superiority.177 
Demonstrations and feints that draw away the defender’s reserves from the point of 
decision assist in the achievement of relative superiority. The aspects of Operation 
FORTITUDE that caused the German command to retain forces in Pas de Calais even after 
the Normandy landing assisting in the Allies gaining and maintaining relative superiority 
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at the Normandy beachhead. Use of deception to bait a superior force into an ambush is 
time honored technique used by inferior forces to gain relative superiority. 
7. Security 
Deception can be a vital asset for maintenance of security. “Real secrecy can only 
be achieved if, in addition to the correct information which the enemy receives, he is also 
provided with incorrect information. Confusion is the only effective method of 
maintaining secrecy.”178 This is especially true for irregular warfare and intelligence 
operations. Deception in support of security typically relies heavily on camouflage and 
denial. In addition to the cover aspects, ruses in the form of cover stories and notional 
documents are used frequently. Status for cover and status for action are terms for the 
cover stories developed to protect intelligence operatives and facilitate their missions. 
MACVSOG utilized a set of cover stories for the overall organization, subordinate 
elements, and even missions in an effort to obscure its activities.179 The cover for status 
of MACVSOG stated the organization was simply a special staff section focused on the 
comprehensive study of counterinsurgency operations, with no implementation 
authority.180  
8. Subversion 
Subversion is defined as: “Action designed to undermine the military, economic, 
psychological, or political strength or morale” of a targeted organization.181 Deception 
can be used in a subversion role, by exploiting internal cleavages within the targeted 
organization in order to foment mistrust and discord. In addition to mistrust and discord, 
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subversive deception can be used to introduce friction into the target’s decision cycle and 
actions; thereby, reducing the overall effectiveness of the target.182 Subversion by 
deception may be particularly effective when used against organizations sensitive to 
internal threats; such as, networked terrorist groups and authoritarian regimes. 
MACVSOG’s use of poison pen letters to increase distrust within the North Vietnamese 
leadership is an example of deception to achieve subversion.183 
9. Mental Isolation 
Deception Mental isolation occurs when the target is unable to perceive or make 
sense of the situation.184 The ultimate goal of mental isolation is to reduce the target to 
passivity or paralysis as the target is unable to appreciate or cope with the practitioner’s 
actions.185 Deception in support of mental isolation seeks to create an impenetrable fog 
of war through camouflage and denial, while increasing uncertainty and ambiguity by the 
presentation of conflicting information through what channels the target retains access 
to.186 The effective mental isolation and subsequent paralysis of a target can negate the 
target’s fighting power and thus ability to resist.187 During the Six-Day War, Israeli 
Military Intelligence attempted a form of mental isolation against Arab forces. Operation 
FOG OF BATTLE “misled top enemy commanders, drew them into traps, diverted their 
forces in the wrong directions, spread confusion and chaos within upper level enemy 
headquarters, and speeded up the process of demoralization and disintegration of the 
channels of command.”188 
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E. COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS OF DECEPTION 
1. Overview of Communications 
In order to understand deception, it is necessary to look at the context in which 
deception is practiced. Of importance to the understanding of deception are the 
communications environment and the target’s decision-making process. Roberta 
Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision provides insight to the role of noise 
within the communications process. Wohlstetter defines noise as competing or 
contradictory signals that are useless for understanding a situation.189 William Reese’s 
“Deception within a Communications Theory Framework” presents an overview of 
communications theory that is critical to understanding the process by which information 
is transmitted from the practitioner to the target. Reese includes in his work the roles of 
channels and indicators; as well as, the ways by which errors enter the process.190 
Whaley and Bell’s collaboration Cheating and Deception; as well as, Bell’s “Toward a 
Theory of Deception” discuss how deception works through communication.  
Deception occurs within the framework of communication (Figure 6). An actor is 
constantly emitting indicators of his actions, capabilities, and intentions into the 
environment, and is likewise constantly receiving indicators from other actors. Indicators 
travel from one actor to another via channels. Some indicators are not perceived by the 
target due to the lack of a viable channel to convey the information. Other indicators are 
corrupted by errors of encoding, transmission, or decoding. The corruption of indicators 
is a form of noise. The indicators an actor receives from other actors in the environment 
constitute another form of noise. The limited set of indicators that do reach the target are 
what the target relies on to form the perceptions of the practitioner for use in the target’s 
decision-making process. Because the target does not have access to all the indicators of 
the practitioner, the target never has a complete picture of the actor’s intentions, 
capabilities, and actions.  
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Figure 6.   Communications Cycle 
As Figure 6 shows, deception works within the communications process. The 
practitioner is constantly emitting indicators of his actions into the environment. Some 
indicators are not seen by the target as there is no channel to convey the indicator to the 
target. The white indicators represent indicators of the practitioner’s true capabilities and 
intentions. The grey indicators represent deceptive indicators. The dashed line indicator 
represents an indicator obscured through cover means. The In8j=kator indicator 
represents an indicator corrupted by errors in encoding, transmission, or decoding. The 
cross-hatched channel is a channel closed through denial means. Finally, the noise arrows 
represent indicators from other actors or the environment that interfere with the target’s 
perception of the practitioner’s indicators. The process depicted is one-half of the 
complete communications process. There is a mirror process running from the target to 
the practitioner as indicated by the black arrow. 
2. Indicators 
Indicators are individual snippets of information about the capabilities, intentions, 
and actions of an actor created through the actor’s interaction with the environment. 
Indicators can take myriad forms and include exercises and training events; personnel and 
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equipment movements; updates on social network sites and other communications 
activity; and solicitations for contracts.191 These pieces of information can be real or 
deceptive. The purpose of deceptive indicators is to provide the target with the 
information required for the target to draw the conclusion that the deception story is 
reality.  
Indicators, whether real or notional, are subject to errors in encoding, 
transmission, and decoding. Errors in encoding occur at the origin of the indicator and 
may result from typographical or syntax errors, improper execution of guidance, and 
translation errors. For example, a notional identification document with an outdated 
stamp is an error in encoding. Errors in transmission alter the indicator as it transits a 
channel from the transmitter to the receiver and can occur due to noise causing 
corruption, interaction with the channel causing changes to the indicator, or the failure of 
the channel to pick up the indicator. Technical faults in the target’s reconnaissance plane 
resulting in indicators of troop movements not being observed is an example of an error 
in transmission. Errors in decoding enter the indicator as it is being processed by the 
receiver, and can include mistakes in interpretation and failures in perception. An 
imagery analyst mistaking a tank for a truck is an error in decoding.192 
3. Channels 
Channels are “the specific ways in which information about a given subject 
reaches an audience.”193 For deception, the most commonly used channel is the 
intelligence collection capabilities of the target. Intelligence channels consist of the suite 
of intelligence collection capabilities, e.g., human, signals, open source, and imagery. 
Examples of intelligence channels range from the double agents used by Britain in World 
War II as part of the Double Cross system to notional radio traffic.194 In addition to 
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intelligence collection channels, there are many other channels for indicators to reach the 
target (Table 4). One of the goals of cover is to reduce the number of channels available 
to adversarial intelligence collection, as restricting channels makes the intelligence 
collection more dependent on the remaining channels, and reduces the likelihood of 
indicators of the actual plan reaching the target. Channels can be preexisting or created in 
support of the deception plan. The use of a corpse by British intelligence during WWII to 
convey notional plans to German intelligence is an example of a created channel.  
Intelligence Human, Signal, Imagery, Measures, Electronic 
Traditional Media Newspapers, Radio, Television, Handbills, Leaflets, Loudspeakers 
Internet Social Media Sites, Commercial Email, Notional Sites 
Military Communications Radio, Official Email, Orders, Radar 
Diplomacy Negotiations, Communiques, Official statements 
Other Word-of-mouth, Surveys, Telephone 
Table 4.   Examples of Channels 
4. Deception’s Role in the Communications Process 
In addition to deception operating within the communications framework, 
deception affects the communications process itself on a number of levels. Indicators can 
be camouflaged to prevent the target from recognizing the indicators. Alternatively, 
indicators can be reduced through various security measures. Channels can be closed off 
via denial capabilities. For indicators that cannot be hidden from the target by cover tools, 
simulations and portrayals can be used to drown the indicator in a sea of noise. 
F. DECEPTION AND TARGET DECISION-MAKING 
To understand how deception affects the target, it is imperative to understand how 
decisions are made. Decision-making is not a rigid process of whereby two individuals 
can see the same indicator, reach the same conclusion, and act the same way; rather, 
decision-making is subject to numerous schemata—cultural, personal, and cognitive—the 
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composite of which is unique to every individual. Colonel John Boyd’s “Organic Design 
for Command and Control” introduces a framework for the decision-making process, the 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop.195 The OODA places decision-making in an 
iterative process where perceptions are created by the synthesis of new information and 
existing perceptions through the schematic lenses. From the revised perceptions, 
decisions are made, driving actions and inaction. While Boyd includes the lenses in his 
decision-making framework, he does not go into depth discussing how culture, personal 
experiences, and genetic heritage impact decisions. 
Richard Heuer’s Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, though intended as a tool 
for intelligence analysts contains a trove of information for the deception practitioner. Of 
particular use is Heuer’s discussion of cognitive biases. Cognitive biases are defined by 
Heuer as “mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies… a 
cognitive bias does not result from any emotional or intellectual disposition towards a 
certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing 
information.”196 Heuer categories the cognitive biases by their effect on intelligence 
analysis: “evaluation of evidence, perception of cause and effect, estimation of 
probabilities, and retrospective evaluation of intelligence reports.”197  
Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz’s Counterdeception Principles and 
Applications for National Security expands the discussion of biases by adding three 
additional categories: personal, cultural, and organizational. Personal biases “are the 
result of personality traits and the firsthand experiences that affect a person’s world view 
throughout the course of their life.”198 Cultural biases are “the result of interpreting and 
judging phenomena in terms particular to one’s own culture and is influenced by the 
knowledge, beliefs, customs, morals, and habits, and cognitive styles that are acquired as 
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a member of one’s specific social environment.”199 Organizational biases are “the result 
of the goals, mores, policies, and traditions that characterize the specific organization in 
which the individual works.”200 Bennett and Waltz’s expansion of biases increases the 
number of potential levers a deception practitioner has to influence the deception target. 
In order to explore how deception affects the target, an expanded version of the 
OODA process is used to represent the target’s decision-making process. The OODA 
process consists of four interconnected phases: observe, orient, decide, and act (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7.   Expanded OODA Process (From: 201) 
1. Observe 
During the observe phase, the target interacts with the environment, actively and 
passively collecting indicators in an effort to gain an understanding of the situation. 
Despite the wishes of every actor, it is impossible to collect a perfect picture of the 
situation as some indicators are missed and others corrupted by transmission and coding 
                                                 
199 Bennett and Waltz, Counterdeception Principles, 72. 
200 Bennett and Waltz, Counterdeception Principles, 74. 
201 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York, NY: Back Bay 
Books, 2002), 344. 
66 
errors. The inability to perceive the total picture is the “fog of war.” Additionally, the 
target’s existing perceptions of the environment and situation affect which indicators the 
target observes.202 As Thomas Kuhn states: “What a man sees depends both upon what 
he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him 
to see.”203 It is during the observation phase the deception practitioner interacts with the 
target. Through camouflage, indicators of friendly activity are obscured from target 
collection. Furthermore, through denial, target collection channels are closed off, 
preventing the collection of unobscured indicators—both friendly and other actor. 
Finally, through active deception, manipulated or manufactured indicators are presented 
for collection, which taken together tell the deception story. Through these means, the 
fundamental effects of deception in the observe phase are to either thicken the fog of war 
by increasing ambiguity or uncertainty by obscuring indicators, or to part the fog of war 
by seeming to decrease ambiguity or uncertainty through the presentation of indicators 
revealing a misleading picture of the situation. It is necessary to understand the collection 
capabilities of the target in order to increase probability of reception of the manipulated 
indicators; as well as, to prioritize camouflage and denial activities towards protecting 
vulnerable indicators. Equally important is an understanding of what the target expects to 
see from the practitioner; in other words, the practitioner needs to develop a detailed 
understanding of self through the lens of the target. 
2. Orient 
After the observe phase, the target transitions to the orient phase. During the 
orient phase, the target processes the collected indicators through a series of schemata 
and synthesizes the result with the target’s existing perceptions to create revised 
perceptions of the environment and situation. Schemata are defined as: “…the dynamic, 
cognitive knowledge structures regarding specific concepts, entities, and events used by 
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individuals to encode and represent incoming information efficiently.”204 These schemata 
create biases in the way the target perceives and processes information. Schemata can be 
categorized as cultural, personal, and genetic. Cultural schemata include the collective 
experiences, legacies, biases, and heuristics developed by organized groups. Personal 
schemata include personal experiences and the resultant biases and heuristics. Genetic 
schemata include the cognitive biases and heuristics developed through conflict based 
natural selection. Schemata and the resultant biases can both aid and hinder deception 
efforts. 
a. Cultural Schemata 
Cultural schemata are the collective set of knowledge, beliefs, 
experiences, values, and norms for a distinct aggregate of people with similar 
characteristics, e.g., state, ethnic group, region, religion, and organization. A target can be 
influenced by several different sets of cultural schemata, for example, a Sunni Muslim 
Iraqi Kurd is influenced by the schemata for his Sunni Islam, Iraqi, and Kurdish aspects. 
While members of a particular culture are not perfectly uniform in their cultural 
schemata, understanding the culture of the target is vital to the success of deception. 
Culture can be a source of trappings for a deception to increase its legitimacy, for 
example, the Sacred Sword Patriots League deception in Vietnam was based in a 
Vietnamese legend of a divine sword given to a prince to drive out the occupying 
Chinese.205 Additionally cultural biases can impact the credibility given to different 
channels. For example, in a country without a tradition of free press, there may be less 
credibility given to traditional media channels. Likewise, in societies with a strong oral 
tradition; such as Arab societies, word of mouth channels may have higher credibility 
than in societies without a strong oral tradition. Understanding the degree to which a 
culture values certain channels can help in deciding which channels to priorities for 
exploitation or denial. 
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Much like the social groups, organizations possess a distinct set of 
schemata that influence information processing. These schemata in turn generate 
organizational biases. An example of an organizational bias with applicability to 
deception operations occurred in the Burma Campaign of World War II. The Japanese 
command in Burma did not trust its intelligence analysts. British efforts to deceive the 
Japanese commander failed because of this bias against the intelligence analysts, the 
deception indictors presented by the British never impacted the Japanese commander’s 
decisions.206 A second example of organizational schemata impacting deception, this 
time to negative results, occurred as part of British plans to invade Italian controlled 
Abyssinia [Ethiopia]. The British plan called for an attack into northern Ethiopia, and a 
deception to make it appear the attack would come from the south. The British 
successfully deceived the Italians into believing the attack would come from the South; 
however, the British failed to account for the Italian Army’s desire to avoid combat. 
Rather than reinforcing the southern approaches to repulse the perceived British 
offensive, the Italians withdrew northward, towards the actual British offensive.207 [This 
episode led to Dudley Clarke’s admonishment to plan deception in terms of the target’s 
actions, and not the target’s perceptions] 
b. Personal Schemata 
Whereas the cultural schemata are the result of the social environment, 
personal schemata are the result of the one’s experiences, motivations, and emotions. 
Four variables impacting the degree to which an experience might affect an individual’s 
worldview: whether the experience was first hand; how early the event occurred in the 
individual’s lift; how important the consequences of the event were to the individual or 
his nation; and whether the individual has a sufficient range of experience to develop 
alternative perceptions.208  
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Within the context of deception, personal create exploitable 
vulnerabilities. For example, the paranoia of Stalin about internal security threats created 
a vulnerability which German intelligence exploited by creating a set of notional dossiers 
detailing Soviet officers’ interactions with German intelligence officers. In a brilliant 
move, the dossiers were not created from scratch; rather Abwher used dossiers from an 
actual episode of German-Soviet military cooperation in 1927 as the basis for the 
notional dossiers. By modifying existing documents, Abwher managed to expediently 
create dossiers with an air of believability—the best deceptions are built on truth. While 
it cannot be proven the deception led to the subsequent purge by Stalin of not only the 
officers in the dossiers, but over 20,000 personnel, including a majority of senior leaders, 
the timing would seem to indicate a connection. The decimation of the Soviet armed 
forces during the 1937–1939 purge significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Soviet 
armed forces prior to Operation BARBAROSSA.209  
c. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
Cognitive biases and heuristics are what the OODA loop considers to be 
genetic heritage; that is cognitive biases and heuristics have developed through natural 
selection. There are many cognitive biases and heuristics; the ones most pertinent to 
deception are: small numbers, anchoring, confirmation, Rubicon, and availability. 
Small numbers bias, also known as representativeness, is the tendency to 
overestimate the reliability of a small sample to be representative of the total set. 
Furthermore, this bias creates overconfidence in observed patterns and early trends. 
Taken together, this means that the perceptions of individuals are created by a smaller set 
of information than is thought.210 Deception benefits from the small number bias by 
lessening the number of indicators needed to generate the required perception. However, 
the small numbers bias also increases the difficulty of shifting initial perceptions. 
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Anchoring heuristic also impacts how an individual adjusts an existing 
perception based on new information. There is a tendency for the starting perception to 
act as friction on any adjustments so that the adjusted perception may be closer to the 
starting position than appropriate.211 Anchoring’s importance to deception is twofold. 
First, anchoring reinforces the maxim that deceptions should use the target’s existing  
perceptions. Second, anchoring indicates a need to ensure when deception is in support of 
a specific plan that the deceptive indicators are transmitted before indicators of the actual 
plan begin transmission.  
Confirmation bias exhibits itself in the tendency of individuals to interpret 
new information in ways supportive to the individual’s established perceptions.212 
Confirmation bias is one reason why deceptions that exploit existing target perceptions 
are preferable to deceptions that seek to change target perceptions. Additionally, 
confirmation bias is another reason to seek to implement deception prior to the target 
forming its initial perceptions. If the initial perceptions are formed relying on deceptive 
indicators, then confirmation bias will generally work to support the deception. 
Rubicon bias is the tendency of individuals to place greater confidence in 
a decision once the decision is made. Prior to making a decision, an individual tends to 
evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of the various options in reasonably deliberative 
manner—subject to the lenses of personal experience and other biases and heuristics. 
However, once a decision is made, the individual tends to view that decision as being the 
best possible decision.213 Along with confirmation bias, the Rubicon bias suggests that 
deceptions should seek to leverage existing perceptions; rather than seeking to create new 
perceptions.  
The availability heuristic expresses itself in the tendency of a person to 
evaluate the likelihood of an event based on “…the ease with which they can imagine 
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relevant instances of the event and the number or frequency of such events that they can 
easily remember.”214 In addition to recall, the availability heuristic also depends on the 
ability of a person to imagine an event. The availability heuristic impacts deception on 
several levels. First, since successful deceptions are often related to significant events, the 
availability heuristic can cause the perception of deception where none exists. Next, since 
the availability heuristic relies on recall and imagination, deception can be used to reduce 
or increase the perceived probability of an event. Finally, since the availability heuristic 
utilizes the probable, deception can be used to protect the unexpected by providing 
plausible explanations; for example, protecting human agents by attributing collected 
information to signals intelligence assets. 
d. Results of Orientation 
The results of the orient phase are revised perceptions of the situation and 
environment that are fed into the decide phase. Gaps in information identified during the 
analysis and synthesis can result in new requirements for the observe phase. Additionally, 
the revised perceptions impact how the expectancy bias affects the collection of new 
information. Successful deception corrupts the outputs of the orientation phase causing 
the target to perceive the situation as the deceiver intends. 
3. Decide 
Once the indicators are synthesized and analyzed, and the target’s revised 
perception of the situation is created, the process transitions to the decide phase. During 
the decide phase, the target uses his perception to develop his courses of action. This 
phase marks the transition of the target from a deliberative mind-set to an implementation  
mind-set.215 In addition to the decide phase feeding forward into the act phase, feedback 
from the decision phase feeds back into the observe phase as new information 
requirements. 
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4. Act 
Finally, the chosen courses of action are implemented. These activities create 
indicators via interaction with the environment. It is at this point a successful deception 
plan reaches fruition though the target’s implementation of the decided actions or 
inactions based on the manipulated perception. If the deception story is accepted and 
acted upon, there should be evidence in the indicators created by the target’s activities.  
While indicators of successful deception are important, equally as important are 
indicators of deception failure; the deception practitioner should seek to collect indicators 
looking for feedback that the deception did not work. 
G. DECEPTION PROCESS 
1. Bell and Whaley 
Bell and Whaley present the deception process as a deception planning loop that 
begins with the development of a desired deception goal in support of the strategic goal. 
The first half of the loop is the decision sector where the potential stratagem, illusion, 
channel, ruse, and characteristics are considered. The second half of the loop, the 
perception sector, executes the characteristics to drive the ruse through the selected 
channel in order to generate the intended illusion to activate the chosen stratagem to 
achieve the deception goal216 (Figure 8). Bell and Whaley’s process is demonstrated 
using their example from Cheating and Deception in figure 9. Bell and Whaley’s 
deception planning process is thorough, but falls short of its potential. One key 
shortcoming is that the process ends with what the target thinks, rather than what the 
target does. This runs the risk of the target thinking what the deceiver desires, but not 
acting in the desired way. 
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Figure 8.    Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Loop (From: 217)  
 
Figure 9.   Example of Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Process in Action 
(From: 218) 
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2. See-Think-Do 
An alternate deception process is articulated in Joint Publication 3-31.4: Military 
Deception. JP 3-13.4 utilizes a three step deception process: See-Think-Do. In the See-
Think-Do model, the deception practitioner first decides what action or inaction the target 
must do in order to support the overall plan. This behavior becomes the deception 
objective. Next, the practitioner considers what the target must think in order to cause the 
deception goal. Finally, the practitioner formulates what the target must see in order to 
create the necessary perceptions to drive the target’s thoughts. The set of indicators the 
target needs to see becomes the deception story.219 While this process offers a direct, to 
the point, tool for deception planning, the model oversimplifies the complexities of target 
decision-making. 
3. Revised Deception Process 
Merging Bell and Whaley’s deception planning loop together with the See-Think-
Do process in the context of the communication and decision-making frameworks 
provides a potentially fuller understanding of the deception process (Figure 10) The 
process starts with the identification of a strategic, operational, or tactical objective, e.g., 
establish a beachhead on the mainland of Europe. From this objective a deception 
objective is derived, e.g., German forces reinforce Pas de Calais, leaving Normandy 
thinly defended. Potential deception objectives must be feasible, that is, the target must 
be capable of performing the action or inaction, and the action or inaction must be 
reasonable. Once the deception goal is determined, the next step is to evaluate what the 
target must think in order to drive the desired action, e.g., Pas de Calais is the Allied 
objective. This phase corresponds to the orient and decide stages of the OODA process. 
Critical to the determination of what the target needs to think is the knowledge of what 
the target already thinks; as well as, what cultural, organizational, and personal schemata 
influence the target’s decision-making. In the case of the example, knowing the Germans 
already viewed Pas de Calais as the likely landing zone greatly aided the deception  
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process. Likewise, had this phase revealed the Germans viewed Normandy as the most 
probable target the entire deception, and in deed the entire plan, would have to be 
reevaluated. 
After the desired perception is decided, then the set of indicators necessary to 
create the perception must be designed, e.g., feints in the form of bombing and 
reconnaissance flights over Pas de Calais; disinformation through DOUBLE CROSS 
system; and simulated Allied forces staging across the English Channel from Pas de 
Calais. This set of indicators is what will paint the deception picture for the target to see. 
Again it is vital to understand what the target already perceives, as the existing perception 
not only drives how new indicators are interpreted through filters like the expectancy and 
confirmation biases, but also what the target sees the indicators as. Additionally, the 
channels available for the target to receive indicators must be identified, and of those 
channels which will be denied the target. Finally, based on the analysis of the available 
channels, and the indicators needed for the deception story, a prioritized set of indicators 
of the actual plan lays out what must be hidden from the target. In the example, many of 
the indicators of the Normandy Invasion did not contradict the Pas de Calais deception, 
and thus did not need to be covered; such as, the airborne training operations, and the 
general build up of materials and personnel. This allowed cover efforts to focus on 
protecting critical indicators like the Mulberry harbors. Once the deception plan is 
implemented, collection of enemy indicators is essential. These indicators help the 















Figure 10.   Revised Deception Process 
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V. PRACTICE OF MILITARY DECEPTION 
I feel that deception and cover plans or operations are fully justified and 
that the employment of cover and deception should . . . be an accepted and 
organized procedure for any campaign.  
– General George S. Patton220 
FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception provides a five-step deception planning process. 
Step one—situation analysis—focuses on friendly and enemy situations, target analysis, 
and a stated desired situation. Step two—deception objective formulation—consists of 
determining the five w’s of the deception objective: what action/inaction is necessary to 
achieve the desired situation; who must perform the action/inaction; when and where 
must they act; and who must be affected. Step three—desired perception—develops an 
idea of what the enemy must think to make him act in the desired manner, and what 
perceptions must be created in order to persuade the enemy to think in the desired way. 
Step four—deception story—generates the information that when conveyed to the target 
paints the perception picture for the target. Step five—deception plan—focuses on 
producing the overall plan for how to convey the necessary information to the enemy, as 
well as the recommending the intelligence requirements to look for indicators that the 
plan is working or not.221 
FM 3-13: Information Operations provides a five-step deception planning process 
designed to nest within the Army’s military decision making process [MDMP]. The steps 
to the process as outlined in FM 3-13 are: receipt of the mission; mission analysis; course 
of action development; course of action analysis, comparison, and approval; and orders 
production. Though the names are different than the steps in FM 90-2, the processes 
within the steps are very similar. In addition to the planning process, FM 3-13 provides 
guidance on the preparation, execution, and assessment of the deception plan. 
Interestingly, the initial iteration of the information operations field manual, FM 100-6, 
published in 1996, did not contain a discrete deception planning process.  
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JP 3-13.4: Military Deception, provides a six-step deception planning process 
based on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System [JOPES]. The six steps are: 
deception mission analysis; deception planning guidance; staff deception estimate; 
commander’s deception estimate; deception plan development; and deception plan 
review and approval.222 The content of these steps is similar to the steps in FM 90-2 and 
FM 3-13, with the addition of the SEE—THINK—DO methodology. 
In addition to the preceding examples of doctrinal deception planning, there is a 
vast body of official and unofficial research addressing the planning and practice of 
deception. Exemplars of the official research include the CIA Deception Research 
Program’s Deception Failures, Non-Failures and Why and Deception Maxims: Facts and 
Folklore; the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences’ 
Doing Deception: Attacking the Enemy’s Decision Processes; and Hans von 
Greiffenberg’s Deception and Cover Plans Project #29, which analyzes German 
deceptions during World War II. Representative of the unofficial research is Benjamin 
Higginbotham’s “On Deceiving Terrorists,” which looks at using deception against non-
state actors. 
Finally, there are a number of historic accounts of deception planning and 
execution to draw from, with much of the work covering the World War II era. For 
example, Roger Hesketh’s Fortitude represents the official history of the London Control 
Section’s pinnacle operation. Similarly, the Official History of the 23rd Headquarters 
Special Troops details the unit’s creation and conduct of tactical deception in the 
European Theater of Operations. David Mure’s Master of Deception covers Dudley 
Clarke’s A-Force in North Africa, and includes a memo from Clarke outlining his 
thoughts and observations on deception. Anthony Cave Brown’s Bodyguard of Lies is a 
massive tome covering nearly the totality of Allied deception, espionage, and clandestine 
operations in the European Theater of Operations. The critical value of these works is 
their discussion of deception in real world application—outside the realm of theory.  
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A. DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS 
The 2012 edition of JP 3-13.4 utilizes a six-step process for planning deception: 
deception mission analysis, deception planning guidance, staff deception estimate, 
commander’s deception estimate, deception plan development, and deception plan review 
and approval.223 This planning process will serve as the framework for the discussion of 
deception planning, with modifications derived from other works.224 
1. Mission Analysis 
The current U.S. military guidance on planning military deception has the military 
deception process overlaid on either MDMP or JOPES planning processes. This is not 
sufficient. Aspects of military deception planning must occur before the beginning of 
formal planning, and ideally the introspective analysis of friendly forces should be a 
continuous process even prior to receipt of a mission. For example, development of 
profiles of potential target leaders must be integrated with ongoing intelligence 
preparations, so that when the planning process begins this vital groundwork is already in 
place. Additionally, a firm understanding of friendly force indicators is necessary in order 
to plan on how to cover critical indicators; as well as, determining what indicators are 
necessary to create the perception of particular activities, e.g., the indicators created by 
pre-deployment preparations. These friendly force indicators should be collected and 
analyzed during routine garrison operations, field training, and actual missions. 
a. Information Requirements 
Information requirements for deception operations are complex, but not 
overwhelming. “In developing such [deception] plans the commander must visualize and 
understand the enemy viewpoint….”225 As TC 30-1 states:  
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Success of cover and deception is dependent on the ability of the deceiver 
to predict the probable enemy reaction. The staff charged with the 
deception planning must be able to think as the enemy does and not react 
as a friendly commander transplanted into the enemy situation. This is 
possible only as a result of a thorough understanding of the enemy, his 
culture, and military system. The enemy intelligence system must be 
evaluated because this system is the vehicle that carries the deception 
story to the enemy commander. Determination must be made regarding 
the enemy’s characteristics, his habits that make him vulnerable to 
deception, and those aspects that present the least likely deception target. 
…if possible, we should know the characteristics of the enemy 
commander, to include the degree of freedom allowed subordinates, his 
reaction time to new situations, and how this fear of the unknown 
influences his actions. A single known characteristic of a commander is 
more important than the entire statistical record of his military career.226  
Note, while TC 30-1 talks in terms of the “enemy commander,” it is important to realize 
when targeting non-hierarchal organizations such as networked non-state actors, the 
target may not be a “commander;” rather, the target may be someone like a low level 
leader, key financier, or technician. Additionally, the target may not be an “enemy” at all. 
As stated previously, enemies, adversaries, neutral parties, and even friendly parties are 
viable targets of deception, though the risk versus benefit calculations when looking to 
deceive neutral and friendly parties must be examined closely. 
The practitioner must also have knowledge of the channels available for both real 
and deceptive indicators to reach the target; as well as, what channels are available for the 
collection of feedback in order to assess the deception operation’s effectiveness. The 
deception practitioner should take every effort reasonable within the constraints of time 
and resources to develop a full understanding to the target. Fortunately, there are several 





                                                 
226 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 15 
81 
Element Product 
Intelligence Intelligence Estimate 
Intelligence Summaries 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
Network Link Analysis 
Counterintelligence Threat Analysis [CITA] 
High Value Individual Target Packets 
Civil Military ASCOPE Analysis 
CMO Estimate 
Military Information Support Target Audience Analysis Worksheets [TAAW] 
MISO Estimate 
OPSEC Critical Information  
OPSEC Indicators 
Chaplain Religious Assessment 
Interagency Country Studies 
Key Leader Profiles 
Commercial Databases Open Source Information 
Table 5.   Sample Deception Planning Resources 
Not only must the practitioner understand multiple targets’ personal 
characteristics, organization, and culture, the practitioner must also know his own 
organization in order to have a firm grasp of the indicators the organization generates, 
specifically the indicators comprising critical information. Critical information is the set 
of indicators that if pieced together could reveal the friendly force plans, capabilities, and 
intentions. The list of critical information should normally be produced by the OPSEC 
officer. A thorough knowledge of friendly forces is required as well for effective 
portrayals and simulations. One of the critical tasks for the 23rd Headquarters Special 
Troops was the reconnaissance of friendly formations. The signals units collected “…an 
unequalled library of combat [Standard Operating Procedures], [Signal Operating 
Instructions], and radio peculiarities.” Likewise, the 603rd Combat Engineers studied unit 
“atmospherics” and collected samples of unit patches, command post signs, and bumper 
markings to facilitate the impersonation of any unit in the 12th Army Group.227 
The degree to which a practitioner needs to understand his own unit means this 
requirement cannot wait for a specific mission. Ideally, the practitioner’s estimate of the 
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friendly forces should be a continuous process, carried out in garrison, training, and 
actual operations. For this, military deception planning must also be continually nested 
with operations security planning. Understanding the myriad indicators an element on the 
move generates, prior to the start of formal mission planning, allows the military 
deception planner to implement early in the process the necessary cover plans to mask 
real indicators and the necessary deception plans to show the required false indicators. 
Waiting until the beginning of the formal planning process to start will result in delays 
that could allow the indicators of the real plan to be received by the target before the 
military deception plan is even implemented. 
All the information is compiled into a deception estimate. Drawing from various 
sources, suggested elements of the deception estimate include: 
 Potential target decision makers, to include biographical data and 
psychological profiles 
 Existing preconceptions about friendly plans, capabilities, and intentions 
 Target organization for systems of decision-making, information flow, and 
command and control; as well as, organization structure 
 Target intelligence capabilities in order to identify channels 
 Target potential plans, capabilities, and intentions 
 Friendly force plans, capabilities, and intentions to identifying indicators 
 Friendly force critical information 
 Friendly force characteristics; such as, unit designations, leaders, 
insignia228 
2. Planning Guidance 
Deception planning guidance from the commander should focus on the deception 
goal: what the commander wants the target to do, or not to do. Identification of the 
deception goal must be accomplished as early as possible in the planning process so that 
the deception plan has sufficient preparation and execution time to allow the target 
opportunity to take the desired action prior to the execution of the actual plan.229 
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Part of the planning guidance is an analysis of the risks and benefits for the 
various aspects of deception. Deception should be considered for all operations, and 
cover aspects always implemented, as FM 100-5 (1954) states: “…deception is a 
continuing action carried out by all echelons of command in activities such as cover and 
concealment, individual combat, use of dummy positions and installations, and 
decoys.”230  
There are situations where active deception may not be appropriate, or where 
deception should focus on supporting operations security and force protection instead of 
offensive operations. Reference Book 31-40 recommends the following questions be 
considered in order to determine whether active deception should be implemented: 
 Is the… situation such that the [target] is susceptible to deception? 
 Is there a logical opportunity for deception? 
 Are there resources, to include time, available to support the deception? 
 Is the [target] likely to react in the desired manner in this situation?231 
 
The final decision on when and how to implement deception rests with the commander. 
3. Planning Methodology 
a. DO 
With the deception objective identified, the next step is the development 
of the deception story. The story should be developed using the SEE—THINK—DO 
methodology.232 Backwards planning with this methodology starts with the DO step. 
This step takes the deception objective and couples it with a specific target. The result is 
phrased in terms of what the specified target does or does not do—this correlates to the 
act phase of the OODA decision-making process discussed in Chapter IV. For example, a 
deception objective might be: “Republican Guard commander keeps his forces in vicinity 
of Kuwait City.” The deception objective must be evaluated in terms of capability, 
reasonability, and feasibility. If these criteria are not met then the deception objective or 
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target needs to be reassessed. For example, the target of the deception may not have to 
authority to order the desired action; in this case, the target should be shifted to the 
individual with the appropriate authority. 
b. THINK 
The next step of planning the deception story is THINK. During this step, 
the deception practitioner must determine what perception the target needs to develop in 
order to cause the desired action. THINK encompasses the orient and decide phases of 
the OODA decision-making process. A firm understanding of the target’s existing 
perceptions, organizational decision-making processes, and schemata is vital to the 
success of this phase of planning, as each of these influence the target’s decision-making 
process (Figure 7, Chapter IV). Continuing the previous example, if the Republican 
Guard commander is a coward then he may need to think U.S. forces do not intend to 
attack Kuwait City; whereas, if he is not a coward, then he may need to think U.S. forces 
intend to attack Kuwait City. 
c. SEE 
The final step in the SEE—THINK—DO methodology is SEE. During 
this step, the practitioner determines what indicators the target needs to receive in order 
to develop the desired perception. SEE is the observe phase of the OODA decision-making 
process. The deception practitioner must know what channels are available for the target 
to collect indicators. The available channels serve as a limit on the range of deception 
techniques used to create the desired indicators—it is a waste of resources to craft an 
indicator the target cannot see. Finishing the previous example, after assessing that the 
Republican Guard commander is not a coward, it is determined that the channels 
available are best suited for demonstrations of amphibious training, simulations and 
portrayals of force build up along the border of Kuwait, and disinformation activities. 
Paralleling the development of what the target needs to see is the determination of what 
the target cannot be allowed to see. The indicators which might reveal the actual 
operation become the focus for covering deceptions to either obscure these indicators via 
camouflaging actions or by denying the channels capable of conveying the real 
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indicators. The set of desired indicators are then woven together to create the deception 
story. The deception story is the: “scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be 
portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception.”233 
4. Deception Means 
From the list of desired indicators developed during the SEE phase, a series of 
deception events is developed. Deception events are “deception means executed at a 
specific time and location in support of a deception operation.”234 The desired indicators 
are generated by the execution of the deception events. Deception means are the 
“methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the 
deception target.”235 The number of deception means is effectively limitless and is only 
constrained by the imagination and resources of the practitioner. Deception means are 
subdivided into three broad categories: physical, cyber electromagnetic, and 
administration. 
a. Physical 
Physical means are those which activate the senses, principally the senses 
of hearing, vision, and smell. A static display of decoy tanks is an example of a physical 
deception means, as are smoke screens. Physical deception means include morphological 
deceptions that alter the physical characteristics of an object; such as, camouflage paint 
schemes or the frames used to disguise tanks as trucks during World War II.236 
Physical means also utilize actions and behavior to convey or hide 
information from the target.237 Demonstrations and feints are common forms of actions 
as physical means. Behavior can be used to create the perception of a pattern in order to 
condition the target to expect this pattern to continue; for example establishing a routine  
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supply convoy for the purposes of setting an ambush. Alternatively, behavior can be used 
to prevent the target from perceiving a pattern, such as using night movements to conceal 
a build up of forces before an assault. 
Physical means also include sonic deceptions, as in artillery simulators 
and loudspeaker systems. It is important to note that not all sonic deceptions need to 
employ mimicry. One method of sonic deception employed by the 4th Infantry Division 
in Vietnam was the use of artillery fires to mask the sounds associated with infantry units 
occupying night positions.238 Prior to the use of the fires, infantry units risked 
compromising their location due to the sounds associated with preparing and fortifying 
the positions. In an urban environment, or other environments not permissive to artillery 
fires, the sounds of operations on the ground could be masked using helicopter flights or 
loudspeaker operations in the areas surrounding the activity. 
b. Cyber Electromagnetic 
Cyber electromagnetic means utilize cyberspace and the electromagnetic 
spectrum [other than visual] in order to communicate deceptive indicators.239 Deception 
activities within cyberspace include the transmission of notional documents as 
disinformation, portrayals in the form of honeypot systems to bait targets into the 
cyberspace equivalent of ambushes, and the use of camouflaging programs such as an 
onion router or proxy server to provide cover for cyberspace activities. Furthermore, 
overt hacking can be used as a feint in order to distract a systems administrator from 
other cyber warfare activities. 
Deceptions within the electromagnetic spectrum are categorized into three 
types: manipulative, simulative, and imitative. Manipulative electromagnetic deceptions 
eliminate existing or convey misleading indicators, as in transmitting misleading 
information on a network known to be compromised. Simulative electromagnetic 
                                                 
238 Office of the Adjutant General, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Artillery 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1969). http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD0505964, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/AD0505964. 
239 Cyber electromagnetic means replaces the traditional category of technical means in order to 
include capabilities that did not exist when the technical means category was created. 
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deceptions replicate existing or create notional capabilities, such as using radio operators 
to create the emissions of a notional unit. Imitative electromagnetic deceptions introduce 
emissions into the target’s own systems; for example, transmitting false GPS coordinates 
to the target’s navigation system.240 
Targets who make use of electronically disseminated policies and orders 
offer a rich resource for exploitation. These documents reveal a perfect template of what 
right looks like, and if they include copies of official signatures provide a valuable source 
of added credibility. Electronically disseminated notional documents can be used to 
increase friction within the target organization by forcing verification of every 
electronically disseminated documents, or by forcing the target organization to drop this 
method of information distribution altogether. 
c. Administrative 
Administrative means include organizational methods to convey 
misleading or hide real indicators. Examples of administrative means include operations 
security and information security to deny indicators; as well as, Human Intelligence 
officers’ use of agents as channels in support of a ruse. Administrative means also 
include the creation of misleading documents; such as, doctored photographs, notional 
orders, or fake identification. 
One method for developing notional documents is to use existing 
documents as the base. This expedites the work, and helps to ensure that the notional 
document looks like a real document. The exemplar for use of existing documents is the 
German use of decade-old dossiers on Soviet officers as the basis for deceptive dossiers 
implicating these officers in anti-Stalin activities.241 
                                                 
240 For the types of electromagnetic deceptions see: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 
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GPS transponders see: Erica Noane, "Hijacking Satellite Navigation," Massachusetts Institute of 
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5. Execution and Assessment 
a. Execution 
The deception events needed to generate the desired indicators are 
incorporated into a time-phased execution matrix in order to create and maintain the 
desired perception (Table 6). The deception execution matrix should be constructed and 
centrally controlled by the command exercising control of the overall plan. Additionally, 
the deception execution matrix must be nested within the overall mission’s execution 
matrix; however, the deception execution matrix must be kept separate to ensure security.  
Task # Date-Time Objective Action Unit Termination Remarks 
1 Not later than 











Not earlier than 




2 Not later than 
0001 5 Jan 
1991 
Iraqi forces focus 
defensive 
preparations 













Not earlier than 




3 Not earlier 
than 0001 17 
Jan 1991 
Cover movement of 




movement of XVIII 
Corps elements 
through radio silence 
XVIII Corps On order  
3 Not earlier 
than 0001 17 
Jan 1991 
Cover movement of 
XVIII Corps in 
preparation for 
‘Hail Mary’ 
Conduct radio traffic 
mimicking XVIII 




On order  
4 Not earlier 
than 0001 13 
Feb 1991 
Iraqi forces remain 
in defensive 
positions  
Conduct feints and 
probing attacks 






On order  
5 Not earlier 
than H-3 
Draw Iraqi 







Not later than 
H+1 
 
Table 6.   Notional Execution Matrix Based on Events of Operation DESERT STORM242 
Emphasis on attention to detail during execution is critical to crafting a 
believable story. In an after action review of Operation ELEPHANT during World War II, a 
member of the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops lambasted the “bad theatre” of the 
operation. The mission was to portray the 2nd Armor Division so that the actual division 
                                                 
242 Daniel Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Deception: Operational Deception in the Ground 
Campaign,” (Paper, Naval War College, 1991), accessed 24 May 2012, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA253245. The date-time information in the table is notional for the 
purposes of presenting a complete matrix. 
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could move to the front lines unmolested. Personnel were instructed to inflate the decoy 
tanks and then go to sleep with no thought of portraying the activities normally seen in a 
tank unit. Also, the personnel of the 23rd did not wear the patches of the 2nd Armor 
Division units, nor were the decoys painted with the appropriate bumper numbers. These 
shortcomings, taken with the blatant disregard of the 2nd Armor Division for operations 
security during its move, resulted in a very weak ruse.243 It is paramount that attention to 
details be observed during deception operations, as a weak deception execution can result 
in the target recognizing the deception and exploiting it in turn. 
b. Assessment 
One problem with accessing deception effectiveness is that some 
assessments would have to rely on counterfactual information. A comment from Secret 
Soldiers sums up this dilemma: “How many American and British fighting men didn’t 
die because, instead of striking the Allied line at a vulnerable point, the Germans 
discovered a regiment of dummy tanks concealed—but not too well—in the Normandy 
woods and pulled back instead? How many Old Hickories survived the push across the 
Rhine because the Germans were preparing to meet the attack thirty miles away, where 
the Special Troops were sending up their racket on heaters [loud speakers] and radios and 
massing their decoys with the help of stagecraft and impersonation?”244 
This is not to say measures of effectiveness are not necessary; rather, 
measures of effectiveness should be tied to observable indicators that will reveal whether 
the target is acting on the deception. For example, in the case of a feint, a measure of 
effectiveness might be the target moving his reserves to support his lines at the point of 
the feint. In the case of deception for subversion, a measure of effectiveness might be 
reports of red-on-red violence, defections, or an increase in absenteeism with in the 
targeted organization. Measures of effectiveness are turned into intelligence requirements 
for collection. 
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Collecting for deception requires a witting actor on the unit’s intelligence 
staff. This actor serves several functions. First, the individual helps to ensure any 
information requirements for the deception plan are included in the unit’s overall 
collection plan. Second, as information comes into the intelligence section for processing, 
the witting actor looks for indicators that show the target is accepting or rejecting the 
deception. Care must be exercised when looking for indicators that the deception is 
working as this can activate the confirmation bias, causing indicators to the negative to be 
overlooked and ambiguous indicators to be interpreted as positive. Finally, the actor must 
work to ensure the deception indicators do not corrupt the friendly force’s understanding 
of the situation.  
6. Termination 
At some point a deception operation will lose its utility; therefore, deception 
operations need to have a plan for the termination of the deception. JP 3-13.4 provides a 
list of possible termination triggers (Table 7). The termination plan should detail the steps 
taken to dismantle the deception, e.g., the release of units from a feint or demonstration 
and cessation of portrayal radio traffic. It is important to note that the termination plan 
should not be set in stone; as the mission progresses, there may be unforeseen 
opportunities to leverage the deceptions past the original objective. For example, 
Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH remained effective past D-Day with the First U.S. Army 
Group being “transferred” to France in order to maintain pressure on German forces; the 
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Trigger Description 
Successful deception operation The deception objective has been achieved 
its objectives, or run its course 
Change in mission  The mission which the deception supports 
changes to a degree the deception no longer 
has utility 
Recalculated risk or probability of success Some element of the deception estimate 
changes such that the risks or costs to 
friendly forces are no longer acceptable 
Poor timing Deception is proceeding too slowly, or the 
window of opportunity has closed 
New opportunity Circumstances change where deception 
may be less risky or more effective if 
deception efforts are realigned 
Deception compromise There is cause to believe the target is aware 
of at least some aspects of the deception 
plan 
Table 7.   Potential Termination Triggers246 
B. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION 
In addition to the detailed planning processes, a number of authors have published 
sets of deception principles, factors, and maxims. FM 100-5 (1954) and FM 3-13 each 
present their own doctrinal set of principles. The CIA’s maxims from Deception Maxims: 
Fact and Folklore are included in slightly altered form in FM 90-2 (1988) and JP 3-13.4 
(2006). Michael Dewar, Jon Latimer, and Jock Haswell each offer their own take on 
deception principles; though there is a good deal of overlap. Finally, Daniel and Herbig 
provide a set of deception success factors; while Dudley Clarke muses on deception 
reflections. From these various sets of deception guidance, it is possible to synthesize 
seven broad principles for deception practitioners247 (Table 8). 
 
                                                 
246 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, IV-13. 
247 Daniel and Herbig acknowledge the strategic initiative factor is more of an observation than a 
controllable factor for the deception practitioner; therefore, this factor is not included as a principle in the 
composite list. Daniel and Herbig, “Propositions on Military Deception,” 24 – 25. 
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Table 8.   Deception Fundamentals, Principles, and Maxims248 
                                                 
248 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Field Service Regulations—
Operations, 1954, 37 – 38; Deception Research Program, Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore 
(Washington, DC: Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, 1980). Variations 
included in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-2: Battlefield Deception, 1-3 and 
Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4: Military Deception, A1-A2; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 
3-13: Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 4-4; Dewar, The Art of 
Military Deception in Warfare, 14 – 15; Jon Latimer, Deception in War (New York: The Overlook Press, 
2001), 60 – 70; Haswell, The Tangled Web: The Art of Tactical and Strategic Deception, 39 – 41; Daniel 
and Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, 16 – 25; Dudley Clarke, 6 September 1972, “Some 
Personal Reflections on the Practice of Deception in the Mediterranean Theatre from 1941 to 1945,” 
memorandum included in Mure, Master of Deception: Tangled Webs in London and the Middle East, 273 – 
275. 
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1. Know the Target and Exploit Existing Perceptions 
a. Understand the Target 
Knowing the target is essential to successful deception as every target is 
unique. British deception efforts in the Pacific during World War II had to be 
significantly modified from the model of deception operations in North Africa and 
Europe; the Japanese commanders did not trust their intelligence staff like the German 
commanders did.249 Every reasonable effort should be taken to develop an understanding 
of the target’s personal, organizational, and cultural schemata; as well as, to identify any 
existing perceptions. 
b. Exploit Existing Perceptions 
Deception can be used to both reinforce the target’s existing perceptions 
and to change the perceptions. Whenever possible, deceptions should seek to leverage 
existing perceptions as is the far easier of the two endeavors. The anchoring bias 
discussed in Chapter IV works against changing perception, as do several other cognitive 
biases. The idea of using the target’s existing perceptions and beliefs is a common 
admonishment in deception writings, as shown in Table 8. The Magruder Principle from 
the set of deception maxims compiled by in the CIA’s Deception Maxims: Fact and 
Folklore states: “It is generally easier to induce an opponent to maintain a preexisting 
belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief. Thus, it may be more 
fruitful to examine how an opponent’s existing beliefs can be turned to advantage than to 
attempt to alter these views.”250 Reinforcing existing perceptions also leverages 
confirmation bias as discussed in Chapter IV. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH during World 
War II is an exemplar of using deception to reinforce the target’s existing perceptions. In 
this case, the German command expected the inevitable invasion of Europe would come 
at the Pas de Calais. 
This principle is not a hard and fast rule; operational necessity may require 
changing the target’s existing perceptions, as was the case with General Pershing and the 
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reduction of the St. Mihiel salient during World War I. German forces expected General 
Pershing to attack where he intended to attack. General Pershing used a convincing 
demonstration supported by several pieces of disinformation to convince the Germans the 
attack would come elsewhere. As a result, the German’s shifted forces away from the 
point of decision, facilitating General Pershing’s success.251 
c. Avoiding Windfalls 
While the deception practitioner wants the target to receive the deception 
indicators, care must be taken that the deception indicators are not too easily presented to 
the target. Given how difficult intelligence collection can be, there is a natural tendency 
to be suspicious of information too freely gained. FM 3-13 offers two methods to reduce 
target suspicion of windfalls. “The first is the unintentional mistake, designed to make the 
target believe that he obtained the indicator due to a friendly error or oversight.”252 An 
example of an unintentional mistake ruse occurred during deception operations in support 
of the American Expeditionary Force’s assault on the Saint Mihiel salient during World 
War I; General Pershing’s chief of staff left a crumpled sheet of carbon paper with the 
imprint of a disinformation laden memo in the wastebasket of his hotel room, knowing 
the German agents on the hotel staff would find the carbon paper.253 
The second method of reducing suspicion of deception indicators is bad 
luck, which is designed to make the target believe the information was obtained “because 
the source fell victim to uncontrollable circumstances.”254 Though now considered 
apocryphal, Meinertzhagen’s haversack ruse is still a good example of how this method 
can be employed.255 In order to deceive Turkish forces of British intent to capture 
Beershaba, Meinertzhagen developed a notional set of documents indicating the focus of 
                                                 
251 See Chapter VI for a detailed account of the deception in support of the St. Mihiel operation. 
252 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-13, 4-10. 
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British efforts was the capture of Gaza, not Beershaba. Next, Meinertzhagen rode toward 
Turkish lines until he made contact with a Turkish patrol. Once the Turkish patrol began 
pursuit, Meinertzhagen fled, and in his haste lost his haversack containing the notional 
documents. Meinertzhagen took pains to increase the legitimacy of the lost haversack. 
First, Meinertzhagen spattered his haversack with blood so it appeared he had been 
wounded during the encounter. Second, in the days after the encounter, numerous British 
patrols were observed scouring the site of the encounter as if searching for the missing 
haversack.256 
2. Security is Paramount 
Maintenance of security is vital to a successful deception operation. Failure to 
properly secure the deception plan can result in leaked indicators that tip the hand to the 
target. If this occurs, there is a significant risk that the target will in turn deceive the 
practitioner, turning the tables. Hesketh states in the conclusion of his work that one of 
the cases against physical deception is the necessity to let too many people in on the 
secret, increasing security risks.257 Similarly, von Greiffenberg admonishes: “If the 
strictest secrecy is not observed all deception projects—even the smallest—are doomed 
to failure from the very start.”258 
However, security must be balanced with the need for coordination, as too much 
security can undermine the coordination necessary for the deception to succeed. This is 
exemplified by British raid at Saint-Nazaire. The British Air Force was tasked with 
conducting a bombing mission on Saint-Nazaire as a feint to distract the German forces 
from the raiding force; however, the bomber crews were not told of the reason for their 
mission, so when low clouds obscured the target, the mission was called off with minimal 
bombing conducted. The short bombing mission put German forces on alert, rather than  
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the intended effect of providing cover for the raid force. In the after action review, the 
bombing crews were adamant that had they known the true purpose of the bombing 
mission, they would have not have cut the mission short.259 
3. Utilize Flexibility, Variety, and Conditioning 
a. Flexibility 
Deceptions must be flexible and the practitioner ready to revise and adapt 
the plan based on feedback from the target. For example, Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH 
was expected to be terminated shortly after the Normandy landings as the landings would 
betray the Allies true intentions. However, in order to keep the German Fifteenth Army 
from assaulting the Normandy beachhead from its position in the Pas de Calais region, 
the Allies decided to adapt and continue OPERATION FORTITUDE SOUTH’s fiction that the 
Allies still had the capability to attack Pas de Calais. The modified deception plan 
became Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH II, and succeeded in keeping the Fifteenth Army in 
place.260 
b. Variety 
Deceptions should employ variety, both in terms of indicators and 
channels in order to increase the likelihood of the deception story reaching the target. 
Reliance on a limited indicators or channels risks the indicator not being received by the 
target. This can occur either due to noise disrupting the indictor, or if the target is not 
monitoring the channel when the indicator is transmitted. The number of indicators and 
channels needed is dependent on the practitioner’s knowledge of the target. While it is 
possible for a single indicator and channel to be used if the practitioner has direct access 
to the target; such as, General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s’ portrayal of additional troops 
during a parley with a Union stronghold’s commander. However, in general practice, 
there should be multiple indicators and channels. For example, in support of Operation  
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FORTITUDE SOUTH, the Allies used a number of indicators and channels to include: 
several agents of the DOUBLE CROSS system, decoys and dummies to simulate units, radio 
teams to portray units, and disinformation. 
c. Conditioning 
Conditioning, also referred to in literature as “crying wolf,” is a deception 
technique that relies on desensitizing the target to friendly actions. Conditioning seeks to 
create three misconceptions in the target’s mind. First, friendly activities are following a 
routine. Second, the routine is set, with deviation unlikely. Third, because the friendly 
activities are following a set routine, the risk to the target is reduced.261 The 
quintessential example of conditioning is the Egyptian preparations leading up to the 
1973 Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian Army undertook a series of training exercises on 
its side of the Suez Canal, establishing a pattern of behavior. The staging of forces for the 
war followed the pattern of the training exercises, lulling Israeli intelligence into a false 
sense of understanding.  
Stonewall Jackson provides an additional exemplar for conditioning the 
target. Early in the Civil War, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had been allowed to 
maintain its East-West line between Washington and the West, despite a portion of the 
line crossing through Virginia. Jackson, while serving as commander at Harper’s Ferry, 
complained that the trains disrupted his men’s sleep and requested all east bound trains 
run between 11pm and 1am. The railroad company complied in an effort to maintain 
good will. After a while, Jackson requested all west bound trains run at the same time as 
the east bound trains; again the railroad complied. Once the schedule was up and running, 
Jackson used his detachments at Point of Rocks and Martinsburg to trap all the rolling 
stock between them. The trains were then diverted to the south for use by the 
Confederacy.262 
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4. Coordination and Control 
a. Control 
Control of deception planning and execution should reside at the lowest 
echelon capable of executing the plan. For example, an infantry platoon conducting the 
camouflage aspects of cover should maintain control of the plan at the platoon level. 
Control of deception plans requiring external support, e.g., airborne jamming, should be 
controlled at the level capable of coordinating for the support. This allows for von 
Greiffenberg’s guidance that: “One responsible agency issues the order, assigns what 
equipment may be necessary, and supervises the course of the operation as a whole.”263 
At the same time, the commander overseeing the deception operation must “make one 
individual responsible for overseeing a [deception] operation.”264 Having too many 
people “in charge” results in no one being in charge. 
b. Coordination 
Coordination for a deception plan must be made with adjacent units and 
higher headquarters so that deceptive indictors do not contaminate the other units’ 
intelligence collection efforts. Additionally, coordination helps to ensure the deception 
plan nests with and compliments higher and adjacent unit plans, and does not conflict or 
degrade these plans. An example of poor coordinate occurred during the assault on the 
German garrison at Brest during the summer of 1944; the 23rd Headquarters Special 
Troops executed a sonic simulation of tank activity to distract the Germans from the main 
effort. Through a lapse of coordination, Company D, 709th Tank Battalion assaulted 
through the area the 23rd had been conducting its simulation; as a result, the German line, 
alert and reinforced thanks to the deception, decimated the company.265 
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5.  Requirement for Target Action 
For deception to succeed, the target must execute the desired action or inaction; to  
merely change the target’s perception is to waste time and resources. This requirement 
demands the deception practitioner never lose sight of the deception goal. As Dudley 
Clarke declares: 
It is important to appreciate from the start that the only purpose of 
Deception is to make one’s opponent ACT in a manner calculated to assist 
one’s own plans and to prejudice the success of his. In other words, to 
make him do something. Too often in the past we have set out to make 
him THINK something, without realizing that this was no more than a 
means to an end. Fundamentally it does not matter in the least what the 
enemy thinks; it is only what line of action he adopts as a consequence of 
his line of thought that will affect the battle. As a result we resolved the 
principle that a commander should tell his Deception staff what he wants 
the enemy to DO… while it is the duty of the latter to decide, in 
consultation with the Intelligence Staff, what he should be made to 
THINK in order to induce him to adopt the required course of action.266 
6.  Preparation and Timing 
As German General Hans von Greiffenberg states in his survey of German 
deception during World War II: “Deception requires detailed preparation, in which 
details and seeming trifles cannot be overlooked. Only seldom will results be produced 
through improvisation.”267  
Adequate resources must be balanced with economy of force. Economy of force 
dictates that the minimum resources necessary to secondary tasks in order to maximize 
forces available for the main effort. Too many resources diverted to secondary efforts 
may leave insufficient forces for the main effort; conversely, too few resources allocated 
in support of deception can lead to failure. For example, one of the reasons for the failure 
of Operation COCKADE was insufficient forces in support of the deception. Operation 
COCKADE was an Allied deception designed to conceal the weakness of Allied Forces in 
Britain, and to discourage Germany from transferring forces out of Western Europe to the  
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Eastern Front.268 The plan required significant resources for execution, but the supporting 
commands successfully resisted tasking efforts, resulting in an ultimately unconvincing 
deception.269  
With regards to timing, two adversaries arrive at the same conclusion. Von 
Greiffenberg states: “The enemy intelligence must be given opportunities to develop the 
picture which has been arranged.”270 While on the Allied side, Clarke states: “Every 
Deception Plan must be given time to work. It is no good telling a Deception Staff to try 
and influence an enemy ‘at once.’”271 
7. Beware Unintended Consequences 
As with any operation, a deception can cause unintended consequences. These 
consequences can vary from insignificant to potentially catastrophic. “Under certain 
circumstances deceptions can produce effects exactly opposite to the planned objective. It 
is therefore advisable to reflect how such a reversal can be detected in time.”272 The 
famous example of a reversal was Dudley Clarke’s deception of the Italian force in 
Abyssinia; rather than reinforcing the southern flank as intended, the Italian force 
withdrew to the north, directly into the intended path of the actual attack.273 
Operation Desert Storm experienced unintended consequences of the deception 
operations as a result of the deception being perhaps too successful. The threat of an 
amphibious assault caused the Iraqi forces to pull their defenses forty kilometers north of 
the southern Kuwaiti border in an attempt to prevent any amphibious assault from 
flanking the lines. The lack of resistance in southeastern Kuwait allowed coalition forces 
operating in this area to rapidly outpace other elements in the attack. This caused the 
synchronization of coalition efforts to be disrupted; some initiative was sacrificed as units  
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were held back in an effort to regain synchronization. Additionally, the amphibious 
demonstrations sparked the withdrawal of Iraqi forces more quickly than expected, 
complicating the destruction of several key Iraqi elements.274  
C. DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF IRREGULAR OPERATIONS 
History is replete with examples of deception in support of conventional 
operations; deception can support irregular operations as well. Irregular operations 
include unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense, stability 
and humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and cyber warfare.275 While theoretically 
any deception technique can be used in support of any type of operation, certain 
deception techniques lend themselves to the nature of the various types of irregular 
operations. 
1. Unconventional Warfare 
A critical concern for unconventional warfare operations is security, especially 
during the nascent phases of the campaign when the state holds a distinct force advantage 
over the movement. Deception is a vital tool for maintaining the security of both the 
forces working with the guerrilla force and for the guerrilla force as well. Otto Heilbrunn 
in his work Partisan Warfare quotes extensively from an unnamed Vietminh manual on 
the utility of deception in support of guerrilla operations: 
We must act above all when the enemy, full of self-confidence, is 
underestimating us. We then order our men to disguise themselves as 
coolies, as enemy soldiers, as hawkers on their way to the market place. 
Our disguised fighters must exploit the element of surprise in order to 
wipe out the enemy in his fort or garrison. This technique requires 
constant and detailed information; one must be fully informed about the 
enemy’s situation, from the first preparations to the time of execution.276 
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The camouflaging aspects of deception would seem to be of particular importance to an 
unconventional warfare campaign in order to allow the special operations force and the 
guerrilla force to move amongst the population like Mao’s fish.  
The adoption of Afghan sartorial and grooming standards by special operations 
forces elements during the opening phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM served two 
purposes. First, the standards were adopted for the purposes of bridging the cultural 
divide between the SOF elements and the Northern Alliance forces, reducing the “out-
groupness” of the SOF elements and leveraging the influence principle of liking. Second, 
the sartorial and grooming standards increased security for the SOF elements by serving 
as a form of blending cover, decreasing the visual signature of the SOF elements by 
merging them visually with the Northern Alliance forces. 
FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations suggests another 
method of deception in support of security:  
False rumors and false information concerning guerilla strength, location, 
operations, training, and equipment can be disseminated by 
counterintelligence through clandestine nets. Facts may be distorted 
intentionally to minimize or exaggerate guerilla’ capabilities at any given 
time. Although such activities are handled within the intelligence section, 
they must be coordinated with the security section in order to prevent 
inadvertent violations of security.277 
In this method, deception can cause the targeted regime to expend resources chasing 
ghosts, such as MACVSOG creating the perception there were far more agents operating 
within North Vietnam than actually present.  
 Finally, deception in support of subversion can be used to introduce friction to the 
regime’s decision-making process through the use of ambiguity increasing measures. 
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one’s own. Sufficient ambiguity increasing active deceptions coupled strong cover 
deceptions increase friction to the point of inducing mental isolation, with the regime’s 
leadership unable to act.278 
2. Counterinsurgency/Foreign Internal Defense 
Pseudo-operations like those employed by the British in Kenya during the Mau-
Mau uprising may be of use in overcoming the information advantage enjoyed by the 
insurgency through intelligence gathering.279 For example, a pseudo-operation might be 
designed to lure in supporters and potential supporters of the targeted group for the 
purposes of intelligence collection and nuanced influence activities. Care must be 
exercised with pseudo-operations as they thread a fine line with perfidy, international law 
stipulates that while combatants may wear enemy uniforms may be worn, combatants are 
prohibited from fighting in them.280 The Selous Scouts of Rhodesia crossed the line into 
perfidy by attacking an insurgent base camp while portraying Mozambique military 
forces.281 
In addition to pseudo-operations, other deceptions may work to illuminate the 
insurgency. For example, disinformation in the form of forged orders inserted into an 
insurgent network can be used to fix cells of the network in time and space for targeting 
by directing the cell to attend a meeting. The effectiveness of this approach depends on 
the nature of the insurgent group; a strict hierarchal structure will be more susceptible 
than a loose-knit structure. Likewise, disinformation about friendly collection capabilities 
can be used to canalize network communications onto less secure or fewer channels, 
facilitating collection efforts, or to protect existing collection capabilities. For example, 
during World War II, ULTRA was protected at times by attributing the intelligence 
collected to other means. 
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Deception for the purpose of subversion could be used to sow discord amongst 
the insurgent network. This tactic could be particularly disruptive if the practitioner has a 
firm understanding of the network and is able to target the individuals serving as links 
between cells. The British used deception in support of subversion against the Irish 
Republican Army by creating the perception the IRA was riddled with British agents. The 
IRA acted on the perception by conducting an internal witch hunt. The resultant purge of 
misidentified “agents” greatly weakened the organization and allowed the British to reach 
favorable terms for a ceasefire.282 Additionally, since there is an inverse ratio between 
security and efficiency, deception for subversion can be used to cause the target to 
increase security measures to the point of operational ineffectiveness.283 Finally, as 
discussed in the unconventional warfare section, deception in support of subversion and 
mental isolation can be used to introduce friction in the OODA decision-making process, 
potentially negating an inherent advantage of networks. 
One note of caution, as tempting as the idea might seem, false flag attacks on the 
populace for the purposes of discrediting the insurgent group are a fundamentally bad 
idea. The effects on popular support for the host nation government and the U.S. mission 
would be catastrophic if the true nature of the operation were revealed. 
3. Stability Operations / Humanitarian Assistance Operations 
Deception operations in support of stability operations and humanitarian 
assistance operations are probably most appropriate when in support of force protection 
or operations security. For example, in areas where banditry is a problem, a 
demonstration convoy might be useful to draw attention away from an actual relief 
convoy. Blending and disguising aspects of deception may be appropriate if a lower 
signature is desired. Rules of engagement and political sensitivities may significantly 
constrain the palette of deception techniques available. 
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4. Counterterrorism 
Benjamin Higginbotham, in his thesis “On Deceiving Terrorists,” presents three 
compelling methods where deception can be used against terrorists and terrorist 
organizations: 
 Create and exploit inefficiencies and weaknesses in the terrorist 
organization 
 Facilitate counter-terrorist operations 
 Conceal counter-terrorist capabilities and intentions284 
Deception in support of subversion as discussed in the previous section on 
counterinsurgency is equally applicable against terrorist groups, and could prove quite 
useful at creating and exploiting internal inefficiencies and weaknesses of terrorist 
groups. For example, disinformation spread via rumors that there is an informant within 
the terrorist group could be spread in areas where the terrorist are suspected of operating 
in order to sow dissension. Alternatively, if previous purges have occurred, a 
disinformation program that suggests the group leadership is planning another purge 
could be used to increase distrust of the leadership, and perhaps an internal preemptive 
strike against the leaders. 
Deception can facilitate counter-terrorist operations by creating surprise. In the 
Israeli raid on Entebbe, deception in the forms of portrayal and masking played a critical 
role in achieving surprise and retaining initiative. First, the Israeli aircraft masked their 
approach behind the signature of a regularly scheduled aircraft. Additionally, the Israeli 
commando force portrayed Ugandan military forces through the use of Ugandan 
uniforms and a Mercedes disguised to look like a Ugandan staff car. These techniques 
sowed confusion amongst the terrorists and their Ugandan guards, with the terrorists 
initially believing the Ugandans had turned on them.285  
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5. Cyberwarfare 
Cyberspace as an emerging arena for military operations presents as many 
opportunities for deception as the physical world. For example, honeypots can be used to 
mislead the target for the purpose of intelligence gathering. Disinformation in the form of 
spoofed emails could be used to prompt any manner of actions by the target. Pseudo-
operations in the form of websites portraying adversary websites can be used for 
disinformation, intelligence gathering, or influence operations. On the defense, ambiguity  
increasing deception can be used to protect sensitive information—e.g., operations plans, 
personnel rosters, or technical data—through the use of multiple files where only one is 
the true information 
D. MILITARY DECEPTION FAILURES 
Finally, no discussion of the practice of deception is complete without addressing 
deception failures. Somewhat optimistically, the CIA report, Deception Failures, Non-
Failures, and Why, states the following with regard to deception failures: “It can 
accurately be stated that deception nearly always succeeds, at least to some degree. 
Indeed it should be emphasized that deception may succeed even when one or more … 
causes for failure is present.”286 Despite this assertion, the report provides eleven reasons 
why a deception may fail. These reasons were derived from an analysis of Allied and 
Axis deception failures during World War II: 
 Detection by the intended victim 
 Incomplete or incorrect understanding of the target’s intelligence 
apparatus 
 Incomplete or incorrect modeling of the deception process 
 Inadequate or improper channels or vehicles to convey the deception story 
 Incomplete or inadequate control over the significant variables of the 
deception process 
 Incorrect assessment of the target’s reaction 
 Deception story falls outside the deception window, e. g., too sophisticated 
to be received or too simplistic to be believed 
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 Unreasonable expected result 
 Target unable to react in the intended manner even if deception considered 
credible 
 Inadequate time for the deception process to run its course 
 Bad luck287 
With the exception of bad luck, each of these failures represents a shortcoming in 
the planning and/or execution of the deception plan. For example, “detection by the 
intended victim” can be caused by failure to properly cover the indicators of the true 
operation, by a poor deception story, or by shoddy execution of the deception tasks. 
Likewise, “inadequate or improper channels or vehicles to convey the deception story” 
represents a failure to either assess the channels available the target, or a failure to revise 
the plan after discovering the channels were insufficient. While no deception plan is 
perfect, proper adherence to the information requirements and principles laid out in this 
chapter can reduce the risk of deception failures. 
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VI. HISTORIC U.S. ARMY USE OF DECEPTION 
Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy.  
– General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson288 
This chapter surveys the use of deception by the U.S. military from the 
Revolutionary War to Operation DESERT STORM. The purpose of this chapter is twofold; 
first to present additional examples of deception in action as prompts for the deception 
practitioner’s creative processes, and second to reinforce the idea that deception has been 
of great utility for the U.S. military throughout its history. 
A. REVOLUTIONARY WAR – BATTLE OF TRENTON 
January 2, 1777 saw George Washington trapped against the banks of the 
Delaware River outside Trenton, New Jersey by a superior British force under General 
Cornwallis. Despite suggestions to attack straight away, Cornwallis was sufficiently 
satisfied that Washington was trapped and so waited to attack the next day. The British 
set camp inside Trenton. During the night, the American force built large bonfires of 
cedar rails along their lines and continued through the night working to reinforce the 
earthworks. British sentries could see movement and hear the sounds of the digging. 
Sporadic cannon fire from the American lines kept the British in Trenton jumpy. When 
Cornwallis and his men arose the next morning to quash the rebellion all they found was 
an abandoned camp with piles of fresh dirt and smoldering fires.  
The fires and work crews served as demonstrations; and the cannon fire as a feint 
in order to reinforce Cornwallis’s perception that Washington was trapped, and to mask 
the noise of the American army quietly marching away to attack Princeton. Wagon and 
cannon wheels were wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise of movement over the frozen 
ground. A group of 500 stayed behind to work the deception. These men pulled out  
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before dawn to rejoin the main body.289 Security of the plan was so tight that “no one 
below the rank of brigadier was privy to the plan; officers who were quartered in outlying 
farmhouses awoke the next morning to find the army gone….”290 
Deception Objective (DO) British forces do not impede withdrawal 
Deception Target General Cornwallis 
Deception Story (THINK) American Army preparing for morning battle 
Deception Events (SEE) Demonstration – bon fires 
Demonstration – men building fortifications 
Feint – cannon fire 
Securing – tight security on plan 
Masking – noise of work obscuring noise of movement 
Termination Trigger Main force withdrawal completed 
Table 9.   Deception Analysis of Battle of Trenton 
B. CIVIL WAR 
1. Peninsula Campaign 
A classic example of an inferior force using deception to transform certain defeat 
to a tactical stalemate and strategic victory occurred during the Civil War. Major General 
Magruder was tasked with preventing the largest Union army yet assembled from 
reaching Richmond. To achieve this objective, Magruder utilized a number of deceptions, 
including the use of soldiers portraying deserters to feed General McClellan 
disinformation exaggerating the size and composition of the Confederate force. The 
“deserters’” information was confirmed by aerial observation which reported on the troop 
movements, cavalry, and camp fires carefully choreographed by Magruder. When 
McClellan approached the Confederate breastworks, he was presented with a now famous 
simulation—Quaker guns. In order to inflate the number of cannon available to the 
Confederate force, Magruder had tree trunks stripped, bored, and painted so that they 
simulated cannon to the casual eye. In McClellan’s perception, the Confederate force was 
larger and better equipped than his, and so McClellan delayed his attack for over a month 
while he assembled the forces he felt necessary for the attack. This delay allowed ample 
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time for the Army of Northern Virginia to place itself between McClellan and Richmond. 
Additionally, the delay subjected McClellan’s force to the bad weather and mosquitos of 
the peninsula, resulting in many soldiers combat ineffective from illness. When 
McClellan finally attacked in early May, he found the Quaker guns, but not Magruder. 
Magruder had used the delay to withdraw his force back to the Army of Northern 
Virginia lines; Richmond was safe.291 
Deception Objective (DO) Union forces do not press attack until after arrival of Army of 
Northern Virginia 
Deception Target General McClellan 
Deception Story (THINK) Confederate force too large to attack without significant Union 
reinforcements 
Deception Events (SEE) Simulation – Quaker guns 
Portrayal – cavalry and infantry units replicating additional units 
Simulation – additional camp fires 
Termination Trigger Army of Northern Virginia in position 
Table 10.   Deception Analysis of Peninsula Campaign 
2. Capture of Atlanta 
During the summer of 1864, Major General Sherman attempted for several 
months to capture Atlanta, Georgia; however, the city was well fortified and Sherman 
was unsuccessful in compelling the surrender of the Confederate defenders under General 
John Hood. Unable to crack the nut that was Atlanta via siege, and unwilling to mount a 
potentially disastrous frontal assault, Sherman resorted to deception and the indirect 
approach. 
The deception used by Sherman was a feigned withdrawal. Prior to 26 August, 
Sherman ordered his men be provisioned with 20 days rations, the unit trains reduced to 
what was absolutely necessary, and all sick and wounded evacuated. Additionally, 
Sherman cut communications with higher headquarters to reduce the chances of a leak or 
captured courier.292 As part of the preparatory movements, Sherman had one brigade of 
dismounted cavalry from the 2nd Cavalry Division occupy the trenches of the 12th and 
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4th Corps in order to prevent the defenders from noticing the corps’ movements.293 After 
midnight on the 26th, in a move reminiscent of Washington at Trenton, Sherman’s force 
began a near silent withdrawal under the cover of darkness. The withdrawal was not 
discovered by the Confederate defenders until the next morning. Initial caution 
transitioned into celebration as the defenders viewed the now empty Union positions 
strewn with cast off materials. The idea that the Union forces had withdrawn was 
reinforced by reports of Union cavalry to the west scrounging for rations.294 The Hood 
telegraphed Richmond reporting his belief that “…the hungry Union army was giving up 
the siege and withdrawing across the Chattahoochee.”295 Sherman’s forces maintained 
tight security until seizing Jonesborough, south of Atlanta. By 2 September, Atlanta was 
in Union hands.296 
Deception Objective (DO) Confederate forces fail to react to flanking maneuver 
Deception Target General Hood 
Deception Story (THINK) Union forces have retreated in defeat 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – 2nd Cavalry Division posing as 12th and 4th Corps 
Demonstration - withdrawal 
Disinformation – cavalry claim to be short on rations 
Blending – silence during withdrawal and movement 
Securing – communications silence 
Termination Trigger Seizure of Jonesborough 
Table 11.   Deception Analysis of Atlanta 
3. Athens, Alabama 
In 1864, Nathan Bedford Forrest elicited the surrender of a Union stronghold at 
Athens, Alabama through the artful use of portrayal. After a short siege of the fort, 
Forrest arranged a parley with the fort’s commander, Colonel Wallace Campbell. During 
the parley, Campbell was provided with a seemingly impromptu tour of the Confederate 
camp. Unbeknownst to Campbell, as he completed the tour of a campsite, many of the 
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Confederate infantry from first campsites were portrayed by dismounted cavalry. After 
Campbell passed, the cavalry remounted and moved to other campsites to be counted 
again. Artillery pieces were similarly shuffled around, so Campbell was presented the 
image of a Confederate force four times its actual size. Rather than risk his men against 
this overwhelming force, Campbell surrendered the fort without further bloodshed.297 
Though Forrest could have reduced the fort through traditional means, the deception both 
saved lives, and afforded Forrest the freedom of maneuver to turn his force on the Union 
relief column heading for the fort. 
Deception Objective (DO) Union stronghold surrenders 
Deception Target Colonel Campbell 
Deception Story (THINK) Confederate force is overwhelming, so resistance is futile 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – troops replicating additional forces 
Termination Trigger Surrender by Colonel Campbell 
Table 12.   Deception Analysis of Athens, Georgia 
C. PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION – RAID ON PALANAN 
By February 1901, the United States had lost over four thousand Soldiers in two 
years of combatting insurrection on the Philippines island of Luzon, with no end in sight. 
The leader of the insurrection was Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo fought a classic guerrilla 
campaign, with his troops seemingly everywhere but himself nowhere to be found. On 8 
February 1901, a U.S. Army brigade commanded by Colonel Frederick Funston captured 
one of Aguinaldo’s couriers with a message from Aguinaldo which “…ordered insurgent 
General Lacuna to send 200 soldiers from his brigade to Aguinaldo’s headquarters.”298 
The courier revealed that the headquarters was located six miles inland at Palanan, in an 
isolated region of Luzon. As important as the location was the information that there 
were only 50 rebel troops guarding Aguinaldo.299 While Funston wanted to act on the 
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information, he knew there was no way for a large American force to reach Aguinaldo’s 
lair without providing enough forewarning to give Aguinaldo opportunity to escape. 
Funston, not willing to let the opportunity to strike a hard blow to the insurrection, turned 
to deception.300 Funston in his memoir states:  
So the only recourse was to work a stratagem, that is, to get to [Aguinaldo] 
under false colors. It would be so impossible to disguise our own troops 
that they were not even considered, and dependence would have to be 
placed on the Macabebes… As it would be absolutely essential to have 
along some American officers to direct matters and deal with such 
emergencies as might arise, they were to accompany the expedition as 
supposed prisoners who had been captured on the march, and were not to 
throw off that disguise until there was no longer necessity for 
concealment.301 
With approval from General MacArthur, Funston ordered 85 Macabebe troops to 
be outfitted with the weapons and uniforms of the insurgents. Funston and the four 
American Soldiers accompanying him were dressed as privates and pretended to be 
prisoners of the disguised Macabebe force. In addition to the disguises, Funston carried 
several pieces of Lacuna’s personal stationary with his forged signature. These would be 
used to send messages from the insurgent leader to Aguinaldo legitimizing the arrival of 
the “reinforcements.”302 After a month’s training for the Macabebe force, Funston’s 
group set off for Palanan. The pseudo-operation worked exquisitely; when the force 
arrived in Palanan on March 26th, Aguinaldo was captured with only five casualties—all 
rebels.303 The forged letters played an essential role in the ruse with Aguinaldo admitting 
the letters were key to his letting his guard down and allowing the band into his camp.304 
Shortly after Aguinaldo’s capture, he ordered the end of the insurrection. Of the 
operation, Aguinaldo opined: “It was a bold plan, executed with skill and cleverness, in 
the face of difficulties which to most men would have seemed insurmountable.”305 
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It’s interesting to note that while Funston’s deception was a tactical and strategic 
victory, breaking the back of the insurgency; Funston was pilloried in American press, 
and even on the Senate floor for committing a war crime. Indeed, but current 
international law, Funston would be accused of perfidy for allowing the Macabebes to 
attack while wearing the enemy’s uniforms.306 
Deception Objective (DO) Allow entry of Funston’s force into Aguinaldo’s camp 
Deception Target Aguinaldo and rebel forces enroute to camp 
Deception Story (THINK) Funston’s force is the requested reinforcements with prisoners 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – Macabebe troops dressed as rebel troops 
Portrayal – Funston and other Americans as captured privates 
Disinformation – forged messages 
Termination Trigger On order after arrival into camp 
Table 13.   Deception Analysis of Raid on Palanan 
D. WORLD WAR I – SAINT MIHIEL 
While a deception practitioner should seek to leverage existing target perceptions, 
there are times when this is impossible. For example, when the true objective is already 
perceived by the adversary to be the objective, reinforcing this perception would be—to 
say the least—counterproductive. In these cases, deception can be used to change the 
target’s perception. General Pershing’s use of deception in support of the assault on the 
Saint Mihiel salient during World War I demonstrates a successful execution of this 
scenario.  
Pershing saw the reduction of the salient as a necessary step to winning the war; 
however, the German High Command fully expected an attack by American forces at Saint 
Mihiel. To increase the prospects of success, Pershing undertook a deception to make the 
German High Command believe the true focus of the American attack would be the Belfort 
Gap, 125 miles southeast of Saint Mihiel, with the deception goal of the German High 
Command shifting resources from Saint Mihiel. On 25 August, 1917, a French liaison 
officer informed the American press corps—off the record—that the American objective 
might be further to the South, perhaps the German town of Mulhouse that located on the 
other side of the Belfort Gap. Not surprisingly, this leak made it by military censors. On 27 
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August 1917, General Pershing sent Major General Bundy, Commander VI Corps, to the 
town of Belfort on secret orders to plan for an offensive through the gap. Major General 
Bundy was an unwitting actor and took to his mission with alacrity. Soon American 
reconnaissance parties were seen around Belfort marking out locations for supply depots, 
field hospitals, and artillery positions. To create the impression of troop movements, radio 
sets from the 91st Infantry Division were used to mimic the transmissions of the VI Corps. 
The military preparations were reinforced with civil-military operations as pained efforts 
were made to ensure the local populace had evacuation plans. The crowning piece of 
disinformation supporting the deception was a piece of carbon paper discarded by Colonel 
Conger, Pershing’s witting actor on the scene, in the waste basket of his hotel room in 
Belfort. Conger had used to carbon paper for a letter to the American Expeditionary Force 
Headquarters detailing the Belfort preparations as only needing an execution date. After 
depositing the carbon in the trash, Conger took a walk, and the German spies on the hotel 
staff did their part stealing the carbon.  
In response to the deception, German High Command moved three divisions from 
Saint Mihiel to reinforce the Belfort Gap. With German perceptions changed and 
behavior suitably modified, Pershing’s 12 September attack against the Saint Mihiel 
salient was a success. After the war, Colonel Conger received confirmation from the 
German commander at Belfort that when he requested the additional divisions he 
understood the buildup might be a ruse, but could not risk it being real. A deception using 
a minimum of resources was able to alter the perception of the German High Command 
in 19 days.307 
Deception Objective (DO) German High Command shifts forces from Saint Mihiel 
Deception Target German High Command 
Deception Story (THINK) American Expeditionary Force plans on attacking through the 
Belfort Gap 
Deception Events (SEE) Demonstration – Major General Bundy 
Demonstration – reconnaissance parties 
Disinformation – leak to press 
Disinformation – Colonel Conger memorandum 
Portrayal – 91st Division creating radio traffic of VI Corps 
Termination Trigger Execution of attack on Saint Mihiel 
Table 14.   Deception Analysis of Saint Mihiel 
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E. DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II 
1. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH 
With an Allied invasion of Western Europe inevitable, the Allies sought to 
obscure the true landing site—Normandy. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH sought to 
convince the Germans the true location of the invasion would be at Pas de Calais so that 
the German forces located there would not react to the Normandy landings. Fortitude 
South consisted of two phases. During phase I, the objective was to cause the German 
forces to make faulty troop dispositions by convincing German High Command that Pas 
de Calais was the true target for invasion, with a target date of 45 days after the 
Normandy landings. For phase II, the objective was to cause German High Command to 
keep the units in Pas de Calais in place. This was to be accomplished by convincing 
German High Command the Normandy landings were a diversionary feint, and that once 
the German reserves were committed at Normandy, the true invasion would take 
place.308 FORTITUDE SOUTH leveraged the existing German perception that Pas de Calais 
was the logical invasion choice.  
The primary elements of FORTITUDE SOUTH were a simulated command and 
disinformation transmitted via the DOUBLE CROSS agents. The First U.S. Army Group 
[FUSAG] was a real headquarters without forces. General Patton was assigned as the 
FUSAG commander as part of the deception plan. FUSAG simulated and portrayed an army 
group through the use of decoys, dummies, and tasked units.309 Many of the simulated 
units assigned to FUSAG were not created for FUSAG; rather, they were part of a long 
running effort to inflate the Allied order of battle and had been used in previous 
deceptions. In addition to the simulated units, a number of real units were notionally 
assigned to FUSAG, while actually remaining under the command of the 21st Army.310 
Much of the information on the location, composition, and activities of FUSAG was fed to 
German intelligence through the DOUBLE CROSS system.311 Additional indicators were 
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presented by radio nets portraying the notional units. The few German reconnaissance 
aircraft flying over the FUSAG simulation were fired upon for realism, but intentionally  
missed so the photos would make it back.312 As D-Day neared, additional events were 
staged in support of FORTITUDE SOUTH. Pas de Calais was included in the preparatory 
bombings to reinforce that it was the target.313 
After the successful landings at Normandy, FORTITUDE SOUTH was continued into 
July, until a sequel plan could be executed. The objective of Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH 
II was “To contain the maximum number of enemy forces in the Pas de Calais area for as 
long as possible.”314 As elements notionally assigned to FUSAG arrived to reinforce the 
Normandy beachhead, local German commanders quickly realized the Pas de Calais 
threat was over; however, FORTITUDE SOUTH II convinced Hitler of the threat, keeping 
the German Fifteenth Army unable to respond to the growing threat in Normandy.315 
Elements of FORTITUDE SOUTH II remained in effect until the beginning of September.316 
Deception Objective (DO) Phase I – German forces commit to faulty troop distributions 
Phase II – German forces in Pas de Calais do not respond to 
Normandy landings 
Deception Target Hitler and German High Command 
Deception Story (THINK) Pas de Calais is the primary target of Allied efforts, the Normandy 
landings are a diversion 
Deception Events (SEE) Simulation – Decoy and dummy equipment 
Simulation – Radio traffic 
Portrayal – Assigned units 
Demonstration – Assignment of Patton as FUSAG Commander 
Disinformation – plans fed through DOUBLE CROSS agents 
Feint – Inclusion of Pas de Calais in preparatory bombing 
Termination Trigger Initially successful Normandy landings, extended via sequel 
Table 15.   Deception Analysis of Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH 
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2. 23rd Headquarters Special Troops 
The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops was a purpose built unit specifically 
intended to conduct deception operations at the tactical level. The unit consisted of a 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company; the 603rd Engineer Camouflage Battalion 
(Special); the Signal Company (Special); the 402nd Engineer Combat Company 
(Special); and the 3132nd Signal Company (Special).317 The 23rd utilized a variety of 
means to simulate or portray other army units to include: decoys, dummies, loudspeakers, 
pyrotechnics, and imitative radio transmissions. Furthermore, the 23rd employed 
disinformation—the 23rd called this “Special Effects—to corrupt the German perceptions 
of the Allied Order of Battle. “Special Effects” included the wear of other unit’s patches, 
stenciling vehicles with other unit designations, creating phony generals, and crafting 
fictional stories; all to be picked up by the German agent networks operating behind 
Allied lines.318 
The techniques implemented by the 23rd played a vital role in operations 
throughout the campaign in Western Europe by depriving German intelligence of the true 
picture of Allied force dispositions. In particular, the 23rd played a critical role in the 
relief of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. The objective of Operation KODAK was:  
To confuse German radio intelligence as to the real location of the 80th 
Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division, both of which were 
committed to action in a counterattack against the south flank of the St. 
Vith-Bastogne salient, by giving radio indication of those Divs in an area 
to the southeast of that in which they were employed. The area chosen for 
the radio deception was such as to indicate their presence as a reserve in 
case of extention [sic] of the German counterattack through 
Echternacht.319 
The surprise arrival of two divisions of reinforcements broke the back of the siege 
of Bastogne.320 
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Deception Objective (DO)  
Deception Target Field Marshall von Rundstedt – German commander outside 
Bastogne 
Deception Story (THINK) The 4th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division were being 
held in reserve 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – Radio traffic by 23rd 
Securing – Radio silence by actual units 
Termination Trigger Arrival of the 4th and 80th at Bastogne 
Table 16.   Deception Analysis of Operation KODAK 
3. Operation WEDLOCK 
In 1943, Joint Security Control—the staff element of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
charged with coordinating U.S. strategic deception—directed Lieutenant General Simon 
Bolivar Buckner Jr., the commander of the Alaska Department to develop a strategic plan 
for the North Pacific. The objective given Buckner was: 
…to deceive the Japanese about US plans for Alaska and the Aleutians by 
exaggerating current American forces and their activities there, and more 
specifically, to convince the Japanese of a build-up intended to invade the 
Kurile Islands. Tentatively this fictional assault was first slated for 1 
August 1944.321 
Buckner’s initial plan was altered after consultation with Admiral Nimitz. Nimitz 
assumed command of the strategic aspects of the deception, while Buckner retaining 
command of the tactical aspects. Nimitz also accelerated the target date for the assault to 
15 June so as to provide cover for Operation FORAGER, the planned real assault on 
Saipan. The revised deception plan became Operation WEDLOCK. In order to present the 
appearance of increased U.S. preparations for the invasion of the Kurile Islands, 
WEDLOCK called for the simulated activation of the 9th Amphibious Force consisting of 
five U.S. and one Canadian division. Additionally, the 9th Fleet would be notionally 
increased in size in order to support the assault. To create the simulated radio traffic 
necessary for these formations, a joint communications center was established.322  
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In addition to the notional forces, WEDLOCK included a number of other deception 
events in support of the story. WEDLOCK coopted the American press—ULTRA intercepts 
confirmed that Japanese intelligence used the press as a means of collection. Rather than 
keeping the meeting between Buckner and Nimitz a secret, the press was encouraged to 
report the meeting and speculate on its meaning. In addition, Joint Security Control fed 
disinformation directly to Japanese intelligence through double agents in the U.S.; via 
military attaches in neutral countries; and by incorporating disinformation into shared 
intelligence with Russia—expecting the disinformation to be collected by Japanese 
agents. Furthermore, troops embarking for the tropics through Seattle were issued artic 
gear so as to appear that they were heading north. Finally, an entire simulated airbase was 
constructed at Holtz Bay on the westernmost Aleutian island.323 
After the invasion of Saipan was completed, it was decided to maintain aspects of 
the WEDLOCK deception, specifically the simulated divisions. Therefore, a sequel plan 
was implemented under the name Operation HUSBAND. Operation HUSBAND was later 
followed by another sequel plan, Operation BAMBINO, which in turn was eventually 
followed by Operation VALENTINE. Each of the sequel plans maintained the simulated 
forces, though with less and less effort in maintaining the deception. As a result, the 
Japanese Imperial Command over time withdrew ships and planes from the Kurile 
Islands to meet more imminent threats; however, the troop levels remained steady 
throughout the series of deceptions.324 
The effect of WEDLOCK can be seen in Japanese troop strengths in the Kurils. 
Whereas there were initially 25,000 troops and 38 aircraft stationed in the Kurils before 
WEDLOCK, after WEDLOCK the garrison had grown to 70,000 troops and 590 aircraft.325 
However, while WEDLOCK succeeded in convincing the Japanese of a serious threat from 
the North: 
                                                 
323 Herbig, “American Strategic Deception,” 270 – 272. 
324 Herbig, “American Strategic Deception,” 279 – 281. 
325 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 2007), 
VII-103 – VII-105, as cited in Leonard Wells, “Military Deception: Equivalent to Intelligence, Maneuver 
and Fires” (Paper, Navy War College, 2008), accessed 20 May 2012, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA494225, 9 – 10. 
122 
…it failed to convince him that this menace was immediate or of primary 
importance. Rather than misleading the Japanese into reordering their 
priorities for the threats which faced them, the deception added another 
plausible threat to an already ambiguous situation.326 
While not as successful as desired, WEDLOCK could be classified as good enough. 
Deception Objective (DO) Japanese shift forces to defense of Kurile Islands 
Deception Target Japanese Imperial Command 
Deception Story (THINK) U.S. intends to liberate Kurile Islands from Japanese occupation 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – increased size of the 9th Fleet 
Portrayal – Troops issued artic gear 
Simulation – radio traffic 
Simulation – 9th Amphibious Force 
Disinformation – Press stories 
Disinformation – Double agent network 
Disinformation – Military attaches 
Disinformation – Russia information exchange 
Termination Trigger  
Table 17.   Deception Analysis of Operation WEDLOCK 
F. KOREAN WAR – INCHON LANDING 
In 1950, General MacArthur approved Operation CHROMITE, an audacious plan to 
conduct an amphibious assault at Inchon to break the impasse with North Korean forces 
to the South. To conduct the operation, General MacArthur directed the formation of X 
Corps under the command of Major General Edward Almond, General MacArthur’s 
Chief of Staff. As cover for the preparations for Operation CHROMITE, Major General 
Edward Almond remained as the Chief of Staff, while the staff for X Corps was formed 
as the Special Planning Staff, and the forces assigned to X Corps were carried as GHQ 
reserves.327  
Since it was impossible to camouflage the amphibious assault preparations, a 
deception plan was needed to mislead the North Korean People’s Army [NKPA] 
command as to the true point of decision. A multi-faceted effort was undertaken to 
mislead the NKPA command into believing the port city of Kunsan as the actual target so 
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the NKPA would not disrupt the actual landing. Kunsan, located one hundred miles to the 
south of Inchon, was a likely target for assault—it had been one of the three courses of 
action during planning. First, Kunsan was given particular attention during the 
preparatory bombing operations, to include a massive operation four days prior to the 
Inchon landing. Second, the 1st Marine Division was publicly given briefings on the 
hydrology at Kunsan. Third, an amphibious feint/portrayal was conducted at Kunsan 
using an ad hoc special operations element, whose purpose was to create the perception 
of a much larger force.328 Additionally, the 1st Marine Brigade, which was the primary 
landing force at Inchon, was assigned to the Pusan ‘general reserve’ in an effort to blend 
it in with other less essential units.329 In order to add a bit of ambiguity to the situation, 
similar efforts—preparatory naval bombardments—were made for Samch’ok, a plausible 
amphibious landing objective on the east coast of the peninsula.330 The Inchon landing 
could not have succeeded without the operational surprise created by the deception plan. 
 
Deception Objective (DO) North Korean forces do not disrupt Inchon landing 
Deception Target North Korean People’s Army command 
Deception Story (THINK) Actual amphibious landing will occur at Kunsan or Samch’ok 
Deception Events (SEE) Feint/Portrayal – Special Operations Company landing at Kunsan 
Feint – Kunsan focus of major bombing attack at D-4 
Feint – Samch’ok focus of preparatory naval bombardment 
Demonstration – public briefing on hydrology at Kunsan 
Blending – preparatory bombings at Inchon blended into larger 
bombing operation 
Blending – assault element assigned to the Pusan ‘general reserve’ 
Blending - Major General Almond remaining Chief of Staff 
Termination Trigger  
Table 18.   Deception Analysis of Operation CHROMITE 
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G. VIETNAM WAR 
1. MACVSOG 
a. Sacred Sword Patriots League  
When MACVSOG was established in 1964, one of the objectives in OPLAN 
34A was to “create the impression that an active, unified, internal opposition exists in 
North Vietnam.”331 OPLAN 34A directed the creation of an impression because MACVSOG 
was prohibited by policy decisions made in Washington from implementing an actual 
unconventional warfare campaign in North Vietnam.332 As a result, MACVSOG 
implemented a complex deception program to create the perception of a growing and 
active underground movement with the objective of forcing the North Vietnamese 
government to withdraw support for the Viet Cong. The notional resistance movement 
was part of Project HUMIDOR, MACVSOG’s psychological operations program.333 The 
centerpiece of MACVSOG’s plan was the Sacred Sword Patriots League [SSPL]. The SSPL 
was presented as an anti-foreign power, Vietnamese nationalist party with its roots in the 
anti-colonial struggles against the French.334 
The SSPL deception was supported by a number of operations. First, North 
Vietnamese fishermen captured as part of MACVSOG’s maritime operations were taken to 
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the Paradise Island facility that portrayed an active SSPL camp.335 While the fishermen 
were subjected to SSPL indoctrination, the primary objective was not to actually turn the 
fishermen into operatives; rather: 
The primary objective of capturing prisoners and leading them to believe 
that they were captives of the SSPL was to establish credibility for the 
organization and convince elements of the populace of [North Vietnam] 
that an opposition organization does exist in [North Vietnam].336  
In addition to the Paradise Island facility, support for the SSPL deception included the 
Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriots League, a portrayed radio station ran by MACVSOG’s 
psychological operations element, and leaflet drops of SSPL propaganda.337  
While the SSPL program did not achieve its primary objective of forcing 
the North Vietnamese government to stop or reduce support for the insurgency in the 
South, the program was effective at forcing the North Vietnamese government to increase 
internal security measures. A study of North Vietnam’s response to covert operations, 
concluded that “Hanoi interprets allied special operations in North Vietnam as a major 
facet in the US strategy. As such it views these operations with considerable alarm.”338 
Additionally, the end to all covert activities in North Vietnam was included in the initial 
‘price for peace’ demands by the North Vietnamese contingent at the Paris peace talks.339 
The SSPL program was effectively ended with the 1 April 1968.340 
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Deception Objective (DO) North Vietnam reduces support to South Vietnamese insurgency 
Deception Target Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam leadership 
Deception Story (THINK) The SSPL is an active resistance movement challenging the 
Communist government of North Vietnam 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – Paradise Island operations 
Disinformation – SSPL radio station and leaflet drops 
Termination Trigger Since deception was in support of the overall campaign there was no 
defined termination trigger. Termination occurred in response to 
North Vietnamese negotiation demands. 
Table 19.   Deception Analysis of SSPL 
b. Deception in Support of Security 
In addition to the SSPL program, MACVSOG utilized deception in support 
of a robust organizational security program. As part of the security program, MACVSOG, 
as well as all the major subordinate components, had an official cover story in an attempt 
to disguise the true nature of the organization. The official cover story for MACVSOG was: 
Studies and Observations Group (SOG): “Studies and Observations Group 
is a special staff section of Headquarters, United States Military Assistanct 
[sic] Command, Vietnam (USMACV) under the supervision of the Chief of 
Staff, USMACV. It is responsible for the study an observation of joint or 
combined counterinsurgency operations of a comprehensive nature. The 
studies and observations include intelligence and psychological activities 
as well as combat actions that may involve any forces or resources of any 
service of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and USMACV. 
SOG is not an implementing agency, the operations it studies and observes 
are conducted by the RVNAF commands which have responsibility for the 
areas of observations.341 
In addition to the overarching cover stories, individual missions were 
given cover stories. For example, if an aircraft conveying agent teams or equipment 
between South Vietnam and Thailand had an incident necessitating an explanation for the 
mission, the explanation was that the aircraft was diverted from routine operations in 
South Vietnam in order to respond to a distress call.342 
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Deception Objective (DO) Ignore MACVSOG 
Deception Target Everyone without need-to-know 
Deception Story (THINK) MACVSOG is a staff element used to collect data, not an operational 
headquarters  
Deception Events (SEE) Disinformation – cover stories 
Termination Trigger Since deception was in support of the overall campaign there was no 
defined termination trigger 
Table 20.   Deception Analysis of MACVSOG Security 
2. MACV 
Elements of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) utilized 
deception in their operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. In 
one case, the 25th Infantry Division learned of an inexperienced NVA regiment with 
orders to seek out an allied base as a way of building experience and morale. At the 
recommendation of the division staff, the commander of the 25th decided to provide the 
enemy with a suitable target. In February 1969, an infantry company established firebase 
DIAMOND I in the vicinity of the enemy force. What the NVA saw as a vulnerable target 
was in reality ringed with sensors and ground radar systems, and supported by three 
artillery support bases and air support. When the NVA decided to attack the firebase the 
sensor array deprived the NVA of surprise. Supported by the artillery bases and air 
support, the firebase repulsed two attacks with minimal casualties, while the NVA 
regiment was decimated. This stratagem was repeated by the 25th Infantry Division with 
at three additional firebases with similar successes. Repetition of the stratagem was 
achievable because establishing new firebases was a routine occurrence. While using 
troops as bait may seem distasteful, the stratagem was effective; moreover, by 
establishing DIAMOND I, the 25th Infantry Division was able to influence the NVA into 
attacking on the 25th’s terms. The alternative would have meant allowing the NVA force 
to attack any one of a number of bases.343 
In analyzing this deception, it is interesting to note that the deception was not the 
force, rather the purpose of the force. As the report noted, had the NVA not acted on the 
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deception, the unit was still available to conduct patrolling operations.344 The deception 
goal was to incite the NVA to attack a specific firebase in order to neutralize the threat. 
The deception story was that the DIAMOND firebases were just more of many firebases, 
but conveniently located for attack: a variation of cry-wolf with an element of honeypot. 
Deception Objective (DO) NVA attacks DIAMOND firebases 
Deception Target NVA leadership in 25th Infantry Division area of operations 
Deception Story (THINK) DIAMOND firebases are perfectly positioned for NVA attack 
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – DIAMOND as typical firebase 
Termination Trigger On order once threat around firebase was disrupted 
Table 21.   Deception Analysis of DIAMOND I 
In another example, prior to an attack on a Viet Cong (VC) stronghold, a ranger 
battalion conducted operations with heavy artillery support leading away from the VC 
base area. At the same time an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalion 
similarly conducted operations moving away from the stronghold. After the feints were 
completed, the Ranger and ARVN troops were airlifted back to attack the stronghold. A 
prisoner captured during the assault on the stronghold indicated that the Ranger and 
ARVN battalion’s movements lulled the VC into believing the base area was not the target 
of the operation. Usually feints are used to draw enemy forces away from the decisive 
point, but knowing how the enemy will react allowed the feints to achieve the opposite 
result. In this case, the feints of the Ranger and ARVN battalions were successful in 
convincing the VC to remain at the decisive point.345 
Deception Objective (DO) VC force remains at the stronghold 
Deception Target VC stronghold commander 
Deception Story (THINK) It is safe to remain at the stronghold because the Ranger and ARVN 
battalions do not know about it 
Deception Events (SEE) Feint – Ranger battalion operation moving away from stronghold 
Feint – ARVN battalions operation moving away from stronghold 
Simulation – additional camp fires 
Termination Trigger Assault on stronghold 
Table 22.   Deception Analysis of Ranger Assault 
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H. OPERATION DESERT STORM 
Operation DESERT STORM provides an exemplar of how the concepts of deception 
work together to achieve the desired effect. According to General Schwartzkopf, 
Coalition forces implemented the “Hail Mary” plan because unfavorable force ratios—
the Iraqi forces in Kuwait had numerical superiority and were in the defensive—
precluded a frontal assault. Therefore, the flanking maneuver was essential for countering 
the Iraqi force advantage. 346 Deception became key to distracting Saddam from the “Hail 
Mary” preparations: 
The goal of the deception was to convince the Iraqis that the main attack 
would come up Wadi Al Batin along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi western border. 
This attack would be supported by an amphibious attack from the northern 
Gulf and attacks directly into the defenses along the southern Kuwaiti 
border. The desired effect was to hold the RGFC and the professional 
army, the regular armor and mechanized divisions, oriented upon the Wadi 
and coast. This disposition would expose them to the VII and XVIII 
Airborne Corps enveloping maneuver and facilitate their destruction.347 
This deception plan played to Saddam’s expectations, as early intelligence reports 
indicated a concern about amphibious operations and a belief that an attack through the 
desert was impossible.348  
The first step of the deception plan was the removal of Saddam’s primary channel 
for intelligence—the Iraqi Air Force.349 Prior to the start of the air campaign, 
reconnaissance and logistical preparations for the envelopment were prohibited, with all 
activity limited to reinforcing the perception of the main effort coming through Wadi Al 
Batin. In response to the staging of forces at the mouth of the wadi, Iraqi forces 
reinforced their positions on the other side. Within the assembly areas, “Virtually every 
division constructed replicas of Iraqi defensive positions and conducted extensive 
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training against them.”350 The press pool was allowed access to report on this training, 
but not to the maneuver training necessary for the flanking maneuver. Once the air 
campaign was started, and the threat of the Iraqi Air Force removed, VII Corps and 
XVIII Corps moved from their staging areas south of Wadi Al Batin to their new staging 
areas in the western desert. As a security measure for the movement, and to maintain the 
illusion that the two Corps were still in place, other units still located in the original 
staging areas portrayed the XVIII Corps using false radio traffic.351 
Portraying a secondary effort, the II Marine Expeditionary Force conducted 
several amphibious training exercises, including Operation IMMINENT THUNDER. These 
demonstrations had the intended effect of causing seven Iraqi divisions to shift to the 
Kuwaiti Coast.352 The press was given access to cover these amphibious training 
operations as well, providing another channel to Saddam on the Coalition’s intent to 
conduct an amphibious landing.353 The amphibious demonstrations were further 
reinforced by PSYOP leaflets showing a tidal wave shaped like a Marine washing over 
Iraqi soldiers.354 On the morning of 24 February, SEAL Task Force Mimke conducted an 
amphibious feint, supported by naval gunfire, to reinforce the threat of landings in order 
to prevent the reallocation of the Iraqi divisions on the coast.355 
The deception operations may have worked a little too effectively. When the 1st 
Cavalry Division launched its feint on 24 February through Wadi Al Batin, it met little 
resistance. The Joint Forces Command East and I Marine Expeditionary Force similarly 
met little resistance along the coast. The Iraqi forces were so concerned with being 
flanked by an amphibious landing they had withdrawn forty kilometers north. The quick 
advance of these forces necessitated the launch of the Hail Mary eighteen hours early. 
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The rapid withdraw of Iraqi forces and the resultant rapid advance of Coalition forces 
into Kuwait sufficiently upset the operation’s synchronization that Schwarzkopf and his 
ground commanders were forced to sacrifice some initiative in order to reset 
synchronization.356  
 
Deception Objective (DO) Iraqi forces concentrate away from “Hail Mary” flanking movement 
Deception Target Saddam 
Deception Story (THINK) Coalition main effort will come through Wadi Al Batin with 
supporting amphibious landing 
Deception Events (SEE) Demonstration – 1st Cavalry Division entry into Wadi Al Batin 
Demonstration – II Marine Expeditionary Force’s amphibious 
training 
Demonstration – Training facilities in the assembly areas 
Disinformation – PSYOP using amphibious imagery 
Portrayal – Radio traffic of XVIII Corps 
Blending – Radio silence by XVIII Corps 
Termination Trigger On order 
Table 23.   Deception Analysis of Operation DESERT STORM 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by 
falsehood… we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 
‘honesty is the best policy,’ and that truth always wins in the long run. 
These pretty little sentences do well for a child’s copy-book, but the man 
who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword forever. 
 – Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley357 
A. CONCLUSION 
Deception has demonstrated its utility in the exercise of war since the dawn of 
recorded history. Even within the more limited scope of U.S. Army operations, deception 
has proven its worth time and again, from helping to save the Continental Army from 
sure destruction during the Revolutionary War to assisting in the rapid and complete 
defeat of a numerically superior foe during Operation DESERT STORM. Likewise, 
deception has proven its worth against conventional foes such as the German and Iraqi 
Armies, and against irregular foes like the Viet Cong and the Philippine insurgents. 
Given the demonstrated worth of deception across the spectrum of operations and against 
myriad opponents, it is unacceptable to see the lack of emphasis given deception in 
current Army doctrine. 
The level of emphasis of deception within U.S. Army doctrine has waxed and 
waned between 1905 and 2012. A number of explanations for this fluctuation have been 
presented, e.g., morality, the American style of war, and a professional officer class. The 
fluctuation is perhaps best explained by the perceived balance of power with the nation’s 
adversaries and the resultant leaning towards either the cumulative destruction or 
systemic disruption styles of war. When the U.S. Army perceives it has a force 
advantage—as has been the case since the end of the Cold War—then weight is given 
towards cumulative destruction, while systemic disruption and deception wanes. 
Conversely, when the U.S. Army perceives a force disadvantage—as was the case during 
World War II and the period of the 1970s through Operation DESERT STORM—then 
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weight is given systemic disruption and deception, while cumulative destruction wanes. 
If this is indeed the case, then the emerging era of austerity and economy of force roles 
would seem to suggest a shift towards systemic disruption and with it deception is in the 
offing. Furthermore, since balance of power ratios are essentially meaningless against 
adversaries relying on heavily systemic disruption approaches—e.g., Al Qaeda and other 
non-state actors—deception would appear to be of increased utility. However, the most 
recent capstone doctrine publications ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 between them have a 
single bullet point mentioning deception without elaboration.358 As the U.S. Army seeks 
to do more with less, it must take to heart Whaley’s observation about the cost of 
deception: 
Stratagem is cheap. It requires a very small initial investment of men and 
materiel. Effective stratagem can be the part-time work of only one man, 
particularly if he is the commander. And the most elaborate of such 
operations involved only diverting for a few weeks the services of several 
hundred men, a dozen or so small boats, a few aircraft, a fair amount of 
radio and other electronic gear, some wood, canvas, and paint, and bits of 
aluminum scrap. None of this was permanently lost to inventory, except 
the aluminum.359 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
What follows are some recommendations the U.S. Army should adopt to address 
the current shortfall of deception emphasis within doctrine and operations. These 
recommendations are an economy of force middle ground between the current doing 
nothing, and the actions of a resource rich U.S. Army. If resources and personnel were as 
effectively unlimited as they were in World War II, these recommendations would 
include a call for purpose built deception support battalions—modern versions of 23rd 
Headquarters Special Troops. However, this recommendation is unfeasible in the current 
fiscal and force cap environment, thus the recommendations focus on increasing the 
capabilities of existing units and personnel. 
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1. Doctrine 
“Capstone doctrine establishes the Army’s view of the nature of operations, the 
fundamentals by which Army forces conduct operations, and the methods by which 
commanders exercise mission command;” therefore, in order for deception to be fully 
integrated into U.S. Army operations, deception must be fully integrated into U.S. Army 
doctrine.360 The current single bullet guidance in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 
3-0: Unified Combat Operations of “conduct military deception” without further 
elaboration must change to something along the lines of the guidance in FM 100-5 
(1954), which stated: “It is imperative that commanders constantly realize the importance 
of combat deception and that they train their troops and staff in the techniques and 
planning for combat deception.”361  
To achieve full integration of deception within Army doctrine, an office dedicated 
to the proponency of military deception must be created at either the Mission Command 
Center of Excellence or the Special Warfare Center and School. The office must have the 
single mission of proponency for deception, because prior history indicates that deception 
suffers when it is a secondary task. This office must have the mandate for active military 
deception and coordination authority with the proponents for the cover aspects of 
deception, e.g., camouflage, OPSEC, and counterintelligence. In addition to coordination 
authority, the deception office must be incorporated into the approval process for doctrine 
related to the covering aspects of deception so as to ensure unity of effort in the 
presentation of deception doctrine. Finally, all formal education on active deception must 
be either consolidated under the auspices of, or the programs of instruction approved by, 
the deception office; again to ensure unity of effort and message. 
In the development of deception doctrine, the focus should be on theory with 
illustrative examples illuminating the theory in an operational context. The purpose of the 
doctrine should be to spark creative thought on how deception might be practiced, not to 
dictate how deception is practiced. Additional emphasis should be given to the 
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information requirements needed to develop a full understanding of the target. Particular 
care must be taken to ensure that doctrine does no prescribe particular techniques or 
template approaches; a doctrinaire or dogmatic approach would create the potential 
disastrous situation of predictable deception. 
2. Leadership, Education, and Training 
Integration of deception into U.S. Army operations demands that leaders embrace 
the potential of deception as part every operation. There are two ways to inculcate a 
respect for the utility of deception in leaders. First is for senior leaders at the upper 
echelons of the U.S. Army to direct deception integration into all training operations as a 
forcing function, especially at the combined arms training centers. Commanders who are 
accustomed to integrating deception into field training exercises beginning during the 
formative stages of their careers will be more apt to integrate deception into actual 
operations. Care must be exercised to ensure that the integration of deception into 
training does not degenerate into a templated, predictable process, as the use of variety is 
an essential factor in deception success. 
Second is for leaders at the lowest echelon practical to receive formal education in 
deception (Table 24). As the earlier a leader is trained and aware of the utility of 
deception the more likely deception will be integrated into the leader’s planning 
methodology. Additionally, the educating and implementing at the lowest levels helps to 
ensure that as personnel advance, their experience with deception advances as well. If 
company commanders receive formal education on deception, then as they move up into 
senior leadership and staff positions they will carry the education with them, so that the 
majority of staff members from battalion and up will have training and experience in 
deception. The combination of the top down forcing function coupled with the bottom up 
education will serve to inculcate the idea of deception in the force more thoroughly than 
either approach by itself. This will help to bring the situation described in 1941 Field 
Service Regulations of Operations to fruition:  
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A commander who is ingenious and resourceful in the use of tactical 
strategems [sic] and ruses often will find methods of deceiving or 
misleading the enemy and of concealing his own intentions.362 
As with deception doctrine, formal deception education should focus on the 
theory of deception, especially the target’s decision-making process, and the concepts of 
biases, schemata, and heuristics. In addition to theory, formal education should include an 
emphasis on the information requirements for profiling potential targets. Illustrative 
examples drawn from prior uses of deception should be used to illuminate the theory 
within an operational context, but not as examples of “how to conduct” deception. What 
must be avoided in the formal education are any deception planning templates or guides 
that could result in a dogmatic approach to deception. 
Organization Echelon Minimum Optimum  









MISO OIC / NCOIC 
Inform and Influence OIC 




Command Sergeant Major 
S3/S2 NCOICs 
Inform and Influence OIC 
MISO NCOIC 
 Company Commander First Sergeant 
Platoon Leaders 
Platoon Sergeants 




Battalion Operations Warrant 
Assistant S3 / S2 
Command Sergeant Major 
S3/S2 NCOICs 






















Command Sergeant Major 
S3/S2 NCOICs 
 Company Commander First Sergeant 
 Detachment OIC NCOIC 
 Team NCOIC  
Table 24.   Recommended Personnel for Formal Deception Education 
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3. Personnel Selection 
The personnel holding the positions in Table 24 are the recommended recipients 
of formal deception education; however, this should not be interpreted as saying these 
personnel are the only ones involved in deception planning. Depending on the deception 
plan, other personnel may be needed, e.g., developing a notional order of battle will 
require a witting actor in the personnel section. Additionally, the fact a person occupies a 
position indicated in Table 24 does not imply the person is cut out for deception 
planning; more important than either the rank or the position are the personal 
characteristics of a deception planner. Deception planning requires a certain type of 
strategic thinker who has initiative and is creative, intelligent, mentally agile, and security 
conscious. A deception planner does not need to be “immoral” or “morally flexible;” 
rather, a planner needs to be able to set aside personal considerations for the 
accomplishment of the mission. Lieutenant Colonel Simenson, the operations officer for 
23rd Headquarters Special Troops, was personally against the use of deception, but he 
did not let his personal feelings interfere with the mission.363 That said, a person who is 
unable to set aside personal feelings on deception is best left as an unwitting actor. 
A commander may feel the need to reach outside his staff for the best candidate; 
much like General Wavell requested Dudley Clarke by name to head up British deception 
efforts in North Africa during World War II.364 Regardless of whom the commander 
chooses to lead his deception planning, the planner must be assigned to the unit. It is 
unrealistic and counterproductive to expect an outside element to assume deception 
planning for a unit. First, delegating responsibility to an outside element undermines the 
integration of deception into unit training and operations; when the outside element is not 
present during routine field training exercises neither is deception. Second, attaching a 
deception planning function serves to inhibit the growth of an organic capacity for 
deception within the unit by absolving the supported commander and staff of the 
planning responsibility. The commander responsible for the overall mission must also 
plan and execute the supporting deception stratagem. 
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4. Facilities 
Deception planning requires a segregated facility in order to control access to the 
deception plan. The segregated facility can be as simple as a lockable room to secure 
compartmentalized information. The critical requirement is that the facility is 
commensurate with the level of classification of the plan and supporting resources. At the 
same time, the deception planner cannot work in complete isolation from the rest of plans 
and operations. In order to ensure the deception plan is fully nested in the supported plan, 
the deception planner must also be physically integrated into overall operations planning, 
and therefore also needs to have a space that is connected to the plans space.  
C. FINAL NOTE 
As a final word of caution, the deception practitioner must remember that the past 
is a guide not a blueprint. As Roger Hesketh notes in his report on Operation FORTITUDE: 
“It is always unsafe to apply too literally the experiences of one war to the changed 
circumstances of another.”365 A good example of a historic technique which may no 
longer be appropriate is the use of troops to convey disinformation as prisoners. 
Magruder used troops portraying deserters to convey disinformation to McClellan; this 
tactic would be rightfully unacceptable today for U.S. planners—though interrogators 
must still watch for this deception in use by our adversaries.366 Likewise, the use of a 
corpse as the central prop in Operation MINCEMEAT might have trouble making it through 
legal review today, or more importantly, the target’s forensic capabilities. And the 
deliberate use of the press to convey disinformation as was the case with Operation 
WEDLOCK would surely cause significant blowback today. 367 This is not to say that these 
techniques cannot be adapted for use in the current operational environment; rather, that 
historic examples of deception must be adapted for usage in the current operating 
environment, with careful consideration given to the changes since the time the deception 
was executed. 
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